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The Body in French Queer Thought from Wittig to Preciado: Queer Permeability 
The emergence of queer theory in France offers an opportunity to re-evaluate the state of 
queer thought more widely: what matters to queer theory today? The energy of queer 
thinking in France – grounded in activist groups and galvanised by recent hostility 
towards same-sex marriage and gay parenting – has re-ignited queer debates. This book 
identifies a common concern in French queer works for the materiality of the body, and 
argues for a return to the body as fundamental to queer thought and politics, from HIV 
onwards. Examining Paul B. Preciado’s experimentation with theory and pharmaceutical 
testosterone; Monique Wittig’s exploration of the body through radically innovative 
language; and, finally, the surgical performances of French artist ORLAN’s ‘Art 
Charnel’, this book asks how we are able to account for the material body in philosophy, 
literature and visual image.  
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Introduction 
 
 
the full sense of the flesh of it ... 
David Wojnarowicz, Close to the Knives (1991) 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]  
La Pudeur ou l’Impudeur [Shame and Pride], Hervé Guibert (1991) 
Copyright Photo Christine Guibert La Pudeur ou L’Impudeur. 
 
 
 
What makes the materiality of the body so vital to queer theory? Surely, in 
part, it is that the roots of queer politics and theory in the US are inseparable 
from the political response to the AIDS crisis. Queer thought emerged from a 
consciousness of the material vulnerability of certain bodies at risk of 
contracting the virus; bodies deemed disposable by the state.i The opening lines 
of French writer Hervé Guibert’s Le Protocole compassionnel [The 
compassion protocol] (1991) display the carnal realities of the author’s body as 
it is ravaged by the effects of the HIV virus.ii Guibert’s body does not fade with 
his illness: while he writes of witnessing ‘nouvelles absences de chair’ [‘new 
losses of flesh’] (18), corporeality is rendered sharply in focus in his writing, 
taking centre stage as the virus transforms his body, in turn transforming his 
daily realities and changing how he is able to move, to wash, or to look at his 
body in a mirror. It is not only the body’s image that is made evident; where so 
 2 
often the body’s materiality remains unacknowledged and overlooked, in 
Guibert’s work it is this materiality that becomes pivotal as the effects of a 
virus attaching to his body’s cells, multiplying and attacking his immune 
function, become central and undeniable. Nevertheless, Guibert’s description 
of this bodily reality in his text appears frustrated: while carnal realities 
overtake his everyday life, even his sense of self, he appears aware of the 
difficulty – the impossibility, even – of presenting this to his readers fully. It is 
to visual work that Guibert turns, and in the opening minutes of his short film 
La Pudeur ou l’Impudeur (1991a),iii Guibert records himself standing naked in 
front of a mirror. Over these frames, he reads lines from Le Protocole 
compassionnel, as if supplementing his words with the visual image of his now 
emaciated body, perhaps even depicting a thwarted attempt to display his body 
‘laid bare’, or to present it fully.  
The work of the American writer and artist David Wojnarowicz 
similarly uses both text and visual image to present the experience of living in 
or as a body with HIV. He writes in Close to the Knives (1991) of his use of 
Super 8 film to attempt to show the material realities of HIV/AIDS. Filming 
the body of his friend Peter Hujar immediately after his death seems to him to 
capture ‘the full sense of the flesh of it’, the image ‘printed on celluloid on the 
back of my eyes’ (102). In another work, Memories that Smell like Gasoline 
(1992), Wojnarowicz describes wanting to show a Super 8 film (perhaps this 
same film) of a friend’s dying face, to project in a hospital ward – a political 
effort certainly as much as it was aesthetic, and an attempt to show the reality 
of the AIDS epidemic (48). 
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The works of both Guibert and Wojnarowicz emphasise the necessity of 
presenting the material body in all its vulnerability – of recognising the 
vulnerability of particular bodies – as vital to queer politics and thought. Their 
works also repeatedly show the frustration of attempts to express this 
materiality, both in visual image and in writing. What can be made of 
Wojnarowicz’s sense of the immediacy of visual imagery over writing in 
conveying materiality? If the material vulnerabilities of marginalised and 
abjected bodies, as well as the carnality of sex and disease are foundational to 
queer thought, how is queer theory (and philosophical or theoretical writing 
more broadly) able to account for the body? The French context, I will argue – 
through its literary, artistic and philosophical expressions – is particularly well-
placed to reassess the direction of queer thought on the body.  
Despite queer theory’s association with the material body through its 
roots in the AIDS crisis, it has since been criticised for failing to take account 
of this materiality. Leo Bersani’s Homos (1996) highlights the elision of sex in 
the work of Judith Butler,iv and raises the concern that ‘when we speak of gay 
rights, we are speaking of rights for men whose primary erotic pleasure is taken 
from the bodies of other men, and for women whose primary erotic pleasure is 
taken from the bodies of other women’ (58). Tim Dean has more recently made 
the similar point that ‘it is striking how quickly the intractable materiality of 
sex drops out of the discourses of queer critique, in favour of other issues’ 
(2012: 430). From the emerging field of transgender studies, Jay Prosser in 
Second Skins (1998) and Vivien K Namaste in Invisible Lives (2000) have also 
charged Butler’s inaugural work of queer thought, Gender Trouble (1990), on 
this count specifically in relation to transgender and transsexual bodies. Both 
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argue that queer theory’s poststructuralist roots in the work of French thinkers 
such as Lacan, Derrida and Foucault render it incapable of taking account of 
the material body. New materialist thinkers, in particular Karen Barad (2003, 
2007), argue similarly. How did queer theory, at its roots politically invested in 
expressing the material realities of bodies, fail to do so? Can such a failure be 
understood as a result of queer thought’s foundations in French 
poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theory, or rather as a result of the 
fundamental impossibility of representing the body? 
If this French theoretical tradition was central to the birth of queer 
theory in the US – and potentially also to its flawed approach to the body – the 
recent wave of queer expression in the French context also offers ways to 
explore this problem. This book identifies a common concern in French queer 
works for the materiality of the body, arguing for a return to the material and to 
bodily matters as fundamental to queer thought and politics from HIV onwards. 
Examining the ‘embodied philosophy’ of Preciado’s experimentation with 
theory and pharmaceutical testosterone; Monique Wittig’s exploration of the 
body through radically innovative language; and, finally, the surgical 
performances of French artist ORLAN’s ‘Art Charnel’, I ask how we are able 
to account for the material body in philosophy, literature and through 
performance and visual image. 
 
A new wave of French queer thought  
The specific French political and theoretical context is key to the vitality and 
energy of queer thought emerging from France. The development of queer 
studies in France within activist groups from the mid 1990s onwards, a political 
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climate hostile to gay marriage and ‘gender theory’ and the specific theoretical 
legacy in France – already foundational to Anglophone queer thought, from 
Lacan to Derrida – make the recent development of queer theory in France 
unique.  
This charged environment has cultivated theoretical developments that 
demand questions of the queer project globally: what matters to queer theory 
today, given the increasingly globalized traffic of ideas and the rapid 
institutionalization of queer thought in the Anglophone world? How does its 
translation into another cultural and political context expose its universalist 
tendencies? French queer theory has emerged already informed by the 
interventions from transgender theorists (Prosser; Namaste) into early queer 
thought. As a result, French queer thought combines insights from activist 
praxis as well as queer, transgender and feminist theory, responding by creating 
work that confronts the body; addressing the points of convergence between 
theory, philosophy and bodies; as well as the tensions, possibilities and 
limitations of this engagement.  
The specificities of French queer thought are inextricably linked to the 
marginal position of queer theory in France. Queer thinking is still embedded 
in activism rather than entrenched in universities as it increasingly is in the US 
and the UK. This lends French queer texts a particular political focus and 
dynamism, influencing their style (often unconventional in terms of language, 
register or genre).v Queer work emerging from France from the beginning of 
the 21st century remains marginal to Anglophone queer studies, despite Paul B 
Preciado’s Testo Junkie (2008) receiving widespread critical acclaim. 
Referenced by queer heavyweights such as Tim Dean (2015) and Jasbir Puar 
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(2015), Dean describes it as ‘the most important work of queer theory to appear 
in the last decade; those who have pronounced queer theory dead are in for a 
surprise when they read it’ (237). Dean’s remarks pick up on the extraordinary 
energy and pace of Preciado’s experimental text, which in my view is related to 
this unique theoretical and political context from which queer theory in France 
has emerged. 
Rather than simply absorbing the lessons of US queer theory or even 
becoming the partner in a debate, French queer theory has its own specificities 
that are inseparable from the political, theoretical and historical context of 
France. While queer theory has exploded in the Anglophone academy, its 
translation into the French language and context has been difficult. As James 
Agar notes, while  
 
the emergence of queer theory is indissociable from the start of the 
second decade of the AIDS pandemic in America […] the situation in 
France is more complicated. France was a very fertile culture for the 
epidemiological spread of HIV and yet remained until very recently a 
barren ground for the flourishing of queer theory. (2011: 64) 
 
Despite being one of the most cited works in the Anglophone world and 
perhaps the best-known work of queer theory, it took over fifteen years for 
Butler’s Gender Trouble to appear in French (its translation by an American 
philosopher, Cynthia Kraus, was published in 2006). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 
seminal Epistemology of the Closet (1990) took even longer to be published in 
French translation, not appearing until 2005. A leading figure of queer thought 
 7 
in France, sociologist Sam Bourcier, writes that ‘la situation de l’univers 
référentiel et intellectuel français est pathétique. Il y a bien longtemps que 
l’intégralité des œuvres d’Haraway ou de Butler a été traduite chez nos voisins 
européens’ [The French context, referential and intellectual, is in a pathetic 
state. The entire works of Haraway or Butler have long since appeared in 
translation amongst our European neighbours] (Haraway, 2009: 9).  
Such delays in the official publication of queer works meant that ad-hoc 
French translations appeared, produced notably by the collective le Zoo. This 
group was comprised of a number of academics including Bourcier, Preciado, 
Marco Dell’Omodarme and Catherine Deschamps, but it was also an activist 
collective. Its ‘seminars’, later published as Q comme Queer: les séminaires Q 
du Zoo (1996 - 1997) [Q like Queer: the queer seminars of le Zoo], were not 
held at a university but at the Centre Gai et Lesbien de Paris (CGL). In 
contrast, Didier Eribon and Françoise Gaspard held seminars on the 
‘Sociologie des homosexualités’ from 1997 to 2004 at the École des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales (ÉHESS) in Paris, but while they invited a number 
of (mostly American) figures working in queer theory, their focus was on the 
development of gay studies rather than developing a specifically queer 
theoretical approach in France. Indeed, the ÉHESS seminars were the target of 
a ‘zap’ by members of le Zoo (including Bourcier, Dell’Omodarme and 
Maxime Cervulle and carried out under the name Panik Qulture) due to their 
difference in approach.vi  
Le Zoo considered their position outside of the academy to be an 
advantage: ‘en étant au CGL, on parle de dedans et pas de l’extérieur’ 
[‘situated at the CGL, we speak from within rather than from the outside’] 
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(Bourcier, 1998: 10). How should we understand this designation of university 
space in France as ‘exterior’ to critical thinking around minority genders and 
sexualities? While queer theory has become to a certain degree institutionalised 
in the US and to a lesser extent the UK, in France it remains marginal in 
universities and grandes écoles:vii a number of reasons begin to explain this 
notable absence.  
Firstly, the historian Régis Revenin (2012) identifies a 
‘monodisciplinarity’ in French universities that lies in tension with the often 
interdisciplinary nature of queer studies. Bourcier describes fields such as race 
studies, feminist, queer and trans studies as ‘des nouveaux objets/études qui 
menacent salutairement la répartition hexagonale des disciplines traditionelles’ 
[new objects/fields of study which advantageously threaten the very French 
separation of traditional disciplines] (2009: 10). Often gender is seen as a 
question for sociology rather than philosophy or the humanities, with a much 
stricter disciplinary divide than is seen in the UK or US.  
Secondly, while feminism has more often than not been allied to queer 
theory in the US and the UK, often being inextricable from it (Butler, of 
course, considers herself a feminist philosopher) and sharing a common aim in 
the deconstruction of gender and sexuality, Bourcier writes of a tension 
between feminism and queer theory in France. The psychoanalytic strand of 
feminism in France, espoused since the 1970s principally by ‘Psych et Po’ 
(Psychanalyse et Politique) and associated thinkers such as Hélène Cixous, 
Luce Irigaray and Antionette Fouque, tends towards an essentialising 
difference feminism, placing it in opposition to the constructivist aims of queer 
theory (2009: 8). On the other hand, Bourcier contends that materialist 
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feminism in France, dominated by the figure of Simone de Beauvoir and then 
Christine Delphy, does not consider culture surrounding minority sexualities as 
the proper place of resistance (2009: 8). Both strands of feminism share a form 
of toxic Republican universalism, ‘ce républicanisme ranci et cet universalisme 
arrogant rétifs aux logiques identitaires’ [this rancid Republicanism and 
arrogant universalism, blind to the logic of identity] (Bourcier, 2009: 8). 
This question of French Republican universalism recurs time and again 
in queer thinking around and emerging from France. Republican logic – that all 
citizens are equal in relation to the state – results in a ‘supposed blindness to all 
particularities, including of course sexual orientation’ (Robcis, 2004: 113). 
This ‘blindness’ is used to justify the refusal to acknowledge or address 
specific demographics and is fiercely antagonistic towards what it considers 
identitarian concerns.viii As Bourcier notes, in France, ‘universalism is sacred’ 
(2012: 234), and is evident in attitudes towards the study of minority 
sexualities (and gender) in universities. This attitude accuses queer theory as 
well as lesbian and gay studies of being communautariste [communitarian] 
(that is, of putting individual concerns before that of the ‘general’ community), 
minoritarian and even of creating academic ‘ghettos’. Queer, transgender and 
feminist studies are perceived as ‘mauvais sujets minoritaires’ [’bad’ 
minoritarian subjects], as ‘zones de savoirs interdites en France’ [zones of 
knowledge forbidden in France] (Bourcier, 2009: 10).  
Régis Revenin (2012: 170) and Camille Robcis (2015: 452) both note in 
particular the comments of Frédéric Martel, the author of Le Rose et le noir 
[The pink and the black] (1996), a history of homosexuality in France after 
1968. In an article for Le Monde in 1997, Martel expressed concern that LGBT 
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studies posed a danger to the university by subordinating it to the logic of the 
‘ghetto’. Rather than benefitting the university, some evidently see queer 
studies as a threat to it. This way of thinking espoused by Martel goes some 
way to explaining why le Zoo considered themselves outside the university, 
rendering it a space which pushes out thinking emerging from positions of 
difference in favour of universalism.   
 
French politics, gay marriage and ‘la théorie du genre’  
The rhetoric of Republican universalism is powerful, with far-reaching material 
consequences. Republican logic mobilised against the public display of 
religion, which effectively targets Muslim women almost exclusively,ix is the 
same logic that regarded HIV as a ‘private matter’ and delayed the government 
at the time from providing funding for research and targeted information 
campaigns directed at specific demographics (i.e. gay men).x  
Robcis understands French Republicanism as intertwined with the 
concept of the heterosexual family as a stable political unit allied to the state. 
She thus explains the fierce resistance in France to laws pertaining to 
reproductive rights, IVF, surrogacy and adoption outside of the (married) 
heterosexual unit (2004). Republican language was widely adopted by both 
sides of the same-sex marriage debate in France:  
 
choosing the name “Demonstration for All” – was a direct response to 
the embrace of republican universalism on the part of the promoters of 
the law. This was evident in the branding of the bill: a “marriage for 
all,” as opposed to a “gay marriage.” (Robcis, 2015: 452) 
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Homophobic and transphobic rhetoric was combined with nationalism, racism 
and the quintessentially French logic of the République in the coalition of 
voices under La Manif Pour Tous [Demonstration for All] and in the more 
militant Printemps Français [French Spring]. This former group united 
Catholic organisations, far-right groups and politicians of the Left who viewed 
gay marriage as contradicting the values of the Republic and therefore as anti-
French.xi The debate often focused on what was seen as the imperialist 
imposition of identitarian, individualist and neo-liberal American values and 
began to include, often bizarrely, popular opposition to a reductive 
misapprehension of queer theory and ‘la théorie du genre’.  
Placards and posters in the anti-gay marriage protests read ‘Non à la 
théorie du genre’ [No to gender theory] (Robcis, 2015: 896); ‘NON au 
GENDER! NON à l’enfant COBAYE’ [NO to GENDER! Children aren’t 
experiments] (897); ‘Pas touche à nos stereotypes de genre!’ [Hands off our 
gender stereotypes!] (898); and ‘Théorie du genre à l’école STOP’ [STOP 
gender theory in our schools] featuring a giant snail (an infamously 
hermaphroditic creature) about to trample a child. The Catholic Church 
mobilized the idea of gender theory as a threat, which alongside gay marriage 
would promote ‘reproductive technologies, surrogacy, transsexuality and 
masturbation, […] ultimately lead[ing] to the destruction of man and society’ 
(448). While these might seem to be examples of particularly extreme 
responses, similar arguments were repeated by medical professionals, 
mainstream politicians and academics in France.  
Rhetoric around ‘gender theory’ was often nationalist and racist. One 
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political video described the ‘“theory of gender” as an “ethnic theory seeking 
to legitimate homosexuality” and “the fruit of Jewish-American lesbians”’, 
while UMP politician and psychiatrist Nicolas Dhuicq compared gay parenting 
to terrorism (457, 450).xii Ironically, given Butler’s investment in French 
thinkers from Foucault to Lacan, campaign groups such as the ‘Observatoire de 
la Théorie du Genre’ [Observatory of Gender Theory] understand gender 
theory in specifically imperialist terms, as an invasion of France: ‘Longtemps 
cantonnée de l’autre côté de l’Atlantique, la théorie du genre a débarqué en 
France au début des années 2000’ [Long confined to the other side of the 
Atlantic, gender theory disembarked in France at the beginning of the 2000s] 
(Observatoire de la Théorie du Genre).xiii Even in universities ‘la théorie du 
genre’ is considered to be ‘un truc anglo-saxon ([…] un effet de l’impérialisme 
américain ou pire encore une inutile traduction)’ [something Anglo-Saxon 
([…] an effect of US Imperialism, or even worse, a useless translation], the 
fault of ‘le grand Satan butlérien’ [‘the great Butlerian Satan’] (Bourcier, 
2004). The notion of gay marriage – as well as what was perceived to be the 
associated demands of queer and gender theory – as un-French (as American, 
specifically) repeats the widespread and institutional view of AIDS ‘in the 
period 1980–1984 [...] as a quintessentially American concern’, again 
contributing to the French government’s disastrously slow response to the 
crisis (Agar, 2011: 64).xiv 
While it must be conceded that French demonstrations are generally 
larger and more colourful than British protests, the turnout to protests against 
the French law for same-sex marriage by French expatriates in London was 
significantly larger than any UK protest against the law proposing equal 
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marriage in Wales and England in 2013.xv France is often considered a much 
more liberal society than the US or the UK in its attitudes to sexuality, and 
even gender (consider the figure of the androgynous garçonne popularised by 
Jean Seberg and French New Wave cinema, or Yves Saint Laurent’s 
pioneering le smoking suit for women), but in reality this is often far from the 
case. Historically, laws against homosexuality were increasingly harsh in 
France in the period from the end of the second World War to 1968. Julian 
Jackson’s Living in Arcadia (2009) describes a tightening of laws against 
homosexuality in this period, contradicting the common assumption that legal 
restrictions against homosexuality were simply a hangover of the Vichy regime 
(and therefore another foreign imposition). Such laws included the 1949 
Prefectural ordinance making it illegal for two men to dance together in the city 
of Paris until the late 1960s (48). Obscenity laws were actively enforced later 
than is commonly thought in France, with the notable and high-profile 
prosecution of Sartre in 1971 (after he lent his name to a publication by Guy 
Hocquenghem and the Front Homosexuel D’Action Révolutionnaire 
[Homosexual Revolutionary Action Front] (FHAR) in the Maoist magazine 
TOUT!) as well as Félix Guattari in 1973 (as the editor of the journal 
Recherches, convicted of outraging public decency after his publication of the 
special issue, ‘Trois milliards de pervers’ [‘Three Billion Perverts’],xvi again 
containing texts by the FHAR).  
Until 1987 advertising condoms in France was illegal (Agar, 2011: 67). 
As of January 2019, IVF remains illegal for homosexual couples – a bioethics 
law from 1994 restricts la procréation médicalement assistée (PMA) to 
married, heterosexual couples with proven fertility problems. And until 
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October 2016, when the Assemblée Générale adopted new legislation, 
transgender people seeking to legally change their gender in France were 
expected to present documentation to a court proving medical sterilisation. 
These laws indicate the power relations between the state (through legal 
discourse, the political establishment and medical institutions) and particular, 
marginalised bodies. Requiring transgender individuals to undergo sterilization 
demonstrates a logic of amputation in order to protect the body politic: the 
particular, trans body must not reproduce, thereby contaminating the universal. 
French universalist ‘blindness’ towards minority sexualities was again 
emphasised after the mass shooting at a gay club in Florida in June 2016, with 
not one single national newspaper headline the following day mentioning the 
fact that the club was gay.xvii These realities facing LGBT individuals in France 
and the violent response to gay marriage give some idea as to the political 
climate from which queer theory in France has emerged.  
 
French Theory, praxis and the particular: a ‘queer made in France’ 
There is a strong tradition in France of theoretical writing bound up with 
politics and activism, from Sartre’s ‘committed’ writing, to that emerging from 
May ’68 and the feminist and gay activists of the time. Members of the 
Mouvement de Libération des Femmes [Women’s Liberation Movement] 
included Antoinette Fouque of ‘Psych et Po’, as well as Christine Delphy and 
Monique Wittig; the latter two founding the journal Questions Féministes in 
1977.xviii Thinking on sexuality in France is also indebted to social movements 
that mixed activism and reflective writing, including the review Arcadie 
headed by André Baudryxix and the FHAR, whose more vocal members 
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included Guy Hocquenghem, Daniel Guérin and Françoise d’Eaubonne. FHAR 
activists were also prolific authors, Hocquenghem theorizing sexuality in Le 
Désir homosexual [Homosexual Desire] (1972) and d’Eaubonne developing 
the beginnings of ecofeminism in Le feminisme ou la mort [Feminism or 
Death] (1974). Guérin published L’Anarchisme: de la doctrine à l’action 
[Anarchism: from doctrine to action] (1965) and Homosexualité et revolution 
[Homosexuality and Revolution] (1983). The group ‘Gouines Rouges’ [Red 
Dykes], of which Monique Wittig was a founder, emerged in 1971, partly as a 
result of the increasingly male-dominated meetings and publications of the 
FHAR.  
Quite opposed to the notion of queer theory’s translation into the 
French context as an imperialist imposition, or the import of already-formed 
ideas, French queer theory is the product of this specific political-theoretical 
heritage. Rather than a textbook ‘Queer 101’ for obedient French pupils, Q 
comme Queer offered a chance to consider how queer theory might emerge in 
this new national context: ‘ce que ce pourrait être en France…’ [what it could 
be in France] (11). The activists of le Zoo sought to ‘redéfinir en permanence 
ce que queer peut vouloir dire…’ [permanently redefine what queer could 
mean] (7). Insisting that a ‘queer made in France’ (56) will be a quite different 
prospect from US queer thought, le Zoo sought to return to the roots of queer 
theory, asking ‘Qu’est-ce qu’on jette? Qu’est-ce qu’on garde? Qu’est-ce qui 
nous sert?’ [‘What do we discard? What do we keep? What will serve our 
purposes?] (58). A decade later, Maxime Cervulle’s and Marco 
Dell’Omodarme’s ‘Épistémologies-caméléon’ [Chameleon Epistemologies] 
(2008) also took up the issue of what queer could mean in France, addressing 
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the French political context and universalism in particular. Rather than an 
example of intellectual colonisation, queer thought in France is a specific, 
particular incarnation produced within and as a result of the political and 
theoretical context outlined above. It is not a ‘subset’ of a global, universal 
queer theory, but – in its specificity – offers new perspectives and new 
possibilities for queer thinking more widely. 
Writing for Le Zoo, Catherine Deschamps maintained that queer 
thought should not be understood as static but rather as a strategy of resistance; 
as a result, queer thinking should cultivate different points of resistance in 
France than it would in the US (Bourcier, 1998: 58). In France, le Zoo points to 
anti-Arab racism in the context of France’s recent colonial history, popular 
support of an electorally successful far-right in the Front National, as well as 
resistance to a sanctified universalism and its refusal to recognise the particular 
– whether in relation to race, gender or sexuality. Given the Republican 
demand for minorities to remain invisible, the anti-identitarian injunction of 
queer theory holds a different political significance in France (Bourcier, 2008: 
109). As such, many queer activists in France use the in-your-face collocation 
of identity terms transpédégouine [transfaggotdyke].  
This attention to the specific material conditions within France exposes 
an unacknowledged universalism in Anglophone queer theory.  Following 
Wittig’s critique of universalism, Bourcier and Preciado both emphasise the 
consideration of the particular.xx Referencing Sandra Harding and Donna 
Haraway, Bourcier appeals to ‘savoirs situés’ [situated knowledge], 
underlining the specific rather than neutral position of the researcher (Haraway, 
2009: 14). He is concerned with his own ‘position dans une situation 
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d’énonciation spécifique’ [position as a specific site of enunciation] (2001: 65). 
As for le Zoo, the particular position is often expressed or explored through 
‘l’autoreprésentation’ [self-representation] (1998: 12): ‘le queer c’est alors la 
pratique d’identités différentes, un processus autobiographique’ [queer is thus 
the practice of different identities, an autobiographical process] (98).  
While Bourcier incorporates this principle into his methodology as a 
sociologist, refusing to occupy the position of neutral observer, Preciado 
interrogates his own embodied and particular position in his philosophical 
work. Turning to Preciado, Wittig and ORLAN, I ask how these authors and 
artists consider their own situated and particular bodies, as well as how they 
explore the layers of metaphor surrounding the body when negotiating its 
representation. 
 
Material Bodies and Queer Permeability 
Through the term ‘material’ body, I aim to consider bodies in all their 
physicality: their flesh, their cells and skin, their potential to feel pain, pleasure 
or to suffer violence. I understand bodies as emerging in relation to state and 
discursive power, the movements of capital, as well as viral epidemics, cultural 
productions and relations to others (as examples). In this sense, I draw on both 
the historical materialist and new materialist traditions, without remaining 
entirely faithful to either. None of this should suggest that I attempt to consider 
a ‘brute’ material body that is separate from discourse or language. The body is 
composed of layers of metaphor, as well as cells, skin and flesh – separating 
these out would be impossible.  
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With regards to HIV/AIDS, work by Douglas Crimp, Susan Sontag, 
Simon Watney and Leo Bersani elucidated the metaphors, discourses and 
ideologies surrounding the illness. Sontag’s attempts, however, to ‘abstain 
from or try to retire’  metaphors surrounding the body – a desire to strip the 
body of metaphor – contradict her much more persuasive assertion on the very 
same page that ‘one cannot think without metaphors’ (2002: 91), and later that 
‘metaphors cannot be distanced just by abstaining from them. They have to be 
exposed, criticized, belaboured, used up’ (179). Metaphor and discourse 
surrounding and producing bodies cannot be bypassed, but should be revealed 
and confronted. Along similar lines, Crimp insisted that ‘AIDS does not exist 
apart from the practices that conceptualize it, represent it, and respond to it’ 
(1988: 3). And for Watney, ‘AIDS is not only a medical crisis on an 
unparalleled scale, it involves a crisis of representation itself, a crisis over the 
entire framing of knowledge about the human body’ (1987a: 9). In this book, I 
turn to authors and artists who confront, reveal and respond to the metaphors 
and discursive processes that shape material bodies, and who speak – from a 
queer perspective – to this ‘crisis of representation’; a crisis of how we 
understand the human body. 
Queer Permeability seeks to take account of a reflexivity, a symbiosis 
between material body and language overlooked in much contemporary theory 
influenced by poststructuralism. It takes inspiration from new materialist 
scholarship seeking to affirm the complex, entangled relationship between 
material and cultural phenomenon. In an article analysing the event, context 
and ongoing effects of Hurricane Katrina, feminist new materialist Nancy 
Tuana writes that ‘in witnessing Katrina, the urgency of embracing an ontology 
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that rematerializes the social and takes seriously the agency of the natural is 
rendered apparent’ (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008: 188). As was evident in the 
AIDS crisis, Tuana emphasises that Katrina was not simply a natural disaster, 
but that human decision-making and cultural-economic phemomena were also 
key to shaping the catastrophe, from the warming of seawater in the Gulf of 
Mexico to forestation policy, and the construction and maintenance of levees.  
 Tuana uses metaphors of porousness and viscosity to emphasise 
indeterminacy and slippage between what we consider ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ 
phenomena: ‘Viscosity is neither fluid nor solid, but intermediate between 
them. Attention to the porosity of interactions helps to undermine the notion 
that distinctions […] signify a natural or unchanging boundary’ (193-4). Where 
Tuana’s model emphasises indeterminacy and porous borders, my work builds 
upon Preciado’s imagery of the absorption of testosterone gel into his skin to 
elucidate the notion of permeability, a transitive model signifying an 
overlapping of language, culture and materiality. Permeability does not simply 
allow for one ontologically distinct substance to pass through another leaving 
both intact, but rather refuses this ontological separation. It suggests 
absorption, secretion and a lively, interaction between language and matter that 
cannot be pulled apart but remains inseparable.   
Bringing the work of Preciado, Wittig and ORLAN together allows for 
the consideration of a number of different approaches to the material body: 
from philosophical writing to prose poetry, visual image to performance. 
ORLAN’s investment in utilising her own material body as well as her 
engagement with poststructuralism further sheds light on many of the questions 
raised by my discussion of Preciado and Wittig: in particular, the addition of 
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performance studies offers insight into Preciado’s use of his material body in 
his text as a kind of performance-within-writing.  
This book is committed to both the anti-identitarian impulse that 
inaugurated queer politics and the deep suspicion of universalism permeating 
French queer works. I explore work from a variety of situated positions (rather 
than ‘identities’), seeking to consider multiple differences and particularities. In 
contrast to universalising theoretical claims, this work is committed to 
particularity, seeking to situate the authors and artists it treats within a global 
framework. By examining them within the particular conditions that have led 
to the emergence of queer theory in France, I hope to elucidate the ways in 
which theory, literature and art emerge inextricable from the specific political 
and cultural climate that engenders them. Through the concept of queer 
permeability, I therefore make a claim for the transitivity of theoretical writing, 
emerging inseparable from particular political movements and conditions, and 
able to act materially on bodies. 
 
Chapter 1 returns to Descartes’s work to consider the conditions under which 
he is able to separate rational thought from material body. How has philosophy 
imposed limits upon our understanding of bodies? Moving to Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s engagement with this Cartesian separation of mind and body in Ego 
Sum (1979), as well as the more recent l’Intrus [The Intruder] (2000), I 
compare Nancy's approach to a recent pre-cursor of Descartes in the bodily 
philosophy of Montaigne. While Montaigne similarly involves his body in his 
philosophical thought, Nancy attempts to go further in his concept of writing as 
exscription, writing that is able to gesture towards the material body. Despite 
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this, discourse and matter remain ontologically separate, as I explore through 
Nancy’s concept of touch/separation with bodies as constituting the very limits 
between discourse and matter. It is this separation – from Descartes to Nancy 
and Butler – that subsequent authors and artists examined in the book react 
against. 
 
Chapter 2 considers Preciado’s insistence on a relational model of permeability 
between language and the material body. This model takes queer theory’s 
political and, vitally, bodily concerns into account. Preciado’s method of self-
experimentation with topical testosterone gel in Testo Junkie builds upon a 
Foucauldian understanding of biopolitics to consider the regulatory power of 
the pharmaceutical industry on sex and gender. The absorption of testosterone 
gel through Preciado's skin exemplifies the notion of permeability, signifying a 
symbiosis between texts and bodies informed by Donna Haraway’s work on 
prosthetics. According to this understanding, the body’s borders are lively and 
mutable, shifting to encompass texts and discourse. While Preciado offers 
textual incitements to perform bodily acts in his Manifeste contra-sexuel 
[Countersexual Manifesto], by taking testosterone he also brings a material 
intervention to language by incorporating it as part of his writing practice. 
Through this ‘self-experimentation’, Preciado attempts to break down the 
Cartesian tradition of philosophical writing by producing an ‘autotheory’ 
questioning the generic conventions and boundaries of theoretical writing.  
 
Given the concerns over queer thought’s ability to account for the material 
body, Chapter 3 looks back to the remarkable emphasis on material 
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corporeality in the work of Monique Wittig, the French feminist activist and 
writer of The Straight Mind (1991), foundational to Butler’s origination of 
queer theory. The resurgence of interest in Wittig’s work in queer circles in 
France is part of the desire to revisit queer theory’s roots, from Bourcier, 
Preciado and Cervulle, to Yannick Chevalier’s and Benoît Auclerc’s Lire 
Monique Wittig Aujourd Hui [Reading Monique Wittig Today] (2010). Butler's 
influential reading of Wittig rests, I argue, on a fundamental misapprehension 
of her ‘textual materialism’. Wittig emphasises the materiality of language 
itself on a monist account allowing discourse and matter to interact directly. 
This model allows Wittig to use writing itself as a political weapon. For Wittig, 
experimentation with literary form and creative metaphor can constitute a 
violent, material intervention, producing shocks and clearing ground for new 
possibilities. I consider how Wittig explores the materiality of language in 
Virgile, Non (1985), the progression of metaphors around the sexed body in 
Les Guérillières (1969) and, finally, the fantasy of reaching and resignifying a 
material, cellular corporeal depth through literature in Le Corps lesbien (1973).  
 
Chapter 4 turns to the work of the French performance artist ORLAN. 
Preciado’s project of administering testosterone recalls elements of visual and 
performance art; I explore points of comparison between ORLAN’s work and 
Preciado’s. Through ORLAN’s ‘Art Charnel’, I consider the specificity of 
performance as a potentially anti-universalist medium able to reconcile notions 
of authorial subject and bodily object. ORLAN's work interacts with various 
theoretical concepts through her body. Her series of nine filmed surgery-
performances for La Réincarnation de sainte Orlan (1990) and the sculpture 
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and photographic work produced alongside it explore the construction of sexed 
and gendered bodies. This work has led ORLAN to describe herself as ‘une 
transexuelle femme à femme’ and epitomises what Jay Prosser sees as 
poststructuralism (and queer theory)'s elision of the body, describing ORLAN’s 
work as the ‘insane personification of the poststructuralist insistence on the 
absolute constructedness of the body’ (1998: 62). In this chapter, I approach 
ORLAN's work through her repeated motif of the head, exploring firstly her 
anti-Cartesianism in the performance of Woman with Head at London's ICA in 
1996 and secondly the account of material sex offered by La tête de Méduse 
[Medusa’s Head] (1978). Finally, I consider the confrontation with the 
Lacanian Real symbolised by the repeated trope of the Death’s Head in 
Réincarnation as well as video works from Bien que... Oui mais [Although… 
Yes, but…] (2003) to Bump Load and Memento Mori (2013). 
 
This book asks substantial questions of the queer ‘project’: what does it mean 
outside of the national, cultural and linguistic context from which it emerged? 
How might we reconcile queer theory’s materialist, political concerns with its 
roots in poststructuralism and linguistic theory? Confronting the tensions 
between constructivist and essentialist accounts of sexed bodies, each of the 
authors and artists I discuss explore how we can begin to form a non-
essentialising, materialist account of the body vital to queer, feminist and 
transgender studies. Through their work, I consider the possibilities of 
addressing corporeality through theory, literary writing and performance and 
ask what can be learnt from work that pushes linguistic engagements with 
bodily matter and bodily responses to texts.  
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i See, for example, Bersani’s ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ (1987).  
ii Guibert was a well-known and prolific author and photographer, as well as a 
close friend of Michel Foucault. He died in 1991 after recording his 
increasingly painful battle with AIDS. 
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iii Screened after Guibert’s death on French television channel TF1.  
iv Bersani notes in particular Butler’s claim that what lesbians have in common 
is not a shared sexual identity or even a sexual practice but a common 
knowledge of homophobia (56). 
v There is something of a tradition of using of non-academic language in 
French theoretical work on sexuality, displayed in work from Deleuze and 
Guattari to Bataille or Guy Hocquenghem.  
vi See Perreau (2016: 89) for his take on this conflict. 
vii French Higher Education is comprised of public universities and selective 
institutions known as grandes écoles, whose students often feed into politics, 
the civil service and the education system. 
viii For Oliver Davis, ‘Republican universalism [refuses], as a matter of 
principle, to recognize the collective existence and identity of minority 
communities in their particularity’ (2015: 149).  Agar describes Republican 
universalism as a ‘tradition [...] which sees all as equal partners in the republic 
but which likewise tends not to recognize specific expressions of group 
difference such that universal inclusivity tends to exclude marginalized groups 
such as gays [...] France has difficulty in recognizing and sanctioning 
communities brought together through shared engagement in identity politics, a 
situation clearly evident in recent debates over the wearing of the veil’ (2011: 
64). 
ix Since 2004, pupils in French schools have been banned from ‘ostentatious’ 
displays of religion. This universal language masks the fact that in practice, the 
law has a particular target: Muslim girls who wear the veil. Equally the 2010 
 33 
																																																																																																																																																		
ban on ‘face coverings’ has almost exclusively affected Muslim women who 
wear the niquab.  
x See Boulé (2002: 11) for an overview.  
xi Resistance to gender theory in Europe is not limited to France, with the 
Vatican funding campaigns across the continent. Eva von Redecker describes a 
similar coalition of the Catholic church and the far-right nationalist group 
Pegida in Germany (2016), while Slavoj Žižek references opposition to gender 
theory in Slovenia, apparently there understood as a communist conspiracy to 
undermine societal values (2016). However, the particularities of French 
Republican opposition to gay marriage, which has garnered support from 
across the political spectrum, render the situation in France unique.  
xii The UMP (L’Union pour un mouvement populaire) was an ostensibly 
centre-right party, that of former Presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas 
Sarkozy. It was renamed Les Républicains in 2015.  
xiii This language echoes the Vatican’s idea of gay marriage as ideological 
colonisation as well as the association of effeminate gay men with treachery 
and cowardice in 1930s France (see Perreau 22; 58).  
xiv France had rates of HIV three times as high as those in the UK (Boulé, 
2002: 11), and was ‘notoriously slow in developing a public debate about 
HIV/AIDS, and [...] equally slow in developing integrated and coherent 
government policies and infrastructures to deal with the emerging epidemic’ 
(Agar, 2011: 64). 
xv The London protest against the French law organised by ‘La Manif pour 
Tous’ was attended by around 2000 people, the largest against the UK law was 
a reported 300 people at David Cameron’s constituency office in Witney (see 
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Philby, 2013). Admittedly, the ‘Coalition for Marriage’ (the main group 
opposing the law in the UK) appears to have focused more on lobbying and a 
petition, although this petition received less than 700,000 signatories – by some 
estimates around the same figure that turned out against gay marriage in Paris 
alone in May 2013. The focus on lobbying nevertheless shows a decidedly less 
militant and less violent response to same-sex marriage laws in the UK than in 
France.  
xvi See Nadaud on Guattari (2012: 298), and a discussion of the special issue 
and its place in contemporary activist memory.  
xvii See Nicolas Martin, ‘Tuerie d'Orlando: géométries variables’ (2016).  
xviii However, after a major split with Delphy over the specificities of lesbian 
sexuality in feminist thinking and politics, Wittig moved to the US and began 
to write in English, with her seminal work of collected essays The Straight 
Mind (1991) appearing in English. This represents for Bourcier the influence of 
‘heterofeminists’ in France, who see discussion of gender as indulgent, a 
distraction from ‘real’ issues of sexed oppression. Bourcier writes that the 
silencing of questions of minority genders and sexuality from feminist debates 
is a problem that still persists (2005: 189). Indeed, Delphy, who remains one of 
the most influential feminist academics in France, was a signatory to the 
statement released in 2013 and signed by a number of radical feminists mainly 
in France and the US: ‘Forbidden Discourse: The Silencing of Feminist 
Criticism of “Gender”’. This statement misgenders trans women by referring to 
them as men throughout and supports their exclusion from women-only spaces, 
understanding ‘gender theory’ as a fashionable, postmodern distraction from a 
singular understanding of women’s oppression along biologically essentialist 
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and binary lines (‘biological women are oppressed and exploited as a class by 
men and by capitalists due to their reproductive capacity’).  
xix See Jackson’s Living in Arcadia for a history of Arcadie.  
xx The ‘particular’ will be explored throughout this work, drawing on Wittig’s 
notion of the particular as opposed to the universal. Wittig is an important 
figure for both Bourcier (who translated in part Wittig’s collected essays, La 
Pensée straight [The Straight Mind] (2001)) and Preciado (who dedicated his 
Manifeste contra-sexuelle [Countersexual Manifesto] (2000) to her). Cervulle 
and Dell’Omodarme also note the influence of Wittig (2008: 41), and Cervulle 
maintains attention to materialist concerns through his translations and work on 
cultural studies and cultural materialism, particularly the work of the 
Birmingham School and Stuart Hall. 
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1  Bodies beyond Language or Reason: The legacy of Descartes’s 
Dualism in Poststructuralist accounts of the body  
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter considers the emergence of queer theory in France, through the 
activist group le Zoo, and work by Sam Bourcier and Paul B Preciado. These 
authors responded to Anglophone queer thought years after it had gained 
momentum in the US, and with the benefit of having the critiques of early 
queer thought available to them, in particular, those of transgender theorists Jay 
Prosser and Vivian K Namaste. Both Prosser and Namaste argued that queer 
thought – due to its poststructuralist, Lacanian roots – cannot take into account 
the materiality of the body. In response, embracing the material body becomes 
central to both Bourcier’s and Preciado’s queer works. This chapter 
interrogates the poststructuralist position of the material body as ‘beyond the 
reach’ of language, or as impermeable to language, drawing links between this 
and the Cartesian dualist position which also leaves the body beyond the reach 
of rationalist philosophy. The chapter outlines varying approaches to the body 
in the French context, not only from Descartes, but also the pre-Cartesian 
bodily philosophy of Montaigne, and the anti-Cartesian projects of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, and Jean-Luc Nancy’s work. It considers Nancy’s 
work, however, as paradigmatic of the poststructuralist position separating 
language entirely from (bodily) matter, and uses his work in Corpus (2000) and 
L’Intrus (2000) as a test case for assessing the concerns over 
poststructuralism’s ability to account for the body expressed by Prosser and 
Namaste.   
 
 
Is there something about the way we do philosophy that makes us forget our 
bodies? How might a departure from this philosophical mode affect attempts to 
reach the body? This chapter turns to a decisive moment in the body’s 
figuration within the Western philosophical canon, one that still has 
implications for theory today – that of Descartes’s famous cogito ergo sum: I 
think therefore I exist. Preparing the theoretical ground for the discussion of 
Preciado’s anti-Cartesian intervention in philosophy in my second chapter; 
Wittig’s critique of the separation of matter from writing and, finally, the 
interrogation of embodied subjectivity in ORLAN, I turn here to a 
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consideration of Descartes’s view of bodies, and to the place of his own body 
in particular within his philosophy: how is he able to distance himself from his 
body? I examine Descartes’s account alongside that of Montaigne’s, with these 
two writer’s contrasting views on the body and its place in philosophy 
representing a premodern manifestation of the same tensions regarding the 
body evident in theoretical work today. 
This chapter considers the Cartesian influence in Anglophone queer and 
constructivist thought via its roots in 20th-century French poststructuralism. I 
assess Judith Butler’s concerns over the lingering legacy of Cartesian dualism 
in contemporary poststructuralist and constructivist (including queer) theory, 
drawing a comparison between the elision of the body through Cartesian 
dualism and the side-lining of the body through what she terms a ‘linguistic 
monism’ in constructivist thought. Then, of the 20th-century French reactions 
against Cartesianism, I consider Jean-Luc Nancy’s in-depth engagement with 
Cartesian accounts of the body. Nancy offers a typically poststructuralist 
account of the interaction between the material body and writing, and his 
approach will be considered a ‘test case’ in assessing the criticisms of 
poststructuralism’s treatment of the body.  
 
Descartes’s disembodied philosophy  
Descartes’s announcement of the cogito – his claim that he exists because he is 
a thinking being – together with his substance dualism separating mind from 
body is seen as the key moment in Western thought at which the body is 
disavowed; divorced from human identity and subjectivity in favour of the 
mind. The reception of Descartes’s ideas and the legacy of his thought have 
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been understood as a major rift in how we have viewed our bodies and minds, 
how these interact and what this means for our sense of self. This was nowhere 
more true than in France, where Cartesian thought ‘became nationalistically 
enshrined in the French curriculum’ (Collins, 1998: 817).  
Explorations of subjectivity in French literature and philosophy often 
rework the cogito: from Camus’s ‘Je révolte donc nous sommes’ [I resist 
therefore we exist] (1951: 36), to Nancy’s Ego Sum, discussed below, to 
contemporary French queer writer Erik Rémès’s work Je bande donc je suis [I 
get hard therefore I exist] (1999).i The specific national context of France has 
affected the legacy of Cartesianism: Martin Jay has identified a difference in 
the cultural reception of Cartesian ideas in the Anglophone and Francophone 
worlds. In Downcast Eyes (1993), he argues that the work of Descartes was key 
in producing in France a culture of ‘ocularcentrism’; that is, the privileging of 
vision above other senses. Jay examines recent reactions against this in the 
critical engagement with vision in 20th-century French work, from Bataille and 
the Surrealists to Merleau-Ponty, Foucault and Lacan amongst others: 
 
The grip of modern ocularcentrism was perhaps nowhere as evident as 
in France […] No better evidence of its power can be offered than the 
stubborn hold Cartesian philosophy had on its major thinkers for so 
many years. (69)  
 
Just as this Cartesian heritage has affected the way vision has been approached 
critically in the French (in distinction to the Anglophone) context, the influence 
of Cartesian accounts of the body manifests differently in the Francophone 
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world, with a huge depth of theoretical and paraphilosophical writing 
challenging the dualist account.  
A less critical discussion of Descartes has persisted within Anglophone 
‘analytic’ philosophy, which has often elided the nuances of his original texts 
and ignored his anxious questioning of his conclusions. Gordon Baker and 
Katherine J. Morris use the term ‘Cartesian Legend’ to refer to ‘a fiction, if 
more of a superstition than a mistake’ (1996: 2); Lilli Alanen refers to the 
‘Myth of the Cartesian Myth’ (1989: 391), and Amélie Oskenberg Rorty writes 
of the ‘familiar caricature’ that ‘represents Descartes as having the grossly 
simplified, nearly grotesque features often attributed to Platonists who 
allegedly locate the source of confusion and error in the body, while treating 
the pure intellect as rational, truth-bound’ (1992: 371). Yet, she later adds, ‘like 
all caricatures, this gross distortion of Descartes’ views conveys some features 
of the original’ (371).  
Under which conditions could Descartes have imagined himself without 
a body? Descartes’s texts were much more nuanced than is often suggested, 
and he continually reworks and develops his position in ways that can appear 
contradictory. Upon closer examination of his texts, it is actually much harder 
for him to distance himself from his body than the ‘Cartesian Myth’ allows. He 
often ties himself in knots in considering his body and what it means to him. 
By returning to his original texts, though, it is clear that the seed of later 
distortions is present.  
Descartes’s inability to know bodies with complete certainty, and 
conversely, his wavering ability (or inability) to doubt them is one of the 
anxieties driving the Meditations [1641]. The difficulty of thinking and writing 
 39 
about the body is ever-present in Descartes’s work. The body, although not 
completely beyond reach, will always fall short of his very specific conditions 
for knowledge. In his Meditations on First Philosophy: in Which the Existence 
of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body are Demonstrated, 
Descartes wrote:  
 
whatever proof and argument I use, it must always come back to this, 
that only the things I conceive clearly and distinctly have the power to 
convince me completely. (147)ii 
 
For Descartes, the body will always fall short of being apprehended in thought; 
it will never be known ‘clearly and distinctly’. Clear and distinct principles 
include statements such as ‘I exist’ (the cogito), simple mathematical formulae, 
or truths of logical deduction. What is excluded would be entities such as 
bodies, the perception of which is supposedly less clear-cut. 
Descartes’s very philosophy – his rationalist epistemic standards – thus 
discounts knowledge of bodies, although he does not therefore conclude that 
bodies do not exist – in fact quite the opposite: ‘I thence conjecture that it is 
probable that bodies exist; but this is only a probability’ (152). Descartes’s 
position with regard to bodies is one of rather unsatisfying doubt; while we do 
not know bodies, we also cannot know that they do not exist. His question is 
not so much how far or in what way bodies can be known, but whether they 
can be known fully, according to his exacting epistemic standards. 
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In the opening pages of the Second Meditation, having previously 
dismissed his body, Descartes asks the rather anxious question ‘myself, then, at 
least am I not something?’ (103): 
 
I have already denied that I have any senses or any body. I hesitate, 
however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on body and 
sense that I cannot exist without them? (103) 
 
One aspect of Descartes’s problem is how we can have knowledge regarding 
the body that he believes can only be perceived as an image, or ‘idea’; how we 
can know the extended, material body beyond that, since ‘it is possible that all 
those images, and, in general, all the things one relates to the body, are nothing 
but dreams and chimera’ (102). As Martin Jay notes, Descartes prioritises a 
visual (‘ocularcentric’) engagement with the material world, and feels unable to 
differentiate between dreams and the images we perceive of material things 
(97). Descartes thus sets his rational thoughts apart from the material world 
through his epistemological structure: while we know these images must 
depend on something material, these material things are set apart from thoughts 
in how far we have access to them as ‘clear and distinct.’ Thus, having 
previously considered his body to be ‘perhaps [...] the whole of me’ (152), it is 
this inability (at least in this part of the text) to perceive the body in any more 
‘depth’ than an image (incidentally, the accusation Prosser levels at Butler and 
queer theory, to be discussed later) that leads him to dismiss his earlier 
understanding of himself as primarily a body and to write: ‘But what, then, am 
I? A thing that thinks’ (106).  
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In his Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher 
la vérité dans les sciences [Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting 
One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences] ([1637] 1943), written in 
French rather than Latin, Descartes ultimately sought through his rationalist 
principles to gain control over the unruly body, to ‘master nature’:  
 
au lieu de cette philosophie spéculative […], on en peut trouver une 
pratique, par laquelle, conaissant la force et les actions du feu, de l’eau, 
de l’air, des astres, des cieux et de tous les autres corps […] et ainsi 
nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature. (166, my 
emphasis)   
 
[in place of that speculative philosophy […], it is possible to find a 
practical philosophy, by means of which, knowing the force and the 
actions of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies 
that surround us […] and thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and 
possessors of nature (74)]iii   
 
 
Nature is presented here as object to be possessed, a force or tool to be 
harnessed. Descartes is the investigator, the scientist-subject who will carry out 
that study. Through his new method of deductive science, he seeks to be the 
‘master’ and ‘possessor’ of nature – this language most clearly setting up a 
distinction between himself as subject and nature as his object of study. 
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Through deductive science, Descartes sought to master the body he variously 
describes – in contrast to the soul – as deceptive, unclear and impermanent.   
In contrast to the Meditations, Descartes mentions his body very rarely 
in the Discours. One exception is an extended discussion of his study of the 
heart through his new deductive method, using rationalist principles to enhance 
the scientific understanding he would gain through simple empirical 
observation. Throughout the discussion, this bodily organ is imagined as an 
object. Descartes’s uses the heart of a large animal, which he describes as 
similar to a human heart. At first, the flow of blood to and from the organ leads 
Descartes to compare the arteries to branches of a tree: ‘la veine cave, qui est le 
principal réceptacle du sang, et comme le tronc de l’arbre dont toutes les autres 
veines du corps sont les branches’ [‘the vena cava, which is the principal 
receptacle of the blood, and which is like the trunk of a tree of which the other 
veins of the body are the branches’ (67)] (141). This heart – firstly distanced 
from the human subject by belonging to a non-human animal, is now compared 
to a non-sentient organism in the branches of a tree. Descartes’s second 
comparison sets the heart further away again from the human subject by 
comparing it to the machination of a clock:  
 
ce mouvement […] suit aussi nécessairement de la seule disposition des 
organes qu’on peut voir à l’oeil dans le coeur […] que fait celui d’un 
horloge, de la force, de la situation et de la figure de ses contrepoids et 
de ses roués. (145-6) 
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[this movement […] follows just as necessarily from the mere 
disposition of the organs that can be seen in the heart by the naked eye 
[…] as does the movement of a clock from the force, placement, and 
shape of its counterweights and wheels. (69)] 
 
 
It is now firmly imagined as an inanimate object, distanced from the sentient, 
rational and human scientist-subject.  
Descartes is then able to consider the whole human body as a superbly 
crafted machine:  
 
ceux qui, sachant combien de divers automates, ou machines 
mouvantes, l’industrie des hommes peut faire […] considéront ce corps 
comme une machine (154, my emphasis)  
 
[those who are cognizant of how many different automata or moving 
machines the ingenuity of men can make […] will regard this body as a 
machine (71)]  
 
 
He concludes that it is only through reason that we are able to recognise 
humans as distinct from automata. Irrational beings such as monkeys could be 
‘recreated’ as automata, indistinguishable from the real thing. Thus Descartes’s 
relegation of the body to machinery solidifies the supposedly unique nature of 
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humans amongst animals in their capacity for rational thought, an 
anthropocentric assertion of human sovereignty via rationalist principles.  
There are important material conditions for the kind of thought 
Descartes produces. He insists in both the Discours and the Meditations on 
solitude for his rationalist philosophical investigation. In the Discours, he 
writes of a desire to ‘m’éloigner de tous les lieux où je pouvais avoir des 
connaissances, et à me retirer ici [… où] j’ai pu vivre aussi solitaire et retiré 
que dans les déserts les plus écartés’ [take my leave of all those places where I 
might have acquaintances, and to retire here [… where] I have been able […] 
to live as solitary and as withdrawn a life as I could in the remotest deserts.’ 
(60)] (110). And in the Meditations:    
 
Now therefore, that my mind is free from all cares, and that I have 
obtained for myself assured leisure in peaceful solitude, I shall apply 
myself seriously and freely to the general destruction of my former 
opinions. (95) 
 
Descartes seeks out solitude; it seems to be a necessary condition for the 
philosophical projects he undertakes. This goes beyond a simple concern for 
free time and a lack of distractions as the necessary conditions for any writing 
project. In one his letters to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia,iv Descartes 
suggests it is necessary to the kind of thinking he is undertaking. While 
metaphysical meditation can lead us to understand the soul, in contrast:  
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en usant seulement de la vie et des conversations ordinaires, et en 
s’abstenant de méditer et d’étudier aux choses qui exercent 
l’imagination […] on apprend à concevoir l’union de l’âme et du corps. 
(1953: 1158)  
 
[in using only life and ordinary conversations and in abstaining from 
meditating and studying those things which exercise the imagination 
[…] we learn to conceive the union of the soul and the body. (Shapiro, 
2007: 70)] 
 
In order to appreciate the union between soul and body, Descartes expresses a 
necessity for relationality and conversation. He emphasises to Elisabeth the 
need to get away from meditation (by which he means rationalist philosophical 
thought) and to utilise ‘la vie’. All of these conditions – relational interaction, 
lived experience and a limiting of rationalist contemplation – are apparently 
necessary for an appreciation of the body and how it relates to what Descartes 
terms ‘soul’. One might then pose the following question: is rational 
philosophy fundamentally at odds with an understanding of the body? Is even 
an appreciation (let alone knowledge) of the body possible through this 
philosophical method?  
According to Alanen, the mind-body union has an ‘experiential, pre-
philosophical character’ (1996: 13) and ultimately, the letter to Elisabeth ‘can 
be seen […] as a recognition of the limits of rational knowledge and 
explanation and […] of the importance of daily experience, intercourse and 
action too often neglected by philosophers’ (14). Descartes frames his 
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argument as though rational thought and engaging in the world are almost like 
exercising two different faculties, producing knowledge of two different things 
(mind or body). Privileging one of these methods of investigation (solitary, 
rational thought) will surely then produce specific conclusions and biases. 
Ultimately, Descartes’s method of philosophical enquiry and the conditions for 
his investigation produce a kind of interiority that one can only conceive of in 
solitude.  
Where does this leave theory that seeks to involve itself in the world; 
what are the possibilities for an ‘engaged’ philosophy? Without wanting to 
suggest that Anglophone queer theory is entirely removed from either life or 
ordinary conversations, could a link be made between the increasing 
institutionalisation of queer theory, its distance from the experiential and 
activist concerns of groups such as ACT UP, and its neglect of material bodies? 
If so, could the way in which French queer theory has grown out of activist 
groups such as le Zoo offer a way to refocus upon the materiality of bodies? 
 
The Cartesian legacy in queer thought? Judith Butler and the ‘linguistic 
monism’ of French poststructuralism  
In current thinking, what is left of Descartes’s skepticism surrounding 
the body? What relevance does it have today for theorists, and queer theorists 
in particular? Judith Butler’s essay ‘How Can I Deny That These Hands and 
This Body are Mine?’ (1997) borrows its title from a line in Descartes’s 
Meditations (96). Butler explores Cartesian philosophy out of a concern that 
contemporary constructivism leaves the body in much the same position as 
Cartesian dualism did, even if by different means. The issue for constructivism 
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lies in the limitations of language in approaching the material body; Butler 
famously argues that language cannot tame the beast of the body – when one 
tries to approach the body in language it withdraws, and when one seeks to 
deny it, it rears back up to confront the reader, undeniable. The problem begins 
with the claim that what it is possible to know regarding the body can only be 
known through language; and it is of central importance here that, for Butler, 
the body can only be understood through language.  
Butler works within a theoretical context heavily informed by French 
poststructuralists (Lacan, Derrida, Foucault), one which not only centralises 
language as key to the formation of subjectivities and structures, but 
understands language as the symbolic framework through which alone we may 
access the world. While the body can only be accessed through language, 
Butler also insists that the body is not reducible to language; it is also 
comprised of ‘non-linguistic stuff’ (3). These ‘extra linguistic’ elements of the 
body will of course resist description through or by language (4). In short, ‘the 
body is only knowable through language’ though it ‘exceeds every possible 
linguistic effort of capture’; it is ‘given and withheld at the same time’ (4). 
Butler is ultimately concerned with the idea that language fails to fully grasp 
that which it names. We do not need to deny the material existence of a hand or 
body to seriously consider the question: how far are we able to approach the 
material body in language, and how far will it resist description or 
representation?  
In the passage from the Meditations Butler references in her paper’s 
title, Descartes seeks to reassure himself of the existence of his body, noting 
that only ‘insane persons’ could deny it (96). He asks: ‘how can I deny that 
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these hands and this body are mine?’ – how could he possibly deny the 
existence of his body, and the hands that wrote his sentence, putting ink to 
paper? Yet Butler argues that the doubt regarding his own body Descartes is 
seeking to dismiss here is in fact performed by the question itself. The ‘strange 
grammar’ of the question separates the ‘I’ (the grammatical subject) from the 
hands and body (the grammatical objects) (8). If they ‘belong to’ this ‘I’ they 
are relegated to mere property of a disembodied ‘I’ rather than being materially 
constitutive of it. Unsurprisingly adopting a linguistic focus, Butler suggests 
that even in a question that seeks to show the absurdity of those who doubt the 
body’s existence, Descartes’s grammar already performs the separation of the 
body from the self, a separation that will be explored and extended by 
Descartes later in his work.  
Conversely, when Descartes seeks to doubt his body in his writing, it 
refuses to fade away but is ever present within his language:  
 
when we consider Descartes’ efforts to think the mind apart from the 
body, we see that he cannot help but use certain bodily figures in 
describing the mind. The effort to excise the body fails because the 
body returns, spectrally, as a figural dimension of the text. (14) 
 
The examples she gives are of Descartes’s references to God ‘engraving’ a 
resolution into his mind, or his own ‘imprinting’ of a physical thought on his 
mind (14-15). Ultimately, Butler warns of the slipperiness of the physical body, 
which she argues can never be fully described, present or accounted for within 
writing. On Butler’s model, bodies always display a kind of linguistic 
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recalcitrance; jumping out from the page when we try to deny them, or drawing 
into the shadows when we try to elucidate them.  
While the de-centering of a rational, sovereign Cartesian subject has 
been a key concern for much poststructuralist and queer theorising, does the 
disavowal of the body persist? Butler notes the lingering suspicion with which 
the body is treated in constructivist theories, a suspicion resulting from 
concerns over language’s limited abilities to approach the material world. In 
fact, she claims at the very beginning of her paper that she has been driven to 
write the piece by criticism of constructivist positions’ stance on the question 
of what can and cannot be known regarding sexual difference.v The criticism 
holds that for constructivists, sexual difference is ‘culturally variable, or worse, 
discursively fabricated, as if it is all a matter of language’ (2). Butler, in part, 
mounts a defense against the accusation she feels has been leveled against her 
(an accusation repeated by Prosser); that of ‘having made the body less rather 
than more relevant’ (2). But referring again to her title, she writes: ‘these are, 
of course, Descartes’ words, but they could be ours or, indeed, mine, given the 
dilemmas posed by contemporary constructivism’ (2).  
A startling and uneasy comparison is therefore made between the body 
as figured by Descartes’s dualism and the body as figured by what Butler terms 
the ‘linguistic monism’ of contemporary constructivist positions. In much 
constructivist thought ‘language is said to fabricate or to figure the body, to 
produce or construct it, to constitute or to make it’ (3). This position ultimately 
elides the materiality of the body. That considerations of the body in 
contemporary constructivist theory could leave it in much the same place as 
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Descartes’s dualism is alarming for queer theory’s political and academic 
investment in marginalised bodies and bodily acts.  
If Cartesian philosophy leaves the body beyond the reach of knowledge 
as it will always remain unclear and indistinct, for constructivism, the material 
body is beyond the reach of language. Both positions ultimately leave the body 
unknowable: is this a symptom of the mode of philosophical writing within 
which Descartes worked and in which Butler remains? Butler is, of course, a 
philosopher – a professor of Rhetoric. In fact, the space and weight afforded in 
both their work to their own bodies, to bodily experience, is remarkably 
similar. Butler’s paper references the ways in which Descartes alludes to his 
body in the Meditations (memorably, sitting beside a fireplace, contemplating 
his limbs). Yet Butler echoes Descartes’s treatment of his body with that of her 
own within her paper; she recounts an anecdote in which she experiences 
sleeplessness and unease when watching a documentary containing the 
accusations levelled against constructivism referenced earlier. This bodily 
experience is brushed over as a mere introductory remark – her body is merely 
the setting for a philosophy exercised by the mind, in much the same way as 
Descartes’s. While Butler appears to be consciously riffing on Descartes’s use 
of his body as a setting for philosophy, the allusions she makes are 
telling. Butler does not seek to extricate herself from or surpass the kind of 
rational discourse Descartes worked within in the way that others, including 
Jean-Luc Nancy or Preciado have attempted.  
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Pre- and Anti-Cartesian approaches to the philosopher’s body: Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Michel de Montaigne  
If both Descartes and Butler acknowledge their bodies only as the setting for a 
philosophy of the mind, how does anti-Cartesian work respond to the problem 
of thinking the body? Principal examples of French thought reacting against the 
Cartesian view of bodies include Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
engagement with Descartes, the notion of a body-subject formed in opposition 
to the Cartesian cogito expressed in Phénoménologie de la 
Perception [Phenomenology of Perception] (1945);vi as well as Luce Irigaray’s 
Éthique de la différence sexuelle [An Ethics of Sexual Difference] (1984), 
which reacts against the elision of the feminine in Descartes’s work in order to 
elucidate a concept of sexed bodies. The most influential for Preciado’s 
exploration of the body include Deleuze’s and Guattari’s engagement with the 
radically connected body without organs in L’anti-Œdipe [Anti-Oedipus] 
(1972), which criticises the Cartesian nature of the subject as conceived by 
psychoanalysis; Foucault’s notion of ‘L’Homme-machine’ [man-as-machine], 
the body as an object of philosophical and medical knowledge expressed in 
Surveiller et Punir [Discipline and Punish] (1975); and finally Bataille’s anti-
Cartesian work in the review Acéphale (literally meaning ‘headless’), which is 
taken up by Preciado and discussed in the following chapter.  
Sara Ahmed’s work has taken up the phenomenological emphasis on 
‘the importance of lived experience […] and the role of repeated and habitual 
actions in shaping bodies and worlds’ (2006: 2) in the service of queer theory, 
particularly employing Merleau-Ponty’s description of ‘moments of 
disorientation’ provoked by bodily experience (4). However, since my concern 
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is with Anglophone queer theory’s French poststructuralist roots, I opt here to 
consider a typically poststructuralist example of the reaction against the 
Cartesian view of bodies in French thinker Jean-Luc Nancy’s work. Nancy 
responds directly and extensively to Descartes’s conception of bodies and his 
thinking of what constitutes a subject. While his conception of bodies and 
embodiment appears almost reactionary in its anti-Cartesianism, I argue that a 
lingering dualism regarding the interaction between language and the material 
body remains in his work, and I will use his work to pick apart the concerns 
over poststructuralist approaches to the body.  
 Nancy refers to ‘[le] vilain dualism cartésien, d’origine platonico-
chrétien’ [‘an ugly Cartesian dualism, Platonic and Christian in origin’ (2000a 
133)] that places body and soul in opposition. Preferring to use the plural 
bodies in an attempt to avoid appealing to idealist and universalist notions of 
‘The Body’, Nancy offers an understanding of bodies as limits, as taking place 
at the very borders between ‘le sens’ and matter.vii Bodies ‘happen’, for Nancy, 
where these two meet, where they press against each other. In Corpus, his most 
extensive work on the nature of bodies and how they interact with meaning, 
writing and each other, Nancy writes:  
 
Les corps n’ont lieu, ni dans le discours, ni dans la matière. Ils 
n’habitent ni ‘l’esprit’, ni ‘le corps’. Ils ont lieu à la limite, en tant que 
la limite – bord externe, fracture et intersection de l’étranger dans le 
continu du sens, dans le continu de la matière. (2000a: 16)  
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[Bodies don't take place in discourse or in matter. They don't inhabit 
"mind" or "body." They take place at the limit, qua limit: limit-external 
border, the fracture and intersection of anything foreign in a continuum 
of sense, a continuum of matter. (2008: 17)]  
 
It is clear that Nancy’s conception of bodies owes much to his reading of 
Descartes, reacting against it by uniting what Cartesian substance dualism 
renders as distinct.  
Nancy returns to Descartes’s work to expose the contradictions of 
dismissing one’s own body, and his method is often to twist Cartesian 
philosophy, to focus on its inconsistencies or even to ventriloquise Descartes 
himself either to emphasise the ambiguity already present in Descartes’s work 
itself or to openly contradict Cartesian principles. While in the final essay of 
Ego Sum, ‘Unum Quid’, Nancy gives a clear summary of the complexities with 
which Descartes firstly dismisses his body and then insists on a union between 
body and soul, Nancy manages to find a way to locate his own view of the 
body as already present within Descartes’s works. For instance, he refers to 
Descartes’s letter to Elisabeth to conclude that ‘Le sujet n’est rien que 
l’expérience de l’unum quid’ [the subject is nothing other than the experience 
of unum quid] (159) – unum quid, meaning something that is one, a unification 
rather than separation, and referring here to the union of body and mind.  
In a particularly odd essay from Ego Sum, ‘Dum Scribo’, Nancy even 
goes as far as to ventriloquise Descartes, writing in his voice, and announcing 
that ‘Nulle pensée n’est plus matérielle que la mienne’ (47) [‘No thought is 
more material than my own’], fantasizing about the potential for his (this 
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imagined Descartes’s) own writing, his philosophy, to be inextricable from his 
body: 
 
 je fantasme tout mon corps comme une plume: mon corps – par moi-
même manié, entre mes doigts, corps dactylographique – se meut du 
mouvement des caractères. (53) 
 
[I fantasise of my body as a quill: my body – manipulated by myself, 
between my fingers, a typed-out body – moves itself with each letter] 
 
This ventriloquised Descartes begins to espouse the kind of writing on the body 
Nancy produced in Corpus, openly contradicting Descartes’s own work. Nancy 
engages with Descartes’s writing on the body sometimes to expose the 
complexities of his position, sometimes to pounce on and embrace its 
contradictions and at other times simply to contradict his arguments. His 
reading of Descartes is persistently perverse, but is of course rendered possible 
by the tensions and ambiguities that are already present within the works he 
discusses.  
Nancy pinpoints Descartes’s cogito claim as the Heideggerian 
subjectum, the very foundation of subjectivity (1979: 27-8). His work in Ego 
Sum is dedicated to a typically poststructuralist attack on the certainty 
Descartes sought in his cogito, by exposing it as an empty mask with nothing 
(or nobody) behind it. Nancy’s work often relies on metaphor and imagery to 
gesture towards particularly weighty terms – Ian James thus refers to Nancy’s 
work as a ‘figural praxis’ (2006: 64). In Ego Sum, Nancy employs such 
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imagery to force the Cartesian cogito back to the level of the body. He 
imagines the ‘empty mask’ firstly as an eye, the pupil of which symbolizes 
emptiness beyond its surface (83, 90). Later, he imagines this cogito as a 
mouth, its lips forming a circle to pronounce ‘je’, again producing the black 
space beyond, exposing the emptiness of Descartes’s supposedly solid ground:  
 
Imagine une bouche sans visage (c’est à dire à nouveau la structure du 
masque: l’ouverture des trous, et la bouche qui s’ouvre au milieu de 
l’oeil; le lieu de la vision, de la théorie, traversé, ouvert et clos 
simultanément diaphragmé d’une profération) – une bouche sans 
visage, donc, faisant l’anneau de sa contracture autour de bruit: je. 
(1979: 157). 
 
[Imagine a mouth without a face (a new structure of a mask: an opening 
of holes, a mouth which opens in the middle of the eye; location of 
vision, of theory, penetrated, at once both open and closed, shuttered 
with a proclamation) – a mouth without a face, making a ring as it 
contracts around the sound: I.] 
 
The cogito is brought back to the level of the body, a fractured body-part of a 
mouth ‘sans visage’. The subject is firstly described by Nancy as ‘un murmure’ 
(1979: 25) [a murmur], and later as a bodily convulsion: ‘Dans la fermeture 
brutale du diaphragme de sa certitude, le Sujet se convulse’ (1979: 152) [In the 
brutal closing of the aperture of its certainty, the Subject convulses]. 
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Nancy not only brings corporeality to his readings of Cartesian 
philosophy, but also draws on bodily experience to inform his philosophy in a 
radically different way to either Butler or Descartes. In the short piece L’Intrus, 
Nancy wrote a philosophical account of his heart transplant and surrounding 
health problems and explicitly references Descartes:  
 
Depuis l’époque de Descartes, au moins, l’humanité moderne a fait du 
vœu de survie et d’immortalité un élément dans un programme général 
de ‘maîtrise et possession de la nature’ (2000b: 24)  
 
 [‘Since the time of Descartes, at least, modern humanity has 
transformed the longing for survival and immortality into an element in 
a general program of "mastering and possessing nature."’ (2008: 165)] 
 
To recall, ‘maîtres et possesseurs de la nature’ appears in the Discours just a 
couple of pages after Descartes’s own discussion of the heart as scientific 
object of study. Nancy, however, gives a strikingly different account of the act 
of removing a heart from a body.  
Nancy uses his experience to consider the philosophical implications of 
subjectivity and relationality in the context of an invasive medical procedure. 
He uses his body as a platform for philosophy, working with and including 
bodily affect as the fundamental basis for exploring ideas, rather than treating 
the body as merely an incidental setting from which a philosophy of the mind 
is produced: 
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qu’est-ce que cela peut être, de remplacer un cœur? La chose excède 
mes possibilités de représentation. (L’ouverture de tout thorax, le 
maintien en état du griffon, la circulation extra-corporelle du sang, la 
suture des vaisseaux… (2000b: 25)  
 
[‘What does it mean to replace a heart? Representing the thing is 
beyond me. (Opening up the entire thorax, taking care of the graft-
organ, circulating the blood outside the body, suturing the vessels . . .’ 
(2008: 165)]  
 
Like Descartes, Nancy acknowledges the limits of representing his bodily 
experience in language, resorting to simply listing the procedures relating to 
the operation. He does not excise these experiences from his philosophy, but 
rather embraces them, using them as the trigger for questioning of his sense of 
self: 
 
la transplantation impose l’image d’un passage par le néant, d’une 
sortie dans un espace vide de toute propriété ou de toute intimité, ou 
bien au contraire de l’intrusion en moi de cet espace: tuyaux, pinces, 
sutures et sondes). (2000b: 26, my emphasis)  
 
[‘transplanting imposes an image of passing through nothingness, a 
flight into space emptied of any propriety or intimacy, or else, 
conversely, an image of that space intruding upon the inside of me: 
feeds, clamps, sutures, and tubes.’ (2008: 166)] 
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In Descartes’s discussion, the heart becomes removed from the human subject 
to become a distinct object, first likened to a tree, and then a machine. In 
contrast, Nancy does not flinch from discussing his own body in his text, 
considering his body as inextricably himself (‘l’intrusion en moi’) rather than 
distancing the heart from the human body. Indeed, the separation of the 
Cartesian ‘I’ from Descartes’s body pointed out by Butler in the line ‘How Can 
I Deny that These Hands and This Body are Mine?’ is strikingly different to 
Nancy’s treatment here of his body as simply ‘moi’. In considering his 
subsequent treatment with immuno-suppressant drugs to prevent his body 
rejecting this new heart, Nancy writes of the consequence of their painful side 
effects on his sense of self:   
 
Qui fatiguent, qui abîment l’estomac, ou bien la douleur hurlante du 
zona… À travers tout ça, quel ‘moi’ poursuit quelle trajectoire? (2000b: 
34)  
 
[‘They fatigue, they ruin the stomach, or there's the howling pain of 
shingles ... Through it all, what "me" is pursuing what trajectory?’ 
(2008: 167)] 
 
Nancy again asks the same question as Descartes, although he is provoked here 
by his body’s undeniable, overwhelming presence rather than by seeking to 
doubt it as Descartes did. Where Descartes asked ‘What, then, am I?’ (1985: 
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106), Nancy concludes he is a strange ‘I’, shifting pronouns to use the 
decidedly unphilosophical ‘moi’: ‘Quel étrange moi!’ (2000b: 35) [‘What a 
strange me!’ (2008: 167)]. Nancy even goes as far as to play with the cogito in 
this piece, taking into account his bodily experience to modify it:  
 
Jusqu’ici, il était étranger à force de n’être même pas sensible, même 
pas présent. Désormais, il défaille, et cette étrangeté me rapporte à moi-
même. ‘Je’ suis, parce que je suis malade (2000b: 17-18, my emphasis)  
 
[‘Up to this point, it was strange by virtue of not being even perceptible, 
not even being present. From now on it fails, and this strangeness binds 
me to myself. "I" am, because I am ill.’ (2008: 163)] 
 
Just as Nancy brings the body in to his reading of Descartes, he brings 
Descartes’s work into his philosophical exploration of bodily affect. Yet the 
heart discussed in Nancy’s text is no more ‘his’ than the heart Descartes 
discussed in his Discours. In fact, Nancy breaks down the very notion of 
propriety over the body. His heart is an intruder; he questions whether it ever 
belonged to him. Quite opposed to Descartes’s solitary philosophical 
meditation, Nancy thus uses the experience of his transplant to consider issues 
of relationality and subjectivity, using it as a metaphor (at least in part) to 
exemplify his concept of originary otherness, undermining coherent 
subjectivity: ‘Mon cœur devenait mon étranger: justement étranger parce qu’il 
était dedans’ (2000b: 17) [‘My heart became my stranger: strange precisely 
because it was inside’ (2008: 163)]. 
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While Nancy’s inclusion of his body within the philosophy he writes 
might seem novel, it shares similarities with the pre-Cartesian philosophy of 
Michel de Montaigne. A precursor of Descartes, Montaigne (and in particular 
his scepticism) was influential for Descartes. Yet Montaigne held very different 
views on the interaction of body and soul, views that significantly affect the 
space afforded to his own body within his philosophy. Many of Montaigne’s 
thoughts on this matter are laid out in his essay ‘De l’Expérience’ [On 
Experience], the last essay of his third and final volume of the Essais, which 
brings together much of his philosophy from previous pieces. For Montaigne, 
the denial of either body or soul is ungracious and an insult to both nature and 
God (1979b: 313). Body and soul not only complement each other, but are 
indivisible from one another:  
 
Artissipus ne defendoit que le corps, comme si nous n’avions pas 
d’ame; Zenon n’embrassoit que l’ame, comme si nous n’avions pas de 
corps. Tous deux vicieusement. (1979b: 319)   
 
[Artissippus spoke for the body only, as if we had no soul; Zeno dealt 
only with the soul, as if we had no body; and both were mistaken. 
(1993: 396)] 
 
Montaigne objects to the denial of the body, seeking a philosopher who could 
capture the ‘true mean’ of these conflicting positions, doing justice to the 
demands of both body and soul.viii He sought to bring the soul and body 
together, intertwining the two:   
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Je hay qu’on nous ordonne d’avoir l’esprit aus nues, pendant que nous 
avons le corps à table. Je ne veux pas que l’esprit s’y cloue ny qu’il s’y 
veautre, mais je veux qu’il s’y appliquee (1979b: 319) 
 
[‘I hate to be told that my spirit should be in the clouds while my body 
is at the table. I would not have the mind pinned or sprawling there, but 
I would have it attentive’ (1993: 396)] 
 
Whereas Montaigne seems somewhat hesitant here, still having some 
reservations about dwelling too much on the body, slightly later in the essay he 
uses much stronger words:  
 
A quoy faire desmembrons nous en divorce un bastiment tissue d’une si 
joincte et fraternelle correspondance? Au rebours, renouons le par 
mutuels offices. Que l’esprit esveille et vivifie la pesanteur du corps, le 
corps arreste la legereté de l’esprit et la fixe. (1979b: 326)  
 
[What reason can we have to dismember by divorce a fabric woven of 
so close and brotherly a correspondence? On the contrary, let us 
strengthen it by mutual service. Let the mind rouse and enliven the 
heaviness of the body, and the body check and steady the frivolity of 
the mind. (1993: 404)] 
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Montaigne uses the language of marriage and the fraternal bond to describe the 
connection between mind and body. Both are locked together in a partnership 
much like marriage, to the extent that separating them in ‘divorce’ would 
constitute an act of bodily violence, a dismemberment. Here Montaigne states 
his desire to ‘tie’ body and mind together in a kind of mutually beneficial co-
dependency. 
Montaigne’s philosophical writing involves and draws upon his bodily 
experience as Nancy’s does. In particular, he discusses his bodily ailments in a 
way that is intrinsic to his thought rather than a distraction from it. He 
discusses his numerous health problems at length – his ‘reumes, defluxions 
gouteuses, relaxation, battement de coeur, micraines’ (1979b: 299) [‘colds, 
gouty discharges, looseness of the bowels, palpitations, headaches’ (1993: 
373)], his kidney stones (304), his itchy ears (308) – and uses them as a 
platform for his philosophy in the same way he might use an anecdote from 
Horace or Pliny. In the case of his itchy ears, for example, he discusses the 
pleasure he takes in scratching them before the inevitable regret of doing so to 
offer the reader a lesson on the virtues of restraint (308). His suffering from 
kidney stones is included as having had a profound effect on his beliefs in 
relation to Stoicism and his thinking on death; he rails against the Stoic 
principle of composure and calls for a philosophy able to accommodate bodily 
experience (1979a: 423).ix Although as usual he includes citations from the 
likes of Martial and Seneca, these appear almost as distractions from the 
philosophical provocation he takes from his own bodily ailments rather than 
the contrary. Instead, he uses his condition to consider lineage in bodily terms, 
since he has inherited his kidney stones from his father. Montaigne embraces 
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his body in his work and embeds it in the philosophy he writes, offering a 
seamless coalescence of accounts of bodily experience with philosophical 
discussion.x In this respect, Montaigne’s Essais present a model of the relation 
between philosophy and the body similar to Preciado’s ‘essai corporel’ in Testo 
Junkie, as I explore in the following chapter. Indeed, the tension between these 
diverging approaches towards the body epitomised by Descartes and 
Montaigne not only anticipates, but informs the debates that persist in the 21st 
century, now represented by the tensions between queer and transgender 
theories, or between poststructuralism and various forms of materialism.  
In this premodern incarnation of the debate, Montaigne uses his own 
bodily affect as a platform for his philosophy, as Nancy will centuries later. 
Both find that their experiences of their own bodies and bodily ailments 
provoke philosophical questioning and include them centrally in their writing. 
What, then, does Nancy’s account of bodies offer in addition to Montaigne?  
 
Nancy’s touch/separation and exscription 
Nancy’s conception of both writing and bodies holds very specific implications 
for how they interact in his work. Through his concept of writing as 
exscription, Nancy attempts to bridge the gap between language or writing as 
‘sens’ and what he sees as the material aspects of bodies. His concept of 
writing as exscription attempts to give space to the body while also 
acknowledging the limitations of language and rational discourse for 
approaching it.  
Writing is understood by Nancy as an act of simultaneous inscription 
and exscription, with Nancy’s essay ‘Exscription’ (1990) claiming that: 
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‘writing ex-scribes meaning just as much as it inscribes significations. It ex-
scribes meaning, that is it shows that what it’s about, the thing itself […] 
take[s] place outside writing’ (63).xi Taking a poststructuralist position much 
like that of Butler’s, Nancy goes on to explain that while writing can capture 
signification, ‘being itself’ (the material or the real, Butler’s ‘extra linguistic’) 
is beyond the reach of language. Yet, for Nancy, writing can gesture towards 
the presence of the material through exscription: ‘In inscribing significations, 
we exscribe the presence of what withdraws from all signification, being itself 
(life, passion, substance...)’ (64).  
Nancy uses the metaphor of ink spilling over a page, an excess of 
meaning beyond language – ‘meaning spills out of itself like a simple ink stain 
on a word, on the word “meaning”’ (47). Bodies are always beyond ‘sense’ 
alone and in Corpus, Nancy writes that ‘Nous touchons à une certaine 
interruption du sens, elle a à faire avec le corps, elle est corps’ (112) [‘We are 
touching on a certain interruption of sense, and this interruption of sense has to 
do with the body, it is body’ (125)]. As such, Nancy recognizes the limits of 
rational discourse to take bodies into account and instead relies on his concept 
of exscription, the potential for writing to exscribe bodies. Quite opposed to the 
strict Cartesian demand for rational discourse to know an object clearly and 
distinctly, exscription nonetheless allows a way for language to point towards 
bodies’ materiality within the poststructuralist framework. Bodies are, for 
Nancy, ‘êtres-excrits’: ‘Le corps n’est ni substance ni phénomène, ni chair, ni 
signification. Mais l’être-excrit’ (2000a: 20) [‘The body's neither substance, 
phenomenon, flesh, nor signification. Just being-exscribed’ (2008: 19)]. As 
bodies are not reducible to signification, Nancy hopes through this model to 
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find a way out of the poststructuralist dilemma of how language might deal 
with the ‘extra-linguistic’ aspects of the body.  
While Nancy attempts to make space for bodies in his work, by placing 
bodily affect centrally and by introducing the concept of exscription, his idea of 
bodies as limits nevertheless leads him to a restricted relationship between 
bodies and writing. As such, his model is unable to respond fully to the 
concerns of French queer theorists in their attempts to make theory take 
account of material bodies. While he finds some way out of the limits of 
rational discourse, his bodies remain impenetrable to writing and theoretical 
discourse. Nancy returns time and again to the relationship between bodies and 
writing, asking ‘comment toucher au corps?’ (2000a: 12) [‘How are we to 
touch upon the body?’ (2008: 11)]. He writes that language, specifically 
writing, ‘touche au corps, par essence’ (2000a: 13) [‘in its essence touches 
upon the body’ (2008: 11)].  
While Nancy does suggest that writing can gesture toward the body, 
even the ‘extra-linguistic’ body, the metaphor he uses repeatedly is that of 
touch. For Nancy, touch implies proximity but also separation – a contiguity 
rather than a continuity. Thus while writing might touch the body, it cannot 
pass within. In striking contrast to Preciado, as I explore in my next chapter, 
Nancy’s concept of bodies as limits has definite restrictions for how they are 
able to interact with other bodies and with writing. While Preciado seeks to 
push theoretical writing into the body, and continually uses metaphors of 
porosity and permeability, Nancy’s bodies are impermeable. He writes that: 
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L’écriture touche aux corps selon la limite absolue qui sépare le sens de 
l’une de la peau et des nerfs de l’autre. Rien ne passe, et c’est là que ça 
touche. (2000a: 10)  
 
[Writing touches upon bodies along the absolute limit separating the 
sense of the one from the skin and nerves of the other. Nothing gets 
through, which is why it touches. (2008: 11] 
 
Using molecular imagery and metaphor, Nancy notes that: 
 
Un corpus ne serait donc possible qu’à la condition qu’il y ait accès aux 
corps, et qu’ils ne soient pas impénétrables, ainsi que les définit la 
physique. Car s’il en est ainsi, le corpus se produit comme une 
combinatoire de chocs, comme une agitation brownienne de bonds et de 
rebonds particulaires, moléculaires [… mais] Les corps sont 
impénétrables aux langues – et celles-ci sont impénétrables aux 
corps. (2000a: 50-51)  
 
[A corpus could only happen, then, by gaining access to bodies that are 
not impenetrable, as defined precisely by physics. If this is the case, 
then a corpus is produced as a combination of shocks, as a brownian 
agitation of molecular leaps and bounds. As indeed it is. Bodies are 
impenetrable to languages – and languages are impenetrable to bodies 
(2008: 57)] 
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A writing of ‘bodily entry’, as Nancy puts it – a corpus – could only be 
possible in the event that language is able to access the body; could only be 
produced by the motion of bodily cells as they collide with one another in 
Brownian motion. But Nancy goes on to insist that bodies are impermeable to 
language, language is ‘un dur bloc étendu de signifiance’ (2000a: 51) [‘a hard, 
extended block of significance’ (2008: 57)], which is thus impenetrable to 
bodies. Does this separation of ‘sens’ and matter leave the materiality of bodies 
in much the same place as Cartesian dualism, as Butler warns? Indeed, the 
following lines from Nancy would seem to confirm Butler’s fears:  
 
je le dis un peu par provocation, mais pas seulement – [nous devons] 
restituer quelque chose du dualisme, en ce sens précis qu’il faut penser 
que le corps n’est pas l’unité moniste (opposée à la vision dualiste), 
l’immédiateté, l’immanence à soi dont auparavant on dotait l’âme. 
(2000a: 125) 
 
[I say this as something of a provocation, but not merely so — [we 
must] restore something of the dualism, in the precise sense that we 
have to think that the body is not a monist unity (as opposed to the 
dualist vision), having the immediacy and self-immanence with which 
we earlier endowed the soul. (2008: 133)] 
 
This is indeed a provocative statement, and one that sheds further light on 
Nancy’s definition of bodies as ‘sens’ and matter as entirely impermeable to 
one another: so much so as to warrant something of a return to dualism.  
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Preciado’s thinking is strikingly different. The motif of penetration 
through skin is employed continually in his work, and when Preciado discusses 
the work of Judith Butler, he declares that he wants to ‘pousser […] 
l’hypothèse performative dans le corps, jusqu’aux fluides, la faire passer dans 
les cellules’ [push the theory of performativity into the body, into its fluids, 
force into the cells] (2008: 98). Just as Descartes’s concept of himself as a 
thinking subject resulted from and enforced a condition of non-relationality and 
solitude, Nancy’s and Preciado’s ideas of what bodies are impacts on questions 
relating to the affective power of literature and theory and how bodies interact 
with the world. Nancy’s specific conception of bodies leads him to this model 
of relationality between writing and the body; since bodies are conceived as 
limits, they may be touched by writing, but never penetrated or passed in the 
way that Preciado’s model allows.  
 Nancy’s work gives an example of the kind of engagements with the 
Cartesian account of bodies that have emerged in the recent French context. 
His account offers an exploration and interrogation of coherent subjectivity 
through the consideration of the material body, such as in the description of his 
heart transplant in L’Intrus. His work, as well as that of Montaigne, shows that 
the elision of the body in philosophy is not inevitable, that attempts to discuss 
the body need not abandon philosophy completely. Rather than simply 
involving the experience of his body in his philosophical writing, as Montaigne 
had already done prior to the interventions of Descartes, Nancy describes the 
relation between bodies and meaning through the models of exscription and 
touch/separation. These models, however, display all the ambiguity and 
contradiction that Nancy locates in his reading of Descartes’s mind/body 
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dualism: if bodies are the very meeting point of matter and sens, they are also 
the point at which they are separate. Nancy does not describe the ‘mélange’ of 
meaning and body that Merleau-Ponty reads in Montaigne’s work, but 
ultimately describes their separation. Indeed, while Nancy’s account reacts 
against Descartes, the typically poststructuralist relation he sees between 
material body and sens appears to be haunted by Cartesian dualism and gives 
weight to concerns over the place of the body in poststructuralist thought. In 
the following chapter, I ask how Preciado’s project of incorporating his own 
bodily experimentation into his theory seeks to go further, insisting on the 
permeable boundaries of bodies and on a reflexivity between bodies and texts.   
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i See Best & Crowley (2007) for an exploration of existentialism, HIV/AIDS and the cogito in 
Rémès’s work.  
ii Descartes originally wrote the Meditations in Latin, and this chapter uses the Penguin 
Classics English translation.  
iii All translations from this work are cited from Cress, in René Descartes: Philosophical 
Essays and correspondence (2000).  
iv Descartes corresponded with Elisabeth on philosophical issues. This particular letter to her is 
dated June 28 1643, two years after publication of the Meditations.  
v A question extensively explored by Butler, particularly in Bodies that Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of “Sex”. 
vi See in particular the section ‘Le Cogito’ (423-68). 
vii ‘Sens’ in Nancy’s work is often characterised by being opposed to matter. While it relates to 
matter and is always embodied, this relationship is always one of touch, with ‘sens’ and matter 
always remaining impenetrable to each other’ (James, 2006: 205).  
viii Montaigne believed that such a philosopher could be found in Socrates (1979b: 319). 
ix For an extended discussion of the body in Montaigne’s work, see Stegman’s article 
‘Exposing Montaigne’ (2007: 314). In particular, for an extended discussion of Montaigne’s 
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work. See also earlier work on the body in Montaigne, particularly Cathy Yandell’s ‘“Corps” 
and “corpus”: Montaigne’s “Sur des vers de Virgile”’ (1986) and Lawrence Kritzman’s ‘My 
body, My text: Montaigne and the Rhetoric of Sexuality’ (1983). 
xi The word ‘meaning’ here is often used to translate Nancy’s concept of ‘le sens’, which is also 
translated elsewhere by the English ‘sense’ or simply left untranslated. Like many of Nancy’s 
terms, ‘le sens’ is over determined, but is often opposed to matter, as I go on to discuss.  
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2 Queer permeability in Paul B. Preciado’s literature of entanglement: 
narrating the posthuman self, performing philosophy  
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter explores Paul B. Preciado’s Testo Junkie (2008) and Manifeste 
contra-sexuel (2000) [Countersexual Manifesto (2018)], outlining a 
permeable account of the relation between bodies and language that I argue to 
be crucial to queer theory’s biopolitical investments. Drawing on new 
materialist analysis (Jane Bennett (2010); Karen Barad (2003; 2007); Noella 
Davis (2009)), I explore Preciado’s reworking of Butlerian performativity to 
account for transgender experience, seeking to push Butler’s theory into the 
material body’s cells and setting it to work at the level of the material body. 
Preciado presents his transgender body as a means to explore theory through 
performance as well a philosophical writing. By presenting his own body as 
inextricably entangled with his philosophy, Preciado not only confronts 
concerns from transgender theorists (Jay Prosser (1998); Vivian K Namaste 
(2000)) regarding queer theory’s ability to account for the material body, but 
also draws on the French literary genre of autofiction to dismantle the 
Cartesian notion of a ‘disembodied’, rational and dispassionate philosopher. 
Preciado presents his body as just as permeable to material events and 
discourses as it is to the Testogel he administers, exemplifying my notion of 
queer permeability. His work explores what it might mean to narrate a 
posthuman account of the self, a literature of entanglement.  
 
 
Paul B. Preciado’s work emerged as part of the French queer activist and intellectual 
group Le Zoo. A former student of Derrida, Preciado’s work is indebted to French 
poststructuralism, but also embraces a materialism that, though hard to define in 
traditional terms, could be placed somewhere between contemporary heterodox 
Marxism and feminist new materialism – although Preciado does not engage directly 
with the latter, his work shares striking similarities to this approach, as this chapter 
will bear out. I focus here on two of Preciado’s texts, the Countersexual Manifesto 
(2000) and Testo Junkie: sex, drugs and biopolitics (2006; 2008; 2013).i The first of 
these is at once a political manifesto and a diagnosis of contemporary society; a 
collection of theoretical essays (on Butler, Derrida, Deleuze); an invitation to partake 
in transformative rituals and to sign a countersexual contract divesting oneself of 
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naturalized gender. Testo Junkie is also not a singular text: for a start, it was 
published originally both in Spanish and in French in 2008 by Preciado himself, and 
then translated by Bruce Benderson into English in 2013. While Preciado writes of 
feeling ill at ease in any single national or linguistic context, the book is very much 
embedded in Paris where it was written, with descriptions of the author walking the 
city’s streets, taking part in the queer scene and surrounded by familiar French 
literary figures such as Guillaume Dustan and Virginie Despentes. Testo Junkie 
records its author’s daily application of Testogel, a topical pharmaceutical 
testosterone gel, that is absorbed through his skin. This process is recounted through 
narrative sections set alongside a theoretical genealogy of pharmaceuticals, making 
the text impossible to define neatly in terms of genre and exploding the notion of a 
‘disembodied’ and neutral theoretical work.  
This chapter will respond to concerns expressed in the previous chapter: if 
early (Anglophone) queer work informed by (French) poststructuralism is haunted by 
a Cartesian dualism insistent on the absolute separation of language from matter, 
resulting in a world reduced to language and rendering the material inaccessible 
(‘linguistic monism’), how does Preciado’s embrace of matter and materialism in his 
work respond to these concerns? Preciado’s work is a frequently dizzying mixture of 
theory and practice, writing and performance, poststructuralism and materialism, 
material and metaphor. What can be made of his project of self-experimentation with 
testosterone in Testo Junkie, a move intended to change the rules of philosophy; to 
‘decapitate’ the philosopher? How can we understand his inclusion of performance in 
his work from the Manifeste onwards, or his desire to push Butler’s concept of 
performativity into the body? These ideas identified in Preciado’s work all contribute 
to a model of permeability between language and the body, politics and theory, the 
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self and the other, the individual and the global, which can answer the concerns of 
Prosser, Namaste – and indeed Butler herself – regarding queer theory’s ability to 
take account of the material body, and the material world.  
 
 
Rethinking performativity  
  
Preciado’s work intervenes in queer studies almost two decades after it erupted in the 
US in the early 1990s. It is clear that he has taken on board many of the revisions 
made and objections raised since its conception. In his introduction Queer zones 
(2001), by another member of Parisian queer activist and intellectual collective Le 
Zoo, he writes that rather than the materiality of sex ‘la théorie queer a joué la carte 
du genre’ [queer theory has played gender as its hand] (15), and then conflated the 
two:  
 
la théorie queer a eu tendance à fondre sexe et genre. Résultat: elle a zappé le 
corps. Et avec lui, tout ce qui rendait le menu queer indigeste: le sida, les 
drogues, le travail sexuel, les pratiques trans(sexuelles)… (16) 
 
[queer theory has tended to merge sex and gender together. The result: it has 
made the body vanish. And with it, everything that made the queer ‘menu’ so 
hard to swallow: AIDS, drugs, sex work, trans(sexual) practices…]  
 
For Preciado, it is clear that the body is central to ‘le menu queer’; these ‘indigeste’ 
bodies or bodily acts are central to its political force, and should be where queer 
 78 
theory’s allegiances lie. His work seeks to take account of the material vulnerability 
of marginalised bodies to normative discourse, and responds in particular to critiques 
of early queer theory from the field of transgender theory from Jay Prosser (1998) 
and Viviane K. Namaste (2000).  
 Prosser and Namaste are both critical of queer studies’ (particularly Butler’s) 
treatment of transsexual and transgender ‘phenomena.’ Prosser’s Second Skins 
(1998) describes ‘queer theory’s [...] incapacity to sustain the body as a literal 
category’ (27). He argues that Butler’s theory of performativity relies on a scopic 
fascination with transgender phenomena, which understands the body purely ‘as 
visual surface’ (43), rather than materially experienced.ii For Prosser, transsexual 
bodies are inescapably material; their embodiment means they ‘exceed [...] 
performativity’ (33). Namaste’s criticism of Butler in Invisible Lives (2000), like 
Prosser’s, focuses on the inability of queer theorising to take the ‘realities of [trans 
people’s] lives’ into account (1), realities which very often have to do with the 
material body. Indeed, Namaste’s list of such daily realities rarely departs from 
inescapably material, bodily concerns: ‘learning how to inject hormones; recovering 
from surgery; electrolysis; Norvir, Crixivan, and Interferon; overdoses; visiting the 
hospital; trying to find a surgeon willing to perform sex reassignment surgery on a 
seropositive transsexual’ (1).iii  
Prosser’s reading of Butler focuses on her account of the murder of Venus 
Xtravaganza, the Latina trans woman featured in Jennie Livingston’s documentary 
film Paris is Burning (1990). His criticism is threefold: firstly, that her particular 
deployment of psychoanalytic theory (what he views as a misreading of Freud) fails 
to imagine a material body beyond its fantasised image; secondly, that Venus’s 
transsexuality (her desire to change her material sex) is viewed as the limitation of 
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subversive transgender practices; finally, that her reading of Venus wavers between 
the literal and the metaphorical, just as her interchangeable use of the terms ‘penis’ 
and ‘phallus’ confuses the Real and the Symbolic. Prosser sees this last point as 
exemplary of poststructuralism’s failure to distinguish been the literal (material) and 
the figurative. It is this theoretical shortcoming that renders Butler’s reading of 
Venus as ultimately depersonalising: ‘in metaphorising transsexuality, Butler 
inadvertently repeats something of this deliteralization of the subject, her [Venus’s] 
body, her death. The substance of the transsexual body is sublimated in the move 
from the literal to the figurative’ (1998: 55).  
Prosser identifies queer theory’s issue with materiality not in its focus on 
transgender as opposed to transsexuality in and of itself, but in its roots in 
poststructuralism: 
 
my sense is that the reasons for transsexuality exceeding queer lie […] in 
queer’s poststructuralist problems with literality and referentiality that the 
category of transsexuality makes manifest – particularly in relation to the 
sexed body. Butler’s metaphorical displacement of the literality of Venus’s 
sex can serve to exemplify just this. (58)iv  
 
‘Literality’ – used here to denote the real or the material – is displaced, understood 
solely on the level of linguistics and metaphor by this theoretical field. Both Namaste 
and Prosser diagnose this inability to take proper care over the material as an issue 
stemming from queer’s theoretical heritage. Both hold poststructuralism (not one 
particular author, but poststructuralism generally) to blame in their critiques, with 
Namaste writing that ‘an American application of French poststructuralist theory to 
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transgendered phenomenon voids the possibility of transsexual and/or transgendered 
bodies’ (2000: 2). Prosser’s concern over poststructuralism refers to a paradox 
identical to that voiced by Butler about the potential for language to grasp the 
material body: ‘Is this paradox about the body – the body’s materiality slips our 
grasp even as we attempt to narrate it – our inevitable poststructuralist legacy?’ 
(1998: 13).v  
Butler’s Bodies That Matter sought to take greater account of the materiality 
of bodies, responding to a question often posed to her: ‘What about the materiality of 
the body, Judy?’ (1993: viii). She understands the use of the informal, feminised 
‘Judy’ as opposed to ‘Judith’ as an attempt to extricate her from the ‘masculine’ and 
‘cerebral’ discipline of philosophy, to ‘recall [her] to a bodily life that could not be 
theorized away’ (viii). And indeed, she seems to identify an uneasiness, a ‘blind 
spot’, when attempting to deal with the material body as a philosopher:  
 
I began writing this book by trying to consider the materiality of the body 
only to find that the thought of materiality invariably moved me into other 
domains. I tried to discipline myself to stay on the subject, but found that I 
could not fix bodies as simple objects of thought […] I reflected that this 
wavering might be the vocational difficulty of those trained in philosophy, 
always at some distance from corporeal matters, who try in that disembodied 
way to demarcate bodily terrains: they invariably miss the body or, worse, 
write against it. (viii) 
 
Butler’s expression here of her inability to fully conceptualise the material body in or 
through language, and particularly within a philosophical enterprise, amounts to the 
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same concerns she expressed in her reading of Descartes, as I discussed in the 
previous chapter. What can be made of this opposition between philosophy and 
‘corporeal matters’? What might this mean for a philosophy such as queer, that is at 
its very heart invested in such matters? 
As a result of his engagement with Butler, Prosser, in addition to Namaste, 
ultimately advocated for the separation of queer studies from transsexual studies. He 
describes a: 
 
conceptual splitting between transsexual and queer and, indeed, of queer 
theory’s own incapacity to sustain the body as a literal category. In 
transsexuality, sex returns, the queer repressed, to unsettle its theory of 
gender performativity. (1998: 27). 
 
Yet while these critics argue that queer theory should be abandoned as inherently 
incapable of dealing with embodiment, and thus unable to account for transsexual 
bodily experience, Preciado instead seeks to build on queer work: not only to expand 
it to take account of embodiment, but to reconceptualise the relationship between 
language and matter and offer a different model to the typically poststructuralist 
account which sees these as fundamentally different, like oil and water. His work 
instead demonstrates an overlapping and blurring of borders – what I will later 
describe as permeability –  bringing bodies into texts and texts into bodies. Not only 
does he imagine this reflexivity between bodies and texts, he re-imagines what we 
understand by language, the body, and indeed philosophy.   
Preciado takes up both Prosser’s and Namaste’s arguments on Butler in his 
Manifeste contra-sexuel, writing that ‘l’identité performative manquerait par là 
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même de poser la question de la corporalité’ [performative understandings of identity 
do not even pose the question of corporeality] (75). His concern for the material is 
more far-reaching than simply seeking to accommodate transsexual and transgender 
embodiment, however. He also wants to consider more globally the kinds of 
embodied transformations that he sees as essential to ‘le queer’, including the bodily 
experiences of those living with HIV:  
 
En privilégiant la performance de genre, les effets théâtraux, le pouvoir 
performatif du langage et de la textualité, les théories queers de l’identité 
performative sont restées propres sur elles évitant finalement, malgré les 
apparences, de penser les changements corporels radicaux des personnes 
vivant avec le sida ainsi que les transformations corporelles des personnes 
transgenres et transexuel(e)s. (75, my emphasis)  
 
[by focusing on gender performance, theatrical effects, and the performative 
power of language and textuality, queer theories of performative identity have 
remained self-contained and have avoided, despite appearances, consideration 
of the radical bodily changes of people living with AIDS as well as the bodily 
transformations of transgender and transsexual people.] 
 
 
While the reading of Butler that Preciado offers here is not strictly faithful (Butler’s 
Bodies That Matter specifically clarifies that gender performativity has nothing to do 
with theatricality), Preciado follows Prosser in understanding performativity as 
relating to language and textuality and in holding this relation responsible for 
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avoiding proper engagement with the materiality of bodies. He also hints here at a 
sense in which queer studies has betrayed its earlier, founding commitment to 
materiality through its activist roots in the HIV/AIDS crisis.   
Like Prosser and Namaste, Preciado also expresses concern over the linguistic 
focus of constructivist thought:  
 
Dans les années 90, période d’euphorie constructiviste s’il en fût, on a 
beaucoup célébré la fluidité des genres sans prendre suffisamment en compte 
la force des technologies du corps qui modifient et stabilisent l’identité de 
sexe et de genre. (2000: 75-6, my emphasis) 
 
[In the 90s, a period of constructivist euphoria if ever there was, we saw a 
celebration of the fluidity of gender that did not take sufficient account of the 
force of technologies of the body, which modify and stabilize sex and gender 
identity.]  
 
Again Preciado follows Prosser in criticising queer theory’s valorisation of 
transgendered fluidity, which in effect served to obscure corporeality. Ultimately, 
though, he does not reject Butler, queer thought or performativity, instead seeking to 
build on her work to include the material body. In an interview with Butler herself 
for the French gay magazine Têtu, Preciado recalls:  
 
Je suis obsédée par la question du corps et de sa matérialité et j’ai eu un choc 
en découvrant l’analyse performative de l’identité selon Butler […] Ce que je 
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voulais depuis le début, c’était prendre cette analyse et l’amener sur le terrain 
de la corporéité.’ (Têtu, 2008)  
 
[I am obsessed with the question of the body and its materiality and I was 
amazed to discover Butler’s performative analysis of gender […] From the 
start, I wanted to take this analysis to the level of the body.]  
 
Preciado also writes, in Testo Junkie, of wanting to ‘pousser l’hypothèse 
performative dans le corps, jusqu’aux fluides, la faire passer dans les cellules’ [push 
the hypothesis of performativity into the body, right up to its fluids, to channel it into 
its cells] (2008: 98). But how might one begin to deploy performativity at the level of 
the body?  
Firstly, Preciado takes Butler’s theoretical arguments on drag and 
performativity in Gender Trouble and resituates them on a material, practical level. 
He reconsiders Butler’s argument for the subversive potential of drag practices 
through descriptions of the drag king workshops he ran in France, and in Chile. The 
practice of drag is described as activating a dormant queer virus in participants: 
 
Une fois le virus king activé en chaque participante, il agira, comme soupçon 
de genre, au delà de l’atelier, il se propagera au reste de la vie quotidienne et 
provoquera des modifications dans l’ensemble de nos interactions sociales. 
(2008: 320)  
[Once the king virus is activated in each participant, it will continue to act as a 
mistrust of gender even beyond the confines of the workshop, it will spread 
throughout daily life and spark modifications in the entirety of our social 
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interactions.] 
 
Once ‘infected’, participants are transformed beyond the confines of the workshop; 
the ‘virus’ provoking a fundamental and seemingly irreversible change in attitude 
toward gender. Drag is metaphorised as a physical agent that can transform the 
molecular structure of the body in the same way that a virus, or indeed a molecule 
such as pharmaceutical testosterone, might. But there is an insistence that goes 
beyond metaphor here: Preciado affirms that the (material) practice of drag is a 
lasting and transformative epistemic practice, able to effect material changes in 
social understanding and interactions. Echoing Foucault’s concept of dispositifs 
disciplinaires – of the multiple material and discursive apparatus that disciplines 
bodies, Preciado refers to ‘le dispositif drag king’ [the drag king device] as ‘un 
processus ouvert de mutation’ [an open process of transformation] (2008: 311) as an 
alternative and intentional form of bodily discipline.  
Secondly, Preciado’s desire to push performativity into the body, to set it to 
work at the level of its cells, is enacted through a concept he terms ‘biodrag’. 
Butler’s work is expanded so that it concerns not only gender but may account for 
the materiality of bodies, the material configuration of sexed bodies:  
 
S’il est possible d’évoquer, avec Judith Butler, une ‘production performative 
du genre’, il faut préciser que ce qui est codifié, imité, et répété 
coercitivement, ici, ce n’est pas seulement une représentation théâtrale ou un 
code sémiotique, mais bien la totalité biologique du vivant. Je nommerai 
‘biodrag’ ce processus. (154) 
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[If it is possible to describe, using Judith Butler, a ‘performative production of 
gender’, we must be clear that this is codified, imitated and coercively 
repeated. What I discuss here is not simply a theatrical performance or a 
semiotic code but rather the entire biology of a living being. I call this process 
biodrag’.] 
 
What Preciado imagines through the concept of ‘biodrag’ are supposedly ‘natural’ 
processes that are in fact performed with the use of technologies. These include the 
production of the ‘natural’ regularity of the menstrual cycle via the contraceptive pill, 
or (a particularly French example) the supposedly natural athletic masculinity of 
Tour de France athletes that is in fact fabricated with the aid of hormonal or steroid 
supplements. This is what Preciado terms an act of ‘biocamouflage’: the 
manufactured illusion of natural ‘sexed’ biological processes or bodies (156); the 
concealment of the ways in which the materiality of sex is constructed.  
Preciado’s own experiment in taking testosterone must be understood in 
relation to this concept of ‘biodrag’. If trans bodies are often held up as 
‘constructed’, ‘unnatural’ or somehow ‘fake’, Preciado repeats Butler’s formula of 
drag to work against this exceptionalisation of trans bodies. On Butler’s model, drag 
exposes all gender to be imitative, rather than just that of the drag performer; on 
Preciado’s model, his performed ‘biodrag’ exposes the fact that, in a world flooded 
with pharmaceuticals and other drugs, bodies are – especially in the West – 
increasingly materially constructed and ‘unnatural’. He tells his readers that in 
administering Prozac, Ritalin, alcohol, the contraceptive pill (examples amongst 
many others), ‘Vous autres, vous aussi, vous êtes le monstre que la testosterone 
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éveille en moi’ [you others, you too, you are the monster that testosterone awakens in 
me] (348).  
Preciado’s practice of administering testosterone renders visible the myth of 
natural sex, exposing the reliance of many contemporary sexed bodies, particularly 
celebrated and normative ‘ideal’ examples of men and women (the athlete, the 
pornstar), as reliant on (and constituted by) prosthetic supports. His concept of 
‘biodrag’, explored through performance as well as in writing, puts Butler’s 
performativity to work on the level of the material, sexed body. If Butler’s analysis 
of sex is through psychoanalytic, poststructuralist and linguistic frameworks, 
Preciado displaces a psychoanalytic understanding of the production of (discursive) 
sex,vi translating Butler’s thinking on gender to material, sexed bodies and putting it 
to work in exploring the material production of sex.  
While Preciado responds to criticisms of Butler from the field of transgender 
studies, similar critiques have been made by new materialist thinkers. Karen Barad 
writes that: ‘Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the 
semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn […] every “thing”—even 
materiality—is turned into a matter of language’ (2003: 801). Barad has also 
reworked performativity from a materialist perspective, calling for ‘a specifically 
posthumanist notion of performativity—one that incorporates important material and 
discursive, social and scientific, human and nonhuman, and natural and cultural 
factors’ (808). If, on Butler’s model of performativity, gender does not precede but is 
constituted by gendered acts; for Barad, material objects do not precede their 
interaction, but emerge through ‘intra-actions’ – there is no discrete object preceding 
its entanglement with other objects. I will explore further similarities between new 
materialist approaches and that of Preciado’s later on in this chapter, but both 
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Barad’s and Preciado’s reworking of performativity move away from an entirely 
linguistic focus, where linguistic acts affect the linguistic formulation of gender, to a 
focus on the ways in which material objects are formed through relations to other 
objects, such as gendered discourse and pharmaceuticals.  
 
 
Performing Theory 
 
Preciado’s first published text, his Manifeste contra-sexuel, is a radical, utopian 
manifesto, set alongside essays on Deleuze, Butler and Derrida. It was published in 
French, then Spanish and translated into English only in 2018. While this manifesto 
is outlined as a collection of ‘Principes de la société contra-sexuelle’ [principles of 
the countersexual society] (32), also included in the text is a ‘contra-sexual’ contract 
and a series of illustrated, bodily ‘Pratiques d’inversion contra-sexuelles’ [practices 
of countersexual inversion] (41). Just as Preciado’s reworking of Butler’s theory of 
drag sets it to work on a practical level through performance, Preciado’s Manifeste 
invites its readers to use bodily acts themselves in attempting to resignify the body.   
Preciado’s manifesto outlines the aims of his ‘nouvelle société’ [new society] 
as ‘la déconstruction systématique de la naturalisation des pratiques sexuelles et du 
système du genres’ [the systematic deconstruction of the ways in which sexual 
practices and the system of gender is naturalised] and proclaims ‘l’équivalence (et 
non l’égalité) de tous les corps-sujets parlants qui s’engagent dans les termes du 
contrat contra-sexuel dédié à la recherche du plaisir et du savoir’ [the equivalence 
(rather than equality) of all speaking body-subjects who enter into the terms of the 
countersexual contract dedicated to seeking pleasure and knowledge] (21). While 
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Preciado’s aim – that of denaturalisation – is similar to Butler’s project in Gender 
Trouble and Bodies that Matter, his strategy is very different. Where Butler engages 
psychoanalytic works, feminist theory and Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism, the 
theoretical essays in Preciado’s Manifeste are set beside instructions for his readers to 
engage their bodies through his contract and practical exercises. Preciado again 
offers a way out of the bubble of ‘linguistic monism’ by emphasising the materiality 
of bodies and utilising them in the task of denaturalising gender and sexual practices.  
The name of the text is a clear nod to Michel Foucault’s concept of a ‘contre-
discours’ [counter-discourse]. Foucault understood that while various dispositifs may 
be mobilsed, particularly by the state, in an attempt to regulate and control bodies 
and behaviors, there will always be a space open in which the terms of the debate can 
be turned upside down and used against their intended purposes. Foucault was clear 
that counter-discourse involved ‘not another theory, but rather a practical 
engagement with political struggles’ (Moussa and Scapp, 1996: 89). Preciado’s work 
takes up this challenge, his ‘manifesto’ leaving no doubt as to his political intent. 
Acknowledging the influence of Butler’s Bodies That Matter, Preciado writes 
that:  
 
Le corps est un texte socialement construit, une archive organique de 
l’histoire de l’humanité comme histoire de la production-reproduction 
sexuelle dans laquelle certains codes sont naturalisés […] La contra-sexualité 
a pour tâche d’identifier les espaces erronés, les ratages de la structure du 
texte. (2000: 25)  
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[The body is a socially constructed text, an organic archive of the history of 
humanity as a story of sexual production-reproduction in which certain codes 
are naturalised […] counter-sexuality aims to identify the gaps, the failures in 
the structure of the text.] 
 
The influence of language in the production of bodies is recognised; that in some 
ways at least, it may be useful to describe the body as a text. Yet bodies are also 
described here as ‘[les] archive[s] organique[s]’ [organic archives], indicating that 
they cannot be described purely as text, or on a linguistic level but must include the 
material or the organic. Preciado juxtaposes ‘archive’, echoing Derrida’s use of the 
term,vii with the notion of the organic, and with this phrase already offers a 
proximity, a fusion, between discourse and matter.viii While Preciado does describe 
bodies as texts here, his countersexual society ‘ne propose pas pour autant des 
interventions politiques abstraites qui se réduiraient à des variations de langage’ 
[does not however propose abstract political interventions which can be reduced to 
variations of language] (25). Strategies that deploy language alone will not suffice, 
and instead Preciado invites his readers to utilise their bodies.  
Descriptions of three pratiques or practical exercises are included in the 
Manifeste. The first draws on Ron Athey’s performance piece ‘Solar Anus’ 
(performed at the Forum des Images in Paris in 1999), itself a response to Bataille’s 
text L’Anus Solaire (1927). Athey’s performance, which Preciado describes in detail 
before outlining the exercise derived from it, included having a black sun tattooed 
around his anus, modifying his genitals by injecting them with a saline solution, 
applying make-up and performing (or attempting to perform) anal masturbation with 
two dildos attached to the high heels he wore.  
 91 
Athey’s performance is described by Preciado as countersexual because it 
works to denaturalise sex; Preciado hails Athey’s use of his physical body in 
subverting not only his gendered presentation but his own sexual organs, described 
by Preciado as they are distorted by the saline injection as resembling ‘plus à une 
sorte d’utérus externe qu’à un sexe masculin’ [more a kind of external uterus than 
male genitals] (45). Preciado’s own countersexual practices follow Athey’s 
performance in outlining corporeal acts that disrupt the notion of natural, 
heterocentric sex, and perform the denaturalisation of sex. Preciado also, however, 
draws inspiration from Athey’s method – his physical, bodily response to a written 
text – and responds to the transitivity between Bataille’s text and Athey’s bodily 
performance. An evolving dialogue takes place between writing and performance, 
each responding to the other. Preciado’s pratiques offer readers the opportunity to 
reproduce this relationship between texts and bodies, offering a textual invitation to 
perform corporeal acts that demonstrate the transitive communication, the permeable 
relation, he sees between bodies and texts.  
Preciado’s treatment of explicitly sexual acts in his work may be read as a 
simple provocation. It should be understood, however, in the context of his 
understanding that queer theory has omitted the body and bodily acts – including, 
ironically for a theory of sexuality, sexual acts – as ‘indigeste’. In this sense, it is a 
provocation, but one aimed squarely at queer theory. In his introduction to the new 
English translation, Preciado explains that his focus on the dildo was an attempt to 
wrest it away from the pathologising grip of psychoanalysis, the cloying influence of 
concepts of penis envy and castration, or from a feminist view that imagines it as the 
very emblem of phallic masculinity. Instead, Preciado embraces it as something 
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entirely different: a symbol of a prosthetic order running counter to claims of 
naturalism, essentialism, purism and pathologisation.  
As such, Preciado’s first practical exercise recreates part of Athey’s 
performance by inviting readers to attach two dildos to a pair of high heels (objects 
Preciado has illustrated in diagrams next to his text) and asking them to attempt anal 
masturbation while wearing them. The second two pratiques, ‘Branler un bras’ [Jerk 
off an arm] and ‘Comment fair jouir un gode-tête’ [How to make a dildo-head cum], 
perform a ‘citation du gode’ [dildo citation] (48; 52) by drawing these godes on 
various parts of the body with a red marker pen.ix Again, both pratiques include 
instructive hand-drawn diagrams, either of the entire body or of specific body parts. 
The accompanying text is humorously set out much as a text-book science 
experiment might be, not only providing instructions, descriptions of materials 
needed, and a total duration for the act, but also a justification for the acts 
themselves. These include ‘L’objectif’ [aim] of learning to ‘trafiquer les signifiants 
sexuels’ [traffic sexual signifiers] (46), or of practicing an ‘inversion’ that amounts to 
‘une operation de citation textuelle’ [an operation of textual citation] aiming to 
‘déplace[r] la force performative du code hétérocentré’ [displace the performative 
force of the heterocentric code] (49).x 
The ‘citation’ of a physical object (the dildo, itself a prosthetic extension of 
what is seen as being the ‘natural’ body) on the body’s skin shows an understanding 
of bodies as inseparable from (gendered) discourse. Preciado insists on the potential 
for writing to subvert not only discursive constructions of gender, but material sex 
(‘les organes sexuels’). He confronts Derrida’s insistence that ‘il n’y a pas de hors-
texte’ [there is no outside-text] from De la grammatologie [On Grammatology] 
(1967), or Butler’s formulation that there is no ‘pre-discursive’ sex, and also insists 
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on the inscription of discourse on bodies. Importantly, however, he does so whilst 
simultaneously underlining their materiality. By insisting on the importance of 
physical performance, he underlines that bodies are irreducible to language alone. 
Preciado’s corporeal pratiques include writing while at the same time emphasising 
materiality – drawing the signifier (the drawing of the gode) onto the body’s skin 
amusingly literally with the tool of a red marker pen. Preciado again shows an 
overlap, a fusion, between text and bodies. His work demonstrates permeability, a 
communicative traffic between discourse and material bodies, with neither reducible 
to or separable from the other and with each shaping the other. Preciado’s pratiques 
are irreducibly bodily acts, but are nevertheless immersed in discourse.   
Preciado’s Manifeste includes a page-long ‘contra-sexual’ contract that can be 
cut out, filled in and signed by the reader, and – if desired, emailed to Preciado 
himself. The contract asks those who sign up to it to renounce all ‘relations sexuelles 
naturalisantes’ [naturalising sexual relationships] , all ‘liens de filiation (maritaux ou 
parentaux) […] assignés par la société hétérocentrée’ [familial ties (marital or 
parental) assigned by heterocentric society], as well as the ‘condition naturelle 
d’homme ou de femme et à tout privilège (social, économique, patrimonial) et à toute 
obligation (sociale, économique, reproductive) derivés’ [idea of being a ‘natural’ 
man or a woman and every privilege (social, economic, familial) and all obligations 
(social, economic, reproductive) derived therefrom] (30-1). This contract acts 
similarly to the pratiques in that it asks readers to act, to perform, in response to 
theoretical work. Rather than passively reading, readers are asked to materially alter 
their behavior, and a reflexive relationship is established between author and reader, 
with readers of the text able to respond to and communicate with its author.  
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The contract included in this text is indebted to Monique Wittig’s notion of a 
‘heterosexual contract’. Preciado dedicates the entire text of the Manifeste to Wittig, 
and writes that in a countersexual society, ‘les corps ou les sujets parlants 
s’appelleront des corps lesbiens ou “wittigs”’ [bodies or speaking subjects will be 
termed lesbian bodies or “wittigs”] (39, emphasis in bold in the original text). Here 
Preciado playfully acknowledges Wittig’s attempts to resignify the female body 
through her fictional writing in Le Corps lesbien, explored in the following chapter. 
Wittig’s essays in The Straight Mind outline her notion of the heterosexual contract 
as productive of sex, describing women as a political class rather than a biological 
category. She understands sexual difference as a political difference, falsely 
naturalised in order to perpetuate women’s subjugation by men. Preciado’s 
countersexual society seeks to ‘substituer à ce contrat social que l’on appelle Nature 
un contrat contra-sexuel’ [substitute this social contract upheld in the name of Nature 
with a countersexual contract] (20). This temporary contract invites those who sign 
up to it to practice the kind of resgnificative, countersexual acts of inversion Preciado 
offers in his pratiques, asking them to become ‘une producteur de godes’ [a producer 
of dildos], ‘un trou de cul et […] travailleur de cul’ [an ass hole and a worker of the 
ass] (30-1). While Butler responds to Wittig’s critique through her writing in Gender 
Trouble, Preciado’s contract responds para-theoretically, asking his readers to 
performatively declare themselves in rebellion.  
This countersexual contract is, alongside Wittig’s influence, also indebted to 
sadomasochistic cultures and the practice of S/M contracts. Preciado affirms that: 
‘les pratiques SM ainsi que la création de pactes contractuels […] ont rendu 
manifestes les structures érotiques de pouvoir sous-jacentes au contrat que 
l’hétérosexualité a imposé comme nature’ [SM practices, in addition to the creation 
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of contractual agreements […] have elucidated the erotic structures of power 
underlying the contract imposed by heterosexuality as nature] (29). Rather than 
simply describing the knowledge derived from these practices in exposing 
naturalised power structures, Preciado uses his contract as a device to open up a 
space in which alternative de-naturalised relations (to oneself as well as others) can 
be explored in practice by his readers. His countersexual society ‘se fait l’héritière du 
savoir pratique des communautés SM et adopte le contrat contra-sexuel temporaire 
comme forme privilégiée pour établir une relation contra-sexuelle’ [The 
countersexual society inherits the practical knowledge of SM communities and 
adopts temporary countersexual contracts as a principal way of establishing 
countersexual relationships] (29). While Preciado’s countersexual contract draws on 
the (usually) private contracts agreed between (and confined to) a fixed number of 
individuals in S/M subculture, its intentions are set on creating more public and far-
reaching societal transformations. His project is thus not simply about resignifying 
individual bodies, but is set on more far-reaching societal transformation.  
In his later interviews, Foucault was open about the creative and political 
potential he saw in S/M practices to resignify the erogenous zones of the body, 
describing practitioners as ‘inventing new possibilities of pleasure with strange parts 
of their body-through the eroticization of the body. I think [S/M is] a kind of 
creation, a creative enterprise’ (1997: 165). The project of resignification that 
Preciado undertakes certainly eroticises ‘strange’ parts of the body (the head, the 
arm) and takes on board this spirit of creation and invention of new possibilities 
through bodily practice. Preciado’s project of bodily pratiques as well as his contract 
is also informed by Foucault’s understanding of technologies and embraces his 
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promise of the possibilities of resistance held by a cultivation of bodies and pleasures 
through technologies of the self.  
In the same interview with Têtu cited earlier, Preciado comments:  
 
Mon but était de croiser l’analyse performative de Judith [Butler] avec 
l’archéologie critique des dispositifs disciplinaires de Foucault, et de les 
amener sur le terrain du corps, et des technologies biochimiques et 
pornographiques. C’est là qu’on en vient au pharmacopouvoir. (Têtu, 2008) 
 
[My aim was to mix Judith’s performative analysis with the critical 
archeology of Foucault’s disciplinary regimes, and to bring that to the level of 
the body, of biochemical and pornographic technologies. That’s where 
pharmacopouvoir came from.] 
 
Preciado does exactly that, taking works of theory and performing them through the 
body. His pratiques are an invitation, an incitement to engage in and proliferate 
various countersexual bodily pleasures free from the pathologising medical discourse 
attached to desire, in what he terms technologies of resistance.  
If Preciado has invited his readers to respond to the work of Butler, Wittig 
and Foucault, he also draws heavily on the work of Donna Haraway: particularly her 
cyborg feminism and work on prosthetics. His phrase ‘archive organique’ offers a 
similar juxtaposition to Haraway’s ‘material-metaphor’, which she uses to elucidate 
her vision of the cyborg. In particular, Preciado takes up Haraway’s invitation to 
consider prostheses as a political tool. In the Manifeste, he follows Haraway in her 
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claim that prostheses are able to interrupt and confuse the borders of the body and of 
subjectivity:   
 
La prothèse, les hormones, le systeme immunitaire, le web etc. ne sont que 
quelque exemples parmi d’autres du fait qu’il est impossible d’établir où 
finissent ‘les corps naturels’ et où commencent les ‘technologies artificielles’. 
(2000: 114) 
 
[prostheses, hormones, the immune system, the web etc.: these are just some 
examples amongst others of the fact that is impossible to establish where 
‘natural bodies’ end and ‘artifical technologies’ begin.] 
 
Prostheses are useful to the extent that their ‘statut borderline’ [borderline status] 
means that it is impossible to ‘tracer des limites nettes entre le “naturel” et 
“l’artificiel”, entre le “corps” et la “machine”’ [trace clear borders between the 
“natural” and the “artificial”, between the “body” and the “machine”] (2000: 119). 
Preciado’s repeated incorporation of godes in his contract as well as his bodily 
pratiques, including drawing a ‘prosthetic’ gode directly onto his skin, takes on a 
new significance in light of this concept.   
If Preciado’s Manifeste deploys the dildo as an emblem of a prosthetic world, 
his next work Testo Junkie is premised upon a performance carried out in response to 
Haraway’s work on prosthetics: the ‘self-experimentation’ Preciado records in taking 
testosterone. Haraway’s ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs’ (1990) asked its readers ‘Why 
should our bodies end at the skin or include at best other beings encapsulated by 
skin?’ (220).xi Preciado’s practice of using topical testosterone gel is a response to 
 98 
this question in and of itself. Preciado’s body does not end at his skin. His skin is not 
an impermeable barrier, but permeable, capable of absorbing and incorporating a 
molecule that will alter the cells of his body. Preciado’s extended project of self-
experimentation with the pharmaceutical prosthetic testosterone alluded to in the title 
of his later work Testo Junkie, and which I consider in the following section, takes on 
board the implications of Haraway’s cyborg and her work on prostheses and 
continues to explore the bodily experimentation initiated by the Manifeste.  
 
 
 
Décapiter la philosophie: undoing philosophy, undoing the philosopher-subject 
 
The cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern 
collective and personal self. This is the self feminists must code. 
Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools 
recrafting our bodies.  
(Haraway, 1990: 205) 
 
 
Influenced by Foucault’s concept of biopower, Judith Butler’s performativity, 
Haraway’s cyborg theory as well as Marxist materialists Antonio Negri and Michael 
Hardt (amongst others), Testo Junkie is a genealogy of the pharmaceutical and 
pornographic industries, which Preciado sees as ‘les deux piliers sur lesquels 
s’appuie le biocapitalisme contemporain, les deux tentacules d’un circuit intégré 
gigantesque et visqueux’ [the two pillars upon which contemporary biocapitalism 
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rests, two tentacles of an enormous and viscous integrated circuit] (2008: 48). The 
vast scale of this system, as well as its liquid quality, means that Preciado offers 
flashes of insight into its workings rather than a neat, systematic overview. These 
insights are explored through his own personal, bodily experience: in particular his 
use of pharmaceutical testosterone.  
Permeating this theoretical text are narrative breaks detailing Preciado’s 
relationships, notably with the author and film maker Virginie Despentes and his 
grief at the death of friend and former editor Guillaume Dustan (referred to in the text 
as V.D. and G.D. respectively). These narrative accounts also include his daily 
administration of Testogel (the brand name for a gel containing the androgen 
testosterone) which is applied to and absorbed through the skin into the bloodstream, 
and which he will take for the duration of writing the text. Preciado describes the 
process of taking testosterone as a self-experimentation, a process of ‘autocobaye’ 
(literally, making oneself the guinea pig or lab rat). The personal narrative and the 
theoretical sections of the text are not easily separable, since Preciado is exploring 
theory through his body in what he calls ‘une autothéorie’ [autotheory] or ‘un essai 
corporel’ [a bodily essay] (11). For example, while he writes about the history of the 
pharmaceutical production of testosterone, he also writes about the effects Testogel 
has on his body as he uses it daily (changing the scent of his sweat, his sleep patterns 
and even the way he writes).  
Preciado’s project of self-experimentation with testosterone is a political and 
philosophical exploration of subjectivity. Putting Haraway’s theory of prostheses into 
practice, he uses the biotechnological prosthetic testosterone in order to disrupt the 
Cartesian binaries Haraway attacks in her work. Preciado reimagines his sense of self 
through this experiment, a reimagining far from the Cartesian philosopher-subject 
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discussed in the previous chapter; the rationalist subject able to separate himself 
entirely from his body. Preciado describes his self-administration of testosterone as 
an attempt at auto-decapitation:  
 
Au début de ce livre, je me suis administré la testostérone (au lieu de 
commenter Hegel, Heidegger, Simone de Beauvoir ou Butler), je voulais me 
décapiter, trancher ma tête façonnée par un programme du genre, diséquer 
une partie du modèle moléculaire qui m’habite. Ce livre est la trace laissée 
par la coupure. (375) 
 
[At the beginning of this book, I took testosterone (rather than discussing  
Hegel, Heidegger, Simone de Beauvoir or Butler), I wanted to decapitate 
myself, slice open my head shaped by a programme of gender, dissect a part 
of the molecular model that lives within me. This book is the trace left by that 
cut.] 
 
Preciado writes here of the importance of bodily action rather than solely deploying 
theory, just as he does in the Manifeste. As if to highlight the difference between his 
own methodology and Butler’s, Preciado references three authors Butler uses in her 
own work (Hegel, Heidegger, Beauvoir) as well as Butler herself, claiming that in 
place of citing these authors, he has opted for the bodily experiment of taking 
testosterone. Preciado goes beyond observing his body, or even placing it centrally 
within his theory as a trigger for philosophical thought. Rather, he deploys it, 
intentionally altering it to insist on the potential for bodily resignification and the 
disruption of binaries.  
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Earlier in this chapter, I noted Judith Butler’s comments on philosophy at 
the beginning of Bodies that Matter: her sense that philosophical investigation was 
somehow ‘disembodied’ and ‘always at some distance from corporeal matters’, that 
philosophers will ‘invariably miss the body or, worse, write against it’. Preciado’s 
work forcefully challenges this view of philosophy with the gesture of the acèphale. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, the image of auto-decapitation echoes Georges 
Bataille’s own anti-Cartesian deployment of the figure of the acéphale. Bataille 
initiated the review Acéphale in 1936, with its first issue carrying the above image 
designed by the surrealist artist André Masson. The image depicts a re-working of 
Leonardo’s Vitruvian Man, the embodiment of classical reason, decapitated and with 
a dagger in his left hand. This image of auto-decapitation is taken up by Preciado 
here, making a similar gesture against Descartes’s disembodied philosophical 
rationalism and the humanist philosophical tradition.  
Towards the end of Testo Junkie, Preciado elaborates on his project of auto-
decapitation by recounting a fable. Adopting a tone and using imagery that wryly 
acknowledges the mysticism with which the body is often treated in contemporary 
theory, the fable begins with a philosopher ascending a mountain with his disciple, 
having promised this disciple that he will reveal the ‘true’ task of philosophy. After 
an arduous climb to the summit, the philosopher removes a blade. He throws it into 
the air and it returns at speed, cutting his head clean off. His severed head rolls down 
one side of the mountain, the headless body down the other. The disciple is faced 
with a choice: should he chase after the head, or recover the body? This, the reader is 
told, has been the lesson of philosophy – a choice between head or body, a separation 
of the two. But, Preciado asks, what if the task of philosophy was instead the 
intentional act of decapitation itself? 
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If the choice is between writing from the head and doing away with the body, 
or the opposite; writing from the body and doing away with the head, neither option 
is particularly appealing: 
 
Deux voies irréconciliables: une tête automatiquement dactylographe, qui n’a 
pas besoin des mains pour écrire; ou un corps décapité produisant, comme par 
suppuration, une réflexion intelligible. Là est le défi et la tentation de tout 
philosophe: courir après le corps ou après la tête. (375)    
 
[Two irreconcilable voices: a head typing automatically, who has no need of 
hands in order to write; or a decapitated body producing, as if by suppuration, 
its intelligible reflections. This is the challenge and the temptation of every 
philosopher: whether to run after the body or after the head.] 
 
He sets himself the task of reconciling what has previously been perceived as 
irreconcilable, and indeed the images he conjures do seem to be entirely opposed. 
Preciado’s description of an eerie bodiless head communicating with the world 
mechanically, through pure thought, ‘typing’ words without demeaning itself by 
relying on anything so bodily as a hand is unnerving – not ‘natural’ enough. While 
Preciado never explicitly mentions Descartes in this particular section, the imagery 
he uses certainly recalls the ‘meditateur’ of Cartesian philosophy, the rational, 
thinking subject who can exist without his body. This first image could certainly be 
understood as describing a philosopher who can do without his body, and the line 
‘qui n’a pas besoin de mains pour écrire’ recalls the line from Descartes’s 
Meditations that Butler takes up: ‘How can I deny that these hands and this body are 
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mine?’ (Descartes, 1985: 96). The other extreme Preciado presents is, conversely, all 
too bodily. The gruesome decapitated body’s only means of communicating its 
‘réflexion’ is by ‘suppuration’ – a medical term used to describe the seeping of pus 
from a wound. This headless body’s reflections are thus described as leaking from its 
body – uncontrolled and undisciplined, messy and abject.xii  
Expanding on the first image of the bodiless thinking head, Preciado writes:  
 
En Occident, jusqu’à présent, nous avons cru que le philosophe était une tête 
pensante (présupposé biohomme qui, mettant apparemment son corps de côté, 
faisait l’économie de sa bite et pouvait prendre une posture universelle). (375) 
 
[In the West, up to the present, we have believed the philosopher to be a 
thinking-head (pre-supposed as a cis man who, supposedly putting his body to 
one side, created an economy with his dick and then took up the posture of 
universality]  
 
Preciado follows many feminist thinkers in acknowledging that what purports to be 
the universal, neutral voice of Western philosophy is in fact a masculine voice. He 
transports this theory to the level of the body; this philosopher is supposedly a 
bodiless ‘tête pensante’, yet all the while employs the phallocentric logic of his 
unacknowledged ‘bite’. Ironically, it is the specific materiality of his body (‘sa bite’) 
that allows him to ignore it; there is nothing about his body that deviates from the 
typical philosopher – the universal does not need to acknowledge difference. The 
philosophical subject is described here as a Western voice – indeed, Gayatri Spivak 
has noted that the universal subject is a ‘concealed Subject (who) pretends it has “no 
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geo-political determinations”’ (1988: 66). It is also a heteronormative voice – ‘the 
point of view of the universal’ to cite Monique Wittig, is that of a subject formed in a 
‘straight society’ (1992: 59).  
The images Preciado presents of writing either solely from the head or from 
the body are both undesirable. In attempting to write theory that is also concerned 
with the body, in attempting to acknowledge the body of the philosopher, Preciado 
refuses to make the choice between head and body that previous philosophy has 
demanded. Rather than abandoning philosophy as the domain of the ‘head’, the 
universal, Preciado seeks to broaden its scope to take account of the body, 
reconfiguring philosophy itself.  
This Cartesian division between body and head, nature and culture, has 
dominated feminist thought. Discussing what he terms ‘le faux débat entre 
“essentialisme” et “constructivisme”’ [the false debate between ‘essentialism’ and 
‘constructivism’] (2000: 113) in the Manifeste, Preciado argues that the division 
between the two has produced a reluctance on the part of constructivists to concern 
themselves with the material body:   
 
Tout se passe comme si le sexe et la différence sexuelle […] pouvaient être 
mieux compris dans un cadre essentialiste alors que le genre […] gagnerait à 
être mieux appréhendé à l’aide de modèles constructivistes (2000: 114) 
 
[it is as if sex and sexual difference [...] could be better understood within an 
essentialist framework and gender […] better apprehended through 
constructivist models] 
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There is a pervasive anxiety in constructivist thought preventing discussion of the 
material body, as though any mention of it could provoke accusations of 
‘essentialising’. Yet for Preciado, both essentialism and constructivism rely on a 
Cartesian understanding of the body by considering nature and culture as separate or 
separable: ‘ces deux dependent d’une idée cartésienne du corps’ [both depend upon a 
Cartesian view of the body] (2000: 115). The premises supporting strict essentialism 
or constructivism are false: the body can never be understood solely as nature or 
culture, but only ever as both. Preciado’s approach, outlining a permeability between 
the material body and the discourse collapses any neat division between the two.  
Preciado deploys the prosthetic of testosterone as Haraway intended: to 
destroy such a binary by blurring the division between head and body. His work 
takes seriously Haraway’s claim that ‘Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the 
maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves’, 
dualisms that include ‘mind/body, culture/nature, male/female’ (1990: 223). In 
refusing this choice, Preciado brings body and head back together, hoping to make 
space for the body within a mode of writing that only ever considers its ‘head’. While 
the project of autocobaye appears to be one of self-splitting (into subject and object), 
Preciado actually occupies both positions, disrupting the division between them. In 
the same way, Preciado’s auto-decapitation allows him to become both bodiless head 
and headless body at once, a decapitation that perversely unites the two. 
In the Manifeste, Preciado had alluded to Descartes’s desire to become master 
and possessor of nature:  
 
Les narrations positivistes du développement technologique (où l’Homme est 
représenté comme la raison souveraine qui tempère, maîtrise et possède la 
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nature brute) […] présupposent une division et une opposition maintenue 
entre le corps vivant comme nature et la machine inanimée. (107)  
 
[positivist accounts of technological development (where Man is represented as 
sovereign reason who tempers, masters and possesses brute nature) […] 
presupposes a division and an opposition between the natural living body and 
inanimate machines]  
  
He identifies in technological or scientific discourse a supposed relation between a 
sovereign reason that is able to manipulate and control ‘brute’ nature, the rational 
scientist-subject who is able to control natural objects. Preciado’s Testo Junkie often 
playfully takes up such scientific language when describing his own body or events 
in his life to highlight this division. For instance, the opening foreword describes 
Preciado’s project as an ‘étude’ [study] of ‘le corps et les affects de B.P.’ [the body 
and the affects of B.P.] (11).xiii The language of ‘mutations externes’ [external 
mutations], ‘le tropisme du corps de B.P. vers le corps de V.D.’ [the tropism of the 
body of B.P. towards the body of V.D.] (11) seems more suited to a scientific 
experiment than a philosophical work (‘tropisme’ being a biological term, for 
instance), a theme that becomes more explicitly evident in the title of chapter five, 
‘Où le corps de V.D. devient un élément du contexte expérimental’ [Where the body 
of V.D. becomes a factor within the experiment] (77). The meaning behind this use 
of scientific language, a kind of scientific drag within the text, becomes clearer when 
Preciado announces that he is at once ‘le rat de laboratoire et le sujet scientifique’ 
[the lab rat and the scientific subject] (2008: 126-7). To be at once the scientist and 
the laboratory rat is to be both the object of study and the subject who records that 
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study. Again, by simultaneously inhabiting the position of philosophical subject and 
bodily object through autocobaye, Preciado destabilises the division between the 
two.  
In addition to troubling the subject who writes theory, Preciado’s work in 
Testo Junkie also disrupts the boundaries of theoretical writing itself. His hybrid 
genre of ‘autothéorie’ [autotheory] (11) simultaneously seeks to disrupt the division 
between theory and literature in an attempt to find a way to address the physical body 
in a theoretical work. The first few lines of the text outline what an autothéorie might 
be:   
 
Ce livre n’est pas une autofiction. Il s’agit d’un protocole d’intoxication […] 
Un essai corporel. Une fiction, c’est certain. S’il fallait pousser les choses à 
l’extrême, une fiction autopolitique ou une autothéorie. (11) 
[This book is not autofiction. It’s a protocol of intoxication […] A bodily 
essay. A fiction, for sure. If we must insist on a description, an autopolitical 
fiction or an autotheory.] 
 
The phrase ‘essai corporel’ contains a certain tension, suggesting that the body is not 
the usual or proper object of concern for theory. The verb ‘essayer’ [to try, to ‘test 
out’ or to experiment] alludes to experimentation as well as the genre of the essay 
(most notably the Essais of Montaigne). The phrase also suggests the kind of 
permeability between theoretical writing (essai) and bodily materiality (corporel) 
Preciado insists on throughout his work. The very first line of Testo Junkie makes it 
clear that Preciado is not writing an autofiction, yet his reference to the genre is 
 108 
significant. Autofiction was first used by Serge Doubrovsky in his novel Fils [Son] 
(1977), to describe novels heavily, but often ambiguously, influenced by 
autobiographical detail. Many of Preciado’s influences, in particular Guillaume 
Dustan and Hervé Guibert, work within autofiction, a genre that plays with an 
ambiguity over where biographical details end and fictional writing takes over. 
Preciado transports this ambiguity into theory, his work playfully testing how far the 
material ‘facts’ of his life and his body can be brought into a mode of writing that 
often excludes such concerns.  
Writers of autofiction frequently exploit the ambiguity inherent to the genre 
in their work. Christine Angot, for example, often dismisses shocking and seemingly 
autobiographical detail in her work (statements regarding incest and homophobia, 
most notably) by attributing them to her narrator ‘Christine’, and by asserting the 
difference between this narrator and herself as author. Gill Rye (2004) explores the 
uneasy relationship between author, narrator and protagonist in the work of Angot. 
She writes that the genre Angot writes within renders her both the subject and object 
of her work. In this way, and significantly given Preciado’s investment in 
performance, Angot’s autofiction ‘has analogies with performance art’ (119). As 
Hannah Westley has noted in her work on the self-representation of the French artists 
Louise Bourgeois and ORLAN, ‘self-representation means being subject and object 
at once – seer and seen’ (2008: 162). Bringing self-representation into theoretical 
writing as Preciado does in Testo Junkie, allows him to further blur the boundaries 
between the subject who writes theory and the studied object – in this case his own 
body. Preciado thus confuses the generic boundaries of theoretical writing, asking 
what theory or philosophy should concern itself with. As much as he troubles the 
opposition of rational subject and bodily object, he also disrupts the notion of a 
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neutral subject who writes theory, gradually widening the scope of theory and 
introducing aspects of his life and body into the text.  
The structure of Testo Junkie itself also begins to collapse the distinction 
between objective theory, as narrated by a neutral or objective theoretical voice, and 
subjective autofictional narrative. The opening chapter, ‘Ta mort’ [Your death], is 
recounted in the first person. Addressed to Dustan, who had recently died after a drug 
overdose, it is a highly personal account of a sexual ritual performed and recorded by 
Preciado. Dustan was a friend of Preciado and the editor of the Manifeste contra-
sexuel, which Dustan included in his series Le Rayon Gay. Particularly when 
describing the action of the performance/ritual, almost every sentence begins with the 
first-person pronoun ‘je’; ‘Je plie… Je me fais… J’ouvre… Je prends… Je dépose…’ 
[I fold… I make myself… I open… I take… I lay down] (18). In stark contrast, while 
the second chapter begins by situating Preciado very briefly through his childhood in 
industrial post-Franco Spain, the rest of the chapter is written in the third person in 
the formal theoretical voice, and with not one single use of the pronoun ‘je’ for the 
rest of its twenty-eight pages. If occasionally dizzying in terms of its pace, it is a 
neutrally-voiced genealogy of the production of pharmaceuticals, technologies and 
discourses surrounding them. As the third chapter returns to personal account, 
recounting the author’s self-prescribed administration of Testogel, the text appears at 
first to be structured ABAB, alternating chapters on ‘theory’ with chapters narrating 
personal events, thoughts and emotions. Just as soon as the reader comes to expect 
that a ‘theory’ chapter will follow a ‘narrative’ chapter, this neatly set-up binary is 
disrupted. Chapter four is a theoretical discussion of the influence of material and 
discursive technologies on the construction of sexuality, incorporating Foucault and 
Butler, yet some aspects begin to undermine the neutral theoretical voice Preciado 
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has thus far employed. A rather jarring invasion of the author’s presence appears at 
the very end of the chapter, after a discussion of the evolution of technologies of the 
body, communication and information:  
 
c’est l’ère de technologies molles, légères, visqueuses, des technologies 
gélatineuses, injectables, inhalables, incorporables – la testostérone que je 
m’administre, par exemple, appartient à ce type de technologies molles. (74, 
my emphasis) 
 
[this is the era of soft, light, viscous technologies; gelatinous, injectable, 
inhalable, incorporable technologies – the testosterone that I administer, for 
example, belongs in this genre of soft technologies]  
 
After discussing the history and evolution of pharmaceuticals, the presence of the 
first-person pronoun ‘je’ coupled with the reflexive pronoun preceding ‘administre’, 
grounds a moment in the complex and lengthy genealogy he is writing in his own 
corporeal existence – a discussion of theory around pharmaceuticals is brought back 
to the level at which it alters the cells of his body. The effect is rendered doubly 
powerful since it recalls the previous ‘narrative’ chapter (the third chapter, 
‘Testogel’), which discusses Testogel in detail: how it is administered, who it is 
supposedly produced for and its effects. What had begun to appear as a genealogy of 
the pharmaceutical industry and its relation to biocapitalism becomes situated in the 
effect of its subject matter on the author’s life and material body. 
The division between these alternating chapters breaks down further as the 
text progresses. Theoretical definitions begin to be used in narrative sections – for 
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instance, the theoretical terms used in chapter four are inserted into chapter five, 
jarring with the rest of the narrative; ‘c’est mon corps, entité prothétique du pouvoir, 
plateforme microexcitable de résistance, qui tombe amoureux’ [its my body, 
prosthetic entity of power, micro-excitable platform of resistance, that falls in love] 
(77), or ‘Durant les septs heures où Victor “travail biopolitiquement”, moi, j’écris’ 
[During that seven hours Victor ‘works biopolitically’, I write] (118).xiv After a 
theory-heavy chapter seven (which the reader anticipates as a ‘narrative’ chapter) the 
reader starts to become confused as to ‘which’ chapter they are reading. The divide 
does not collapse completely, but is unsettled further, playfully. Chapter eight 
includes footnotes to a theoretical discussion of the contraceptive pill, which do not 
refer as usual to a work by Butler or Foucault, but to a conversation with the author’s 
partner, ‘Je discute la pilule avec V.D. qui a incontestiblement plus d’expérience que 
moi en tant que consommatrice’ [I discuss the pill with V.D. who has incontestably 
more experience than I as its consumer] (163), or to the author’s own experience with 
doctors keen to prescribe the pill as contraception (169). By chapter twelve, 
interjections from ‘V.D.’ are included in the main body of the text rather than 
relegated to footnotes (303). In this way, the very structure of the text performs the 
deconstruction of the theoretical voice, the undoing of the ‘neutral’ philosophical 
subject. The affective response it produces in the reader who has come to expect that 
the structure established in the first few chapters will continue is one of uncertainty: 
it forces the reader to question what theory is, what its subject should be and who 
narrates it.   
With the similar effect of situating Preciado’s theory and dislodging the 
supposed neutrality of the theoretical voice, hand-drawn mind maps begin to 
accompany the theory sections of the text. These are not neat, digitally produced 
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diagrams which one might expect to accompany a theoretical work, but include 
scribbled notes and somewhat frantic connecting arrows that seem to capture some of 
the experience of thinking through philosophical ideas. Not only do they bring the 
author’s thought processes into the work, these lines – drawn as they are by the 
philosopher’s hands – are offered for the reader to witness. Of course Preciado does 
not bring his body directly into the text with these marks; they do not imply a body 
any more than any manuscript would. Rather, when juxtaposed with the digital 
typeface of the rest of the text, with its uniformity and conventional formality 
suggesting academic ‘objectivity’, these drawings gesture toward an embodied 
theory, performing a playful and subtle disruption of the notion of a neutral 
philosophical voice. Preciado signals that he is explicitly not a decapitated head 
without the need for hands in order to write. 
Preciado’s method is to insidiously undermine the genre of philosophy. While 
he takes on the neutral philosophical voice at the beginning of his text, this is 
ultimately a form of drag, with the neutral voice gradually exposed as particular, 
embodied, queer. His use of polemic, capitalised headings and phrases, his 
informality, hand-drawn mind maps and the incorporation of frank accounts of 
sexual acts and the inclusion of personal narrative all contrast with the conventions of 
philosophical writing. His use of his body is certainly not as the ‘setting for 
philosophy’ it is for Butler or Descartes. Similarly, his forthright and unashamedly 
bold political positions destroy any notion of impartiality, of neutral and objective 
philosophical inquiry.  
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A literature of entanglement, or ‘Posthuman life writing’   
 
It is futile to seek a pure nature unpolluted by humanity, and it is 
foolish to define the self as something purely human. But how can I 
start to feel myself as not only human? 
(Bennett, 2010: 116) 
 
‘le queer c’est alors la pratique d’identités différentes, un processus 
autobiographique’  
[queer is the practice of different identities, an autobiographical process]  
(Le Zoo, 1998: 98). 
 
 
Preciado’s work could be described as an ‘entangled’ literature, a posthuman life 
writing. In theoretical terms, posthumanist work has undermined certainty in the 
rational, Cartesian subject. But what would it mean to take this seriously in the way 
we live, write and understand the world? ‘Entanglement’ as a term has been used by 
new materialistsxv to diagnose the intermingling between what have previously been 
understood as discreet entities: subjects and objects, selves and others, and even 
discreet substances (for instance, the substance dualism separating matter and 
meaning, body and soul). One could read Preciado’s work as a response to feminist 
new materialist Jane Bennett’s question above: ‘how can I start to feel myself as not 
only human?’. Indeed, how can we divest of this long legacy of human understanding 
 114 
– of understanding ourselves as discreetly human – and really begin to see ourselves 
as emerging and reemerging through ‘entangled intra-relating’ (Barad, 2007: ix); 
through ‘topological reconfigurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations’ 
(Barad, 2003: 818)? This humanist legacy has been partly formed and heavily 
reinforced through the literary genres of memoir, life writing and autobiography. 
Preciado’s work turns these generic forms upside down, ‘recast[ing] the self in the 
light of its intrinsically polluted nature’ (Bennett, 2007: 116).   
Testo Junkie emphasises what Preciado terms an ‘autofeed-back’ between the 
material body and the discourses surrounding it, exploring a symbiotic relationship – 
a reflexivity – between bodies and what might previously have been termed ‘outside 
forces’. This relationship of dynamic coalescence has much in common with 
Bennet’s notion of entanglement, and similarly ends up collapsing any easy 
distinction between inside and outside. For example, Preciado discusses the evolving 
discourses around gender; the forces of global capitalism and the advances in 
technology that have resulted in the commercial production of testosterone by the 
pharmaceutical industry. Without the medicalised discourses around gender, 
particularly the work of John Money, together with the commercialisation of 
pharmaceuticals in what he terms ‘L’ère pharmacopornographique’ [the 
pharmacopornographic era] (23), Preciado demonstrates that the Testogel he 
administers daily simply would not exist; that his material body – his very cells – 
would not exist in the way that it does; and that (since taking testosterone affects the 
way he writes) the text he writes would not exist either.  
Preciado’s work is concerned with the effects of discourses and technologies 
on bodies, but also, reflexively, with the ways in which bodies are productive of 
theories in this continuous and symbiotic process. Not only does Preciado seek to 
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make theories take adequate account of bodies, he also recognises the transitive 
relation between the material body and theoretical writing; that theories can not only 
affect bodies but shape the very cells that compose them. Through testosterone, 
Preciado illustrates that his body is materially affected by theories and discourses. 
Simultaneously, and conversely, Preciado’s theoretical writing is also influenced by 
his body’s absorption of testosterone. As he begins to take testosterone, Preciado 
reports an increased drive to read continually, to write prolifically. His body – altered 
by the prosthetic pharmaceutical – is necessarily implicated in the theory he 
produces. The text outlines a reflexive causality between body and text: in this 
example, discourses around gender result in the pharmaceutical production of 
testosterone, which then affects Preciado’s body and the discourse he produces 
through his text.   
Preciado’s concept of autofeed-back also informs the way in which he 
understands queer theory’s political origins, with its roots in the activist response to 
the AIDS crisis. Elsewhere I have considered how evolving sexual practices – the 
concept and practice of bareback sex, specifically – have affected queer theory, as 
well as how the development of antiretrovirals might affect a body of theory such as 
queer, in addition to individual bodies.xvi Again there is a symbiosis here which 
renders any separation of biotechnologies or sexual practices as material on the one 
hand, and theoretical work as somehow immaterial on the other, as nonsensical. 
Rather, there is a form of autofeedback, and ‘entangled intra-relating’ (Barad, 2007: 
ix), a continuous co-evolution.   
The development of prosthetic hormones has relied not only on medicalised 
discourse but on human experimentation, such as that Preciado describes as carried 
out in Puerto Rico during the 1950’s and 1960’s. This relied on the ‘pseudo-colonial’ 
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status of Puerto Rico, which became a ‘living laboratory’ for US pharmaceutical 
companies, effectively enslaving the local population in the service of developing 
biocapitalism. Preciado acknowledges that his own material existence is formed 
through these forces of global capitalism, material discourses and, as Marxist world-
systems theoryxvii describes, the exploitation of those living in the periphery and 
semi-periphery. Discursive and material technologies, capitalist and colonial realities 
all combine to produce the material body from which Preciado writes: recalling Le 
Zoo’s investment in Sandra Harding’s situated knowledge, he presents an ultra-
situated body and demonstrates an allegiance to particularity over a universal 
philosophical voice. Le Zoo claim the particular position to be expressed through 
‘l’autoreprésentation’ [self-representation] (Bourcier, 1998: 12); and thus queer is 
allied to ‘la pratique d’identités différentes, un processus autobiographique’ [the 
practice of different identities, an autobiographical process] (98). 
What Preciado avoids, though, is a purely individualist account, a navel-
gazing approach. Rather, he uses an exploration of his materially situated, subjective 
position as a starting point for asking much wider questions about the world; 
questions concerning the entanglement of biocapitalism, systems, state power, 
industries and institutions. One real strength of Testo Junkie is its deployment both of 
poststructuralism and queer theory – with their focus on language, culture and 
discourse – together with non-orthodox Marxist materialism and the analysis of 
(bio)capital. Of the latter, it is work by Negri and Hardt that Preciado is most 
influenced by, although he also cites Maurizio Lazzarato, Antonella Corsani and 
Yann Moulier-Boutang. Preciado expands on their concept, which draws itself on 
Foucault, of ‘biopolitical work’, affirming that ‘les industries pharmaceutiques […], 
l’industrie pornographique et l’industrie de la guerre [sont] les secteurs porteurs du 
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capitalisme postfordiste’ [the pharmaceutical industry […], the pornographic 
industry, and the industry of war are the load-bearing sectors of post-Fordist 
capitalism] (2008: 37). Given this, the notion of immaterial labour must be expanded: 
‘les matières premières du processus productif actuel sont l’excitation, l’érection, 
l’éjaculation, le plaisir, le sentiment d’autosatisfaction, de contrôle omnipotent, et de 
destruction totale’ [the raw materials of production today are excitation, erection, 
ejaculation, feelings of self-satisfaction, omnipotent control, and total destruction] 
(2008: 37). Again emphasizing a liquid quality to this system, he writes: ‘l’industrie 
pharmacopornographique est l’or blanc et visqueux , la poudre critalline du 
capitalism biopolitique’ [the pharmacopornographic industry is white gold, viscous, 
the crystalline powder of biopolitical capitalism] (2008: 38). Not only described as 
viscous, but also a powder-fine coating, this new form of capitalism is at once 
insidiously omnipresent, yet hard to perceive, hard to define, and hard to hold on to.  
Preciado’s subjectivity is not only situated in relation to theoretical work, 
global systems and biocapital but is shown to be formed through them: an analysis of 
self therefore includes, and is used to explore, these wider systems. Preciado’s 
exploration of self is presented not as a coherent, natural whole – but, rather, as 
historically and materially contingent, as shifting and constituted by various 
prosthetic-like elements: his relationships with others, with writing, theoretical work, 
and pharmaceutical testosterone. Another element in the web of entanglement that 
produces the ‘self’ Preciado narrates is his personal relationships, most notably, 
Dustan and Despentes. As noted earlier, the foreword of Testo Junkie sets out 
Preciado’s task as an ‘étude’, which takes as its subject ‘le corps et les affects de 
B.P.’ (11). Playing with scientific language, it notes ‘deux mutations externes’, 
unforeseen, which have affected it (these are the death of ‘G.D.’ and ‘le tropisme du 
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corps de B.P. vers le corps de V.D.’) (11). Preciado, his ‘body and affects’, are 
described like a cell, mutating and evolving with the influence of others, moving in 
relation to them.  
Two scenes describing Preciado’s relationships with ‘V.D.’ and ‘G.D.’ 
elucidate Preciado’s experience of self as one that is not discreet or self-contained but 
flooded by texts, language, discourse. Firstly, just as Testo Junkie could not exist as a 
text without Preciado’s bodily experimentation, the embodied experience Preciado 
describes in his text would not be the same without the theories he has consumed. 
Recalling a sexual encounter with Despentes, Preciado writes:   
 
Pendant qu’on baise, je sens que toute mon histoire politique, toutes mes 
années de féminisme avancent directement vers le centre de son corps […] 
Quand je jouis, Wittig et Davis, Woolf et Solanas, la Pasionaria et Kate 
Bornstein, bouillonnent avec moi. (91-2) 
 
[When we fuck, I feel my whole political history, all my years of feminism 
advance directly towards the centre of her body […] When I come, Wittig and 
Davis, Woolf and Solanas, la Pasionaria and Kate Bornstein, simmer within 
me] 
 
Preciado’s use of ‘bouillonner’ here underlines in this description not only how 
intertwined he is with the ideas of the writers cited, but also a sense of energetic 
movement between these ideas and his body. This is a point of culmination in an 
evolution of the way he experiences his body through theoretical and political ideas. 
Just as Preciado’s theory is grounded in and confirmed by his body and his 
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experimentation with it, his experiences and bodily acts are underpinned by the 
theory he has consumed. 
Secondly, in Testo Junkie’s opening chapter, addressed to Dustan (‘Ta mort’), 
Preciado channels Dustan’s writing style as well as enacting a kind of 
autopornographic ritual dedicated to him, and performed in his image, in drag 
(18).xviii Preciado writes that he records this physical performance both by video 
camera and through the writing of the chapter itself.xix The identity of Dustan – his 
physical appearance, his writing style or ‘voice’ as well as certain gestures and facial 
expressions – is recreated as a ‘drag you [Dustan]’ (19). Dustan’s first novel, Dans 
ma chamber [In My Room] (1996), is physically present during his performance and 
read aloud during the scene: 
 
Je suspends ma bite en plastique au-dessus des paragraphes tatoués sur les 
pages de Dans ma chambre. C’est ton geste. Le gode cache une partie de la 
feuille, créant une limite, qui permet de lire certains mots et en dissimule 
d’autres. (19) 
 
[I place my plastic dick below the paragraphs tattooed on the pages on In My 
Room. It’s your look. The dildo conceals part of the page, allowing certain 
words to be read and covering others.] 
 
There is a slippage here between text and body; the pages of the book become skin, 
the text ‘tattooed’ onto them. Things are not what they seem – the bite is made of 
plastic, while the book’s pages become skin. There is a productive exchange between 
prosthetic body and text, with the presence of the former delimiting and restricting 
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what can be read, but, on a more positive reading, in effect creating a new text. 
Preciado playfully inverts Butler’s problem of language’s inability fully to capture 
the body; rather than language’s partial access to the body, the body here allows only 
partial access to the text. In this instance, the prosthetic body overshadows the text, 
overpowering and obscuring it: perhaps reflecting Preciado’s emphasis on the 
material of his body, his insistence that it cannot be reduced to language alone. Both 
the physical book and Preciado’s body become the host in this communion with 
Dustan’s ‘fantôme’ [ghost] (19). During his performance, Preciado imitates a 
memorable facial expression of Dustan’s; ‘Identique, et méconnaisable… C’est ton 
geste’ [Identical, and unrecognisable… It’s your look] (18). As well as temporarily 
taking on something of Dustan, Preciado shows here that Dustan forms part of him – 
they are at once alike and dissimilar, not the same, but inseparable.   
Preciado’s autocobaye presents an epistemic methodology – a mode of 
philosophical investigation – that is inextricable from the body and, vitally, that is 
able to explore the bodily effects of the dominant pharmacopornographic discourse 
and regime that he identifies. He uses his body to perform philosophy; his project of 
autocobaye embodying a cyborg politics inherited from Haraway. By presenting a 
body constituted and permeated by the prosthetic extensions of Testogel, his 
friendships, the philosophy he consumes and the sexual acts he recounts, Preciado 
undermines the very possibility of an ‘organic’ non-prosthetic notion of the self. 
Testo Junkie is not only a work of theory that concerns itself with describing 
corporeality; it is a work of theory with its terms set by the body, inseparable from it. 
While Preciado is certainly critical of aspects of Deleuze’s work in his Manifeste, the 
bodily self presented here reads something like an assemblage – not fixed or stable, 
but a fizzing coalescence of various shifting components, combining together 
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momentarily within an equally dynamic, frothy world system. Preciado presents a 
shifting body flooded with prosthetics, affect, texts, politics, relations to other bodies; 
all of this producing an entangled account of the bodily self, a posthuman literature.  
 
 
Queer Permeability  
 
In the previous chapter, I explored the limitations of two strands of theoretical or 
philosophical writing in approaching the material body – Cartesian rationalist 
dualism and poststructuralist thinking that results in a ‘linguistic monism’, also 
manifest in many constructivist understandings of gender and sexuality, not least 
queer theory. I explored these philosophical approaches out of a concern that both (in 
different ways) leave the materiality of the body unknowable or indescribable. Where 
Cartesian dualism’s complex relation to the body imagines it as separable from the 
mind, both Judith Butler and Jean-Luc Nancy see the material body as impenetrable 
to language, existing in a different ontological ‘order’ to it (Real as opposed to 
Symbolic), and certainly unable to be fully grasped by it. While Butler’s response is 
a warning to bear this in mind, not to resort to a ‘linguistic monism’ that sees the 
body as quite literally constituted by language, Nancy’s is to outline a way in which 
language might allude to the material by exscription. Preciado, however, insists on an 
entirely different model of relationality between material bodies and texts: that of 
permeability. He imagines bodies with shifting and mutable boundaries that are 
permeable to language, with texts as forms (amongst others) of prosthetic extensions. 
This radically different response from Preciado as to what bodies are and to how they 
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relate to language allows queer theory to take account of the weight of bodies’ 
materiality.  
  Writing in praise of feminist work that takes the proposition of material 
monism seriously, avoiding repeating the substance dualism that still permeates 
much feminist theory, separating language from matter and ignoring or remaining 
agnostic on questions of material biology, Noella Davis writes that ‘there is an 
entanglement, a non-separability, of biology with/in sociality’ (2009: 76). Preciado’s 
model of permeability affirms this ‘non-separability’. Instead of the poststructuralist 
insistence on the separation of language from matter, the impermeable block of 
language that leaves discussion of the material body out of reach, Preciado embraces 
a materialist monism. This monist approach need not represent a flattening out of 
substance, or a denial of the power of language. It will include difference, but, as 
Davis writes further, ‘difference is not a joining of two separate categories, but 
instead implies a differentiation within one system, where the differentiated parts are 
entangled such that they cannot be distinctly and separately identified’ (76). 
Permeability implies difference between material bodies and writing, but not 
difference in terms of substance such as that underpinning the dualist account.  
Preciado calls for a politics that is not only situated and self-reflective, but 
that physically experiments with the body of the theorist. He situates his 
methodology through a discussion of the use of cocaine by Freud, as well as his auto-
analysis, and the use of hashish by Walter Benjamin – all of which could be 
described as self-experimentation. Preciado’s writing is a political call to arms: ‘Je 
plaide ici pour un ensemble de politiques d’expérimentation corporelle et 
sémiotechnique’ [I call here for a collection of politics concerned with the body and 
semiotechnics’ (2008: 299). While Preciado makes clear that his body belongs to no 
 123 
particular ideology, this self-experimentation is not a frivolous individual exercise 
but politically laden. Borrowing a phrase from the AIDS activism of the 1980s New 
York art collective Gran Fury ‘art is not enough’, Preciado elaborates:  
 
Une philosophie qui n’utilise pas son corps comme plateforme active de 
transformation techno-vitale tourne à vide. Les idées ne suffisent pas. ‘L’art 
ne suffit pas.’ Le style ne suffit pas. La bonne intention ne suffit pas. La 
sympathie ne suffit pas. Toute philosophie est forcément auto-vivisection, 
quand ce n’est pas dissection de l’autre. Une pratique d’entaille de soi, 
d’incision de la subjectivité. (2008: 307) 
 
[Philosophy that does not use the body as an active platform for techno-vital 
transformation is null and void. Ideas are not enough. Art is not enough. Style 
is not enough. Good intention is not enough. Sympathy is not enough. All 
philosophy must be auto-vivisection, if it is not to be dissection of the other. It 
must practice slicing into the self, an incision into subjectivity.]  
 
The images employed by Preciado, previously with ‘autocobaye’, and here with 
‘auto-vivisection’ and ‘entaille de soi, d’incision’ – contain a definite violence. He 
suggests that his method is a turning inward of the potential violence of theory that 
studies the other, directing it at his own subjectivity.  
Yet is there a way in which Preciado uses bodily experimentation, the 
molecule testosterone, as a material intervention in the text, as a kind of authoritative 
gesture? Does Preciado appeal to the act of taking testosterone as a kind of 
validation, an authenticity engendered by bodily presence? If Preciado does appeal to 
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his material body in this way, it would seem to condemn writing alone as unable to 
approach the body without such a gesture: ‘Les idées ne suffisent pas’. Wittig’s 
account of politics explored through the form of writing itself explored in the 
following chapter certainly offers a different model. But for Preciado, the weight of 
the material body – albeit one that is understood as always fractured, connected and 
mutable rather than coherent and static – is central to his theoretical writing. 
A closer reading of Preciado’s writing on testosterone exposes its dual 
function in the text as metaphor as well as material intervention. Once administered, 
the testosterone gel sinks easily through his skin. In his descriptions of absorbing 
testosterone, Preciado announces this membrane’s hyper-permeable qualities:  
 
il suffit de l’approcher de la peau, pour que d’un simple voisinage avec le 
corps, [la molecule de testostérone] disparaisse et se dilue dans mon sang. 
(61) 
 
[it’s enough simply to come close to the skin, a simple proximity with the 
body and [the molecule of testosterone] disappears and is diluted within my 
blood.] 
  
The process of absorption is precisely not solely a metaphor, but a Harawayan 
material-metaphor, effecting as it does a material change in Preciado’s physical body. 
This model of permeability is also used to describe the relationship between language 
– specifically theoretical language – and bodies. In Preciado’s work, theories are 
imagined as penetrating through skin and into bodies, much like the testosterone he 
administers daily. Particularly important to this is Preciado’s comment on 
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performativity, his desire to ‘pousser l’hypothèse performative dans le corps, 
jusqu’aux fluides, la faire passer dans les cellules’ [push the hypothesis of 
performativity into the body, right up to its fluids, to channel it into its cells] (2008: 
98, my emphasis).xx Just as the testosterone Preciado applies daily sinks beneath his 
skin and into his bloodstream, modifying the cells of his body, Preciado expresses the 
desire to understand theoretical writing – Butler’s theory of performativity here, 
specifically – as affecting bodies at a material level, imagining them passing through 
skin and into the material body, into its cells and fluids. Preciado’s constant 
metaphors of theories as cells, molecules, viruses, as well as his bodily 
experimentation in applying topical testosterone all point towards a model of 
permeability, towards a subcutaneous theory, a theory that is able to ‘get under one’s 
skin’.  
Preciado uses the model of permeability to build on Foucault’s analysis of 
biopower, emphasising the materiality of technologies of power in shifting from a 
disciplinary society to a pharmacopornographic society:  
 
Si dans la société disciplinaire les technologies de subjectivation contrôlaient 
le corps depuis l’extérieur […] dans la société pharmacopornographique les 
technologies font désormais partie du corps, se diluent dans le corps, se 
convertissent en corps. (2008: 74, my emphasis)  
 
[If within the disciplinary society, technologies of the self controled bodies 
from the outside […] in the pharmacopornographic society, technologies now 
make up part of the body, dilute themselves within the body, convert 
themselves into the body]  
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In what could be viewed as a new materialist reworking of Foucault, Preciado claims 
that technologies are materially incorporated rather than acting on bodies from the 
outside. His notion of ‘pharmacopouvoir’ explores pharmaceuticals as material 
aspects of biopower alongside other forms of discursive control. That is, sex and 
sexuality are produced by pharmaceutical testosterone, Viagra or the contraceptive 
pill as much as they are by discursive regimes. 
As much as Preciado draws on Foucault, Butler or Haraway, his model of 
permeability and his focus on the concrete materiality of bodies should also be linked 
to queer biopolitical concerns, exemplified by the AIDS crisis. Preciado connects the 
process of absorbing testosterone through skin to the metaphor of pushing a (bodily) 
queer politics into theory in the paratext of Testo Junkie: ‘La politique queer y 
pénètre la théorie, comme la testostérone se glisse dans la peau’ [Queer politics 
penetrates theory here, just as testosterone slips through the skin]. His reference to 
the activism of the AIDS crisis, to Gran Fury and ACT UP is telling – the necessity 
of engaging his body politically can be linked to the urgency of queer politics during 
this period. Like Preciado, HIV-positive artist and writer David Wojnarowicz writes 
of a political imperative to engage his physical body, to let his ‘hands become 
weapons, every bone and muscle and fiber and ounce of blood become weapons’ 
(1991: 81). Writing during the early years of the AIDS crisis in Close to the Knives: 
A Memoir of Disintegration, published a year before his death in 1991, Wojnarowicz 
threatens an explosion breaching the borders of his body, the membrane between 
interior and exterior. He writes:  
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I’m carrying this rage like a blood-filled egg and there’s a line between the 
inside and the outside a thin line between thought and action and that line is 
simply made up of blood and muscle and bone (161) 
 
While Preciado’s breach of skin is imagined and effected through testosterone, a 
breach from the outside inwards, his model of permeability draws on the logic of 
outward infection or viral transmission that Wojnarowicz expresses here, a logic that 
threatens a violent explosion outwards from within and understands a world where 
bodies are not discreet and contained, but permeated by discourse, vulnerable to 
viruses. Both threaten the integrity of the membrane itself, both pressure the 
membrane of skin to breaking point. 
Four years after Wojnarowicz died from complications related to AIDS, his 
partner followed his wishes and threw his ashes over the fence of the White House as 
part of an action by ACT UP, an act constituting a breach of the imagined borders of 
state power. The biopolitical context of his future death was certainly not lost on 
Wojnarowicz during his life, even if it was not framed in such terms. HIV/AIDS was 
and remains a political virus because of the demographics affected, demographics 
effectively ‘let die’ by the state’s lack of interest in treating AIDS as a public health 
crisis, demographics deemed in some way outside of this public.xxi Preciado’s 
allegiance to a biopolitical understanding of subjugated bodies, those who the state 
would ‘let die’, triggers his model of queer permeability. A model of permeability is 
essential to queer theory in providing a way to describe the material violence of 
discourse and to account for the material vulnerability of marginalised bodies. 
Preciado’s model of permeability affirms this principle, offering a critical 
understanding of the transitivity between material bodies and discourses that is 
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crucial to queer theorising. In his attempts to confront materiality and to describe the 
discursive and material technologies that shape bodies, Preciado’s queer permeability 
is vital to maintaining the political force of queer and to ensure that it continues to 
speak to situated, material bodies – especially to the vulnerability of bodies 
marginalised, manipulated and utilised by and for global biocapitalism, normative 
discourses and technologies. 
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Serpents Tail.   
i I focus my attention on Preciado’s Manifeste and Testo Junkie in this chapter, rather than his other 
published works Pornotopie. Playboy et l’invention de la sexualité multimédia [Pornotopia: An Essay 
on Playboy’s Architechture and Biopolitics] (2011) and Un appartement sur Uranus: Chroniques de 
la traversée [An apartment on Uranus: Chronicles of crossing] (2019). While Pornotopie was 
published later than Testo Junkie, it’s writing precedes the latter as it is based on his doctoral thesis in 
architectural theory at Princeton. While Preciado uses terms in Pornotopie that also appear in Testo 
Junkie (for example, a chapter of Pornotopie is titled ‘Le lit pharmaco-pornographique’), they are still 
nascent in this work, with more developed accounts outlined in Testo Junkie. Un appartement sur 
Uranus, prefaced by Virginie Despentes, comprises a series of very short essays published in the 
French broadsheet Libération between 2013 and 2018. Given their non-specialist audience, this work 
is far more accessible and less theoretically driven than his other works. 
ii In the years since Prosser’s publication, such neat divisions between ‘transgender’ and ‘transsexual’ 
as identity categories no longer seem to apply, but his criticism of Butler still holds.  
iii In the USA, transgender people are understood to be among those at the highest risk of HIV 
infection. Despite insufficient data collection, the figures available show that young, black or Latina 
trans women are disproportionately represented in these figures (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2013).   
iv This tactic of using transgender experience to shine a light on wider theoretical approaches, rather 
than treating transgender experience as the object of study by others, is a common tactic of 
transgender studies, as I argue in ‘Transforming Theory: Innovations in Critical Trans Studies’ (2019) 
Paragraph 42:2, 255-68.   
v Gayle Salamon responds to Prosser’s critique of Butler in Assuming a Body (2010), adding a 
phenomenological approach to the Butlerian account in an attempt to account for the body. Yet she 
repeats the Cartesian dynamic of Butler’s initial claims regarding the body, reaffirming the body as a 
site of doubt and uncertainty and insisting on ‘those immaterial structures which subtend the body’s 
materiality’ (3). She also claims that separating out the ‘matter’ of the body from its linguistic or social 
aspects would render it mute: ‘What the “real” body tells us – or, rather, what it silently displays, 
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without the benefit of language – is nothing. Considered only as a blunt materiality, severed from any 
psychic investments, it has no meaning at all. This body is mute and impenetrable, a fleshy monad that 
is only “Real” in the Lacanian sense of that word, foreclosed from language, symbolization and 
meaning’ (88). I contend that it is impossible, however, to separate out matter and meaning in this way 
– matter is not impenetrable to meaning, nor is meaning ‘immaterial’. Throughout this book I outline a 
materialist monist approach which sees materiality as permeated with meaning, which is committed to 
a constructivist and materialist account of sex and gender.  
vi Preciado does not employ psychoanalytic theory, sharing Bourcier’s scepticism towards it. See, for 
example, Bourcier’s essay ‘Zap la psy, on a retrouvé la bite à Lacan’ (2005).  
vii Derrida, Mal d’archive [Archive Fever] (1995). 
viii For a discussion of Preciado’s work alongside Derrida’s notion of the archive, see Elliot Evans 
(2018) ‘Wittig and Davis, Woolf and Solanas (…) simmer within me’: Reading Feminist Archives in 
the Queer Writing of Paul B. Preciado’.  
ix Preciado uses this shortened version rather than ‘godemichets’. 
x The level of agency bestowed on these acts and their predicted subversive outcome is entirely 
contradictory to Butler in her revision of performativity in Bodies that Matter. While they are certainly 
tongue-in-cheek in the way they are set out, they do conform to a divergence between Butler and 
Preciado about the political potential of intentionally subversive gendered acts. 
xi Butler also cites this line in Bodies That Matter, to make the point that bodies are never simply 
organic, brute matter (1).  
xii The example Preciado gives of bodily writing (‘forcer… le corps à produire du texte’) is that of 
Antonin Artaud (2008: 375). 
xiii The initials ‘B.P.’ refers to Preciado under his previous name ‘Beatriz’.  
xiv Victor was Preciado’s partner. The ‘biopolitical’ work described is sex work; the reader is told 
Victor works as an operator on a phone-sex line. 
xv Karen Barad’s work Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning (2007) in particular develops the term.  
xvi Evans, E. (2015). ‘Your HIV-positive sperm, my trans-dyke uterus: Anti/futurity and the politics of 
bareback sex between Guillaume Dustan and Beatriz Preciado’. 
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xvii A world-systems analysis describes a self-reinforcing global system of capital whereby core 
countries benefit from a system reliant on the low-skilled and low-paid labour of those in the 
periphery and semi-periphery.  
xviii Dustan described his own writing as ‘autopornographique’; Preciado clearly channels this ‘genre’ 
in his opening chapter.  
xix Preciado claims that the ritual he describes performing in writing is also recorded in film, offering 
two potential records of the physical event in different media. The potential of performance and the 
visual to represent the body will be explored later in this book, using the work of the French 
performance artist ORLAN. 
xx To give an example of the divergences in the English translation of Testo Junkie from Preciado’s 
text, this line appears in a much later section of the chapter (chapter six, ‘Technogenre’) with its 
meaning and the theoretical context in which it is situated significantly changed: ‘Today, this 
Butlerian analysis comes together with Donna J. Haraway’s lessons for examining the semiotechnical 
dimension of this performative production: pushing the performative hypothesis further into the body, 
as far as its organs and fluids; drawing it into the cells, chromosomes, and genes’ (Preciado, 2013: 
110).  
xxi See for example Leo Bersani’s ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ for an analysis of the ways in which gay 
men as a demographic were imagined as outside the ‘general public’, with AIDS deemed a threat only 
to certain demographics rather than society as a whole. He summarises this attitude in Homos (1996): 
‘Since AIDS is concentrated among homosexuals, drug users, the poor, and the undereducated – what 
the council calls “socially marginalized groups” with “little economic, political, and social power” – 
the epidemic will have minimal effect on “the structures and directions of [American] social 
institutions”’ (21).  
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3 Writing as a ‘war machine’: Monique Wittig’s textual materialism 
and bodily metaphor 
 
Abstract 
Monique Wittig’s essays and literature are foundational to queer thought, with 
her work best known through its reading by Butler in Gender Trouble (1990). 
This chapter argues, however, that Butler fundamentally misreads Wittig’s 
account of sexuality, shifting Wittig’s materialist account of a ‘heterosexual 
society’ in The Straight Mind (1992) to the psychoanalytically informed 
‘heterosexual matrix’ of Gender Trouble. A Marxist feminist, Wittig insists on 
language’s materiality, which I term ‘textual materialism’, seeking to exorcise 
the lingering Cartesian dualism falsely separating language from materiality. 
Through readings of metaphor around the material, sexed body in Les 
Guérillères (1969) and Le Corps lesbien (1973), as well as startling 
descriptions of words as material objects in Virgile, Non (1985), I explore how 
Wittig’s textual materialism is key to her understanding of the transformative, 
political power of writing. For Wittig, the power of language to shape the 
material body is a fundamental concern of feminist thought: if language 
constructs the body, language can also change it. Long before transgender 
experimentation with gender neutral pronouns or orthographies, and drawing 
on surrealist politics, Wittig considers the creation of new and unfamiliar 
pronominal forms as ‘shocks’: grenades are able to disrupt dominant ideology, 
offering the reader a chance to experience ordinary language anew. Wittig aims 
to use these linguistic experiments to infiltrate universal ideology, to flood ‘the 
straight mind’ with particularity. Given Butler’s suspicion regarding how 
language can approach the material body, this chapter asks what Wittig’s 
textual materialism is able to offer queer theoretical endeavors.  
 
 
 
Monique Wittig’s collected essays, The Straight Mind, particularly her concept 
of a heterosexual society, are viewed as one of the formative influences of 
queer theory. Not only are her ideas central to Butler’s work in Gender 
Trouble, they also inform Teresa de Lauretis’s thinking on gender and 
sexuality. Wittig took a critical stance, however, toward the disciplines that 
Butler combined with her ideas, including Lacanian psychoanalysis and certain 
ideas relating to poststructuralist thought. Queer thinking such as Butler’s has 
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undoubtedly added to an understanding of Wittig’s work, yet it is important to 
consider what might also have been lost with the addition of the theoretical 
frameworks Butler employs, especially given concerns over their ability to take 
the material body into account. Wittig herself offers a powerful materialist 
account of bodies and discourse: could a return to Wittig as one of the 
foundational influences of queer aid more recent attempts to refocus on the 
material body?  
This chapter explores the relation between writing and the material 
body in Wittig’s work. While in the previous chapter I explored how Preciado 
makes a material intervention in his texts through bodily acts such as 
administering testosterone, Wittig’s materialist position allows her to open up 
space for new possibilities for the material body through startling 
experimentation with form and metaphor in her literary works. Wittig’s textual 
materialism is key to understanding her literary project, and I begin by setting 
out the fundamental differences between Butler and Wittig on the relation 
between matter and discourse. In moving from Wittig’s materialist concept of 
the straight mind to Butler’s psychoanalytic understanding of a heterosexual 
matrix, Butler’s reading of Wittig elides the radical transitivity between matter 
and discourse in the latter’s work.  
For Wittig, the function of the straight mind relies on the dismissal of 
particular experience in favour of universalist abstraction. Destroying the 
Cartesian gulf between discourse and matter is key to her political aims and 
central to her literary project. Through her essay ‘The Trojan Horse’ (1984, 
republished in 1992) and imagery of the materiality of language in Virgile, Non 
[Virgil, no – translated to English as Across the Acheron] and Brouillon pour 
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une dictionnaire des amantes [Material for a dictionary of lesbian peoples] 
(1976), I consider Wittig’s claim that literary writing can function as a war 
machine, blasting away convention through the shock of innovative literary 
form emphasising language’s materiality. 
Finally, I discuss Wittig’s exploration of metaphor around the sexed 
body in Virgile, Non, asking how Wittig accounts for material sexual difference 
given her definition of sex as a relational term, as a political class. I then 
examine Wittig’s ambivalence towards metaphor and her understanding of its 
use as a political weapon, offering readings of metaphors around the material, 
sexed body in both Les Guérillères and Le Corps lesbien in order to consider 
metaphor as a violent, creative and concrete intervention rather than simply an 
abstraction of material objects.  
 
 
Context: reception, reading and opposition    
 
Early works of queer theory such as Butler’s Gender Trouble are indebted to 
Wittig’s contribution to literature, as well as her essays on gender and 
sexuality. Butler works extensively with Wittig’s essays as well as her fiction, 
specifically Le Corps lesbien and Les Guérillères; Teresa de Lauretis credits 
Wittig with inspiring her decision to consider lesbian and gay theorising apart 
from feminist theorising. Queer theorists in France have more recently taken up 
Wittig’s work: Wittig is influential to Paul Preciado; Sam Bourcier has written 
on her extensively, and translated The Straight Mind into French. Bourcier also 
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organised a colloquium in Paris on Wittig’s work in 2001, shortly before her 
death in 2003.i  
In a paper presented at this colloquium, Bourcier noted the relative lack 
of interest in Wittig’s writing within France, even in her earlier work written in 
French. Wittig was embedded in the political movements of the 1960s and 70s; 
a founding member of the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes (MLF) and 
the lesbian feminist activist group Les Gouines Rouges [Red Dykes], she began 
writing essays and literary work in French, including an early manifesto for the 
MLF, and yet came to write and publish in English. Wittig’s radical essays and 
especially her infamous conclusion to her essay ‘La Pensée Straight’ [The 
Straight Mind] – that ‘lesbians are not women’ – resulted in the split between 
her and other members of the editorial collective of the journal Questions 
Feministes (most notably Christine Delphy, who went on to form Nouvelles 
Questions Feministes without Wittig). Wittig began instead to publish her work 
in the American journal Feminist Issues.  
By the time consideration of gay and lesbian studies began to appear in 
France with Didier Eribon’s colloquium at the Centre Georges Pompidou in 
1997, Wittig had already moved to the US; taking up a post at the University of 
Tucson, Arizona in 1990. Bourcier presents this move very much as a linguistic 
exile. Indeed, despite Wittig’s essays appearing in both French and English 
from 1976 onwards, the selection collected under the title The Straight Mind 
was published in English. While in France the queer activist collective le Zoo, 
whose members included Bourcier, fought for a translation of these essays into 
French, Bourcier writes that the dismissal of any consideration of gender rather 
than sex in the French academic context had rendered it so hostile that ‘d’une 
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certaine manière, ce texte [The Straight Mind] a été rendu impossible en 
français et en France’ [in some ways, this text had become inconceivable in 
French and in France] (Bourcier & Robichon, 2002: 30).  
Bourcier notes that the overwhelming majority of readers now arrive at 
Wittig’s work through Anglophone queer theory, specifically through Butler’s 
critique of her work in Gender Trouble. Since Bourcier’s colloquium in 2001, 
however, there has been renewed interest in Wittig’s work in France, with the 
publication of Lire Monique Wittig Aujourd’Hui in 2012, edited by Benoît 
Auclerc and Yannick Chevalier, including an essay by Bourcier himself. But 
even this work arrives at Wittig via a strange trajectory, after the arrival in 
France of the translation of Butler’s Gender Trouble some fifteen years after its 
publication in English: 
 
Le retentissement majeur de l’ouvrage [Gender Trouble], dont la 
traduction française – Trouble dans le genre – paraît en 2005, est 
l’occasion pour une nouvelle génération de lecteur.rice.s de 
(re)découvrir Wittig et de s’apercevoir que, dans le monde académique 
nord-américain, elle est un ‘classique’ du xxe siècle. (Auclerc & 
Chevalier, 2012: 6)ii 
 
[The major consequence of the work [Gender Trouble], which appeared 
in French translation as Trouble dans le genre in 2005, is cause for a 
new generation of readers to (re)discover Wittig and to see that, in the 
US academy, it is a ‘classic’ of the 20th Century] 
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Even in France, readings of Wittig’s work emerge via the translation into 
French of Butler’s reading of her. And yet Butler’s reading of Wittig in Gender 
Trouble has been much criticised: de Lauretis claims Butler offers a reductive 
and superficial reading of Wittig’s work, imagining her as:   
 
an existentialist who believes in human freedom, a humanist who 
presumes the ontological unity of Being prior to language, an idealist 
masquerading as a materialist, and, most paradoxically of all, an 
unintentional, unwitting collaborator with the regime of heterosexual 
normativity. (2005: 57) 
 
Without pausing here to examine individually these numerous accusations 
levelled against Butler’s reading, I do want to consider what has been lost by 
Butler’s reading of Wittig and indeed what could be gained by returning to 
Wittig’s works themselves. In particular, what do writers such as Bourcier and 
Preciado seek to gain by returning to Wittig? If Butler abstracted Wittig’s 
materialism in one of the inaugural texts of queer theory, what could a return to 
Wittig’s approach bring to new developments in queer theory?  
The attention afforded to Wittig’s work by French queer writers should 
certainly not be explained as a nationalist project of repatriation or restoration – 
although Bourcier especially is of course concerned with the (feminist) 
academic climate left in France by Wittig’s departure. Rather, I want to 
consider what might appeal in Wittig’s attempts to create new material 
possibilities through literature. If Preciado attempts the resignification of the 
body through bodily acts, by bringing his material body into writing, Wittig 
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employs writing (literary experimentation with form, specifically) to 
dismember the body through words, open up space for new corporeal 
possibilities. While Preciado attempts to escape the overemphasis of the 
linguistic he sees in Butler and earlier queer theory by using his body, Wittig’s 
radical textual materialism means that she does not need such an intervention. 
While Preciado deploys his body, Wittig sees no problem in using writing 
alone as a political weapon, a ‘war machine’. 
 
 
From heterosexual society to heterosexual matrix: Butler’s discursivist 
misreading of Wittig’s textual materialism  
 
Wittig insists on a material monist position: language and matter are not 
separate substances (a dualist account); rather, language is itself material. Like 
others in the French context (Wittig herself cites Barthes, Tel Quel, and 
Genette (1992:70)), Wittig emphasises literary form, and more specifically, the 
materiality of language and words as they are written on a page. She maintains 
that words and language are material – for Wittig, there is ‘another order of 
materiality, that of language’ (1992: 30). Secondly, and following on from this 
first claim, Wittig continually insists in her essays on the power of language to 
affect the material. Her linguistic materialism is vital to her political use of 
literature as a weapon, and to the possibilities of finding a language for new 
and unknown societal relations and corporeal possibilities, for re-writing what 
she understands as the social contract of heterosexuality. In the essay ‘The 
Straight Mind’ (1980, republished in The Straight Mind) she wrote that: ‘There 
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is nothing abstract about the power that sciences and theories have to act 
materially and actually upon our bodies and our minds’ (26). In ‘On the Social 
Contract’ (1989, republished in The Straight Mind), she wrote: ‘even abstract 
philosophical categories act upon the real as social. Language casts sheaves of 
reality upon the social body, stamping it and violently shaping it […] there is a 
plasticity of the real to language’ (43-44, my emphasis). Here, Wittig gives an 
indication of the violence that language, (specifically the universalism of 
‘abstract philosophical categories’) is able to inflict upon material bodies. The 
notion of ‘plasticity’ suggests malleability, the idea that ‘the real’ is able to be 
molded, shaped and changed by language – as such, Wittig attempts to use 
language in very specific ways through her literary practice to effect material 
change.  
By the term textual materialism, I emphasise Wittig’s rejection of the 
separation specifically between discourse and matter, a separation explored 
previously through Butler’s term ‘linguistic monism’, as well as through Jean-
Luc Nancy’s notion of touch. For Wittig, the division between discourse and 
reality is sustained by a Cartesian metaphysics that persists in the disciplines of 
semiotics and psychoanalysis. It is this division that is inseparable from the 
function of universalism, preventing consideration of concrete, material 
oppression and, consequently, of the particular point of view. Wittig insists that 
any separation of discourse from the material is political as it allows only the 
universal position to be expressed. This universal view is one of abstraction; it 
is the legitimate, ‘objective’ voice of philosophical discourse, claiming to 
possess reason and common sense.  
 144 
After citing similar claims on universalism and abstraction from Marx 
and Engels, Wittig notes that a minority group must appeal to universal reason, 
and that this is especially true within philosophical discourse: 
 
in the philosophical domain this [minority] class must give the form of 
universality to its thought, to present it as the only reasonable one, the 
only universally valid one. (1992: 84)  
 
And yet, what she terms ‘the particular point of view’ can only be expressed by 
acknowledging the concrete or the material, rather than abstract universalising. 
As an example she notes Nathalie Sarraute’s comment that she ‘cannot use the 
feminine gender when she wants to generalize (and not particularize) what she 
is writing about’ (1992: 60). The gendered nature of the French language 
makes this much more apparent than in English – with the universal masculine 
(il/ils), as well as gendered nouns and agreements. Wittig goes on to outline 
this more explicitly: ‘Only the masculine as general is the abstract. The 
feminine is the concrete’ (1992: 61). Such concerns are especially out of place 
in philosophical thought and prevent appeals to the universal. So it is, for 
Wittig, that by separating material (particular) concerns from abstract 
(universal) discourse, the particular point of view is dismissed. This split is 
crucial to what Wittig sees very much as universalism’s totalising function.  
The power of universalism is well understood by those inhabiting 
particular positions (as examples, she offers lesbians, gay men, women). Wittig 
argues:  
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All of the oppressed know this power and have to deal with it. It is the 
one which says: you do not have the right to speech because your 
discourse is not scientific and not theoretical, you are on the wrong 
level of analysis, you are confusing discourse and reality, your 
discourse is naïve, you misunderstand this or that science. (1992: 26) 
 
Key to perpetuating the totalising force of universalism is the dismissal of 
concrete and particular concerns in favour of the certainty of ‘abstract 
philosophical categories’ that benefit the unacknowledged universal: not only 
the masculine, but also what Wittig terms ‘the straight mind’. The universalism 
of the straight mind prevents expression of the particular point of view, for 
example: ‘discourses of heterosexuality oppress us in the sense that they 
prevent us from speaking unless we speak in their terms’ (1992: 25). For 
Wittig, it is this erroneous separation of abstract and concrete, of language and 
matter that sustains universalism, thus preventing expression of the particular 
point of view and the creation of new, particular or concrete (as opposed to 
abstract, philosophical and universal) categories. It is through this insistence on 
the materiality of language that Wittig is able to see literature as a political 
weapon ready to breach the borders of universal discourse and create new 
possibilities through language. By acknowledging the concrete, material 
concerns of the particular point of view, Wittig attempts her assault on the 
universal straight mind. 
Wittig identifies in particular the disciplines of semiotics and 
linguistics, as well as the language of psychoanalysis, as key to maintaining 
this split between matter and discourse characterising the universalism of ‘the 
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straight mind’. There exists in these disciplines what she understands as a 
Cartesian division between meaning and matter. More widely, she also 
criticises this ‘classical division of body and soul’ at work in the disciplines of 
history and politics, even in supposedly materialist Marxist and post-Marxist 
traditions, that separate ‘the economic order, the material one, and, on the other 
hand, ideology and politics’ (1992: 73). With the exception of Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s work, as well as some feminists’ materialist approaches, Wittig 
argues that structural and socio-linguistics and semiotics reproduce these same 
Cartesian divisions:  
 
Form and content correspond to the body/soul division, and it is applied 
to the words of language and also to ensembles, that is, to literary 
works. Linguists speak of signifier and signified, which comes to the 
same distinction. (1992: 73) 
 
Despite acknowledging this same problem of Cartesianism even within the 
Marxist tradition, Wittig criticises Roland Barthes for ignoring Marxist 
materialism and instead limiting semiology to a branch of linguistics (1992: 
22). She warns that when universal ideas (‘the discourses of the dominating 
group’) are abstracted to another domain, that of ‘Irreal Ideas’, material 
violence is forgotten:  
 
When we use the over-generalizing term ‘ideology’ to designate all the 
discourses of the dominating group, we relegate these discourses to the 
domain of Irreal Ideas; we forget the material (physical) violence 
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produced by the abstract and ‘scientific’ discourses as well as by the 
discourses of the mass media. (1992: 25) 
 
Using the example of pornography, which she sees as an example of a violent 
and oppressive discourse, she argues that semioticians maintain this divorce 
between discourse and ‘the real’, writing on the contrary that ‘this discourse is 
not divorced from the real as it is for semioticians’ (1992: 25). Whether or not 
one agrees with Wittig’s particular example of pornography, her more general 
argument remains that discourse can violently shape subjectivity and material 
bodies and minds.  
The separation of what Wittig terms as distinct ‘domains’ in semiology 
is reproduced in the separation of ‘orders’ in psychoanalytic discourse, a matter 
I explore in the following chapter. Wittig again objects to a false division in 
this field:   
 
to our analysis they object that there is a symbolic order, as though they 
were speaking of another dimension that would have nothing to do with 
domination. Alas for us, the symbolic order partakes of the same reality 
as the political and economic order. (1992: 57-58) 
 
Having already argued in ‘The Straight Mind’ against what she sees as the 
totalising discourse of psychoanalysis, specifically Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
here Wittig criticises the separation of orders in the distinction of the Symbolic 
from the Real.   
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If Wittig is highly critical of semiotics, linguistic theorising and 
(Lacanian) psychoanalysis, Butler is immersed in them – certainly at the time 
of Gender Trouble – and combines them with Wittig’s political theory of a 
heterosexual society (the ‘straight mind’). Butler is critical of how Wittig 
believes she is able to deploy language. She reads Wittig as imagining a 
sovereign subject independent of language, able to deploy it as a tool rather 
than being constituted by it. She also objects to the political strategy she sees in 
Wittig’s work; that is, a separatist attempt to establish a ‘pure outside’ of 
homosexuality, untainted and untouched by heterosexuality. While Butler 
writes that for Wittig, it is ‘the split between materiality and representation that 
characterizes “straight” thinking’ (1990: 159), she does not appear to 
acknowledge the impact of this in Wittig’s thought. Butler’s inability to take 
Wittig’s materialism into account frames her reading and criticisms of Wittig. 
Indeed, it influences them to such an extent that Butler misreads Wittig’s work 
and the terms on which she is writing. Butler and Wittig work with entirely 
different models of materiality, and it is only on Butler’s own terms that many 
of her criticisms of Wittig can hold – that is, within a discursivist approach and 
on the relational model of a separation of discourse from matter.  
Wittig’s heterosexual society is a description of material societal 
relations: women are defined by Wittig in material terms, not in relation to 
biology but as a political class who are materially (economically, politically) 
subjugated by men. The heterosexual contract produces sex by falsely 
naturalising this relation in order to sustain it. Since lesbians do not share this 
relation to men, Wittig concludes they are not women. In Gender Trouble, 
however, Butler re-formulated Wittig’s heterosexual society as the 
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heterosexual matrix outlined in her second chapter ‘Prohibition, 
Psychoanalysis, and the Production of the Heterosexual Matrix’ (1990: 45). 
Butler’s work offers a very different analysis to Wittig, explaining the 
discursive production of compulsory heterosexuality through the theory of a 
primary taboo against homosexuality in ego formation, informed by 
psychoanalytic theory and structural linguistics. 
Not only does Butler’s heterosexual matrix employ theories antithetical 
to Wittig’s thought, Butler criticises Wittig’s thinking on these theoretical 
terms, producing a reading of Wittig estranged from its original meaning. As 
Sara Salih neatly summarises:  
 
While Wittig claims that lesbian is a concept that is beyond the 
categories of sex and calls for the destruction of heterosexuality as a 
social system (1992: 20), Butler argues that sex and gender are 
discursively constructed and that there is no such position of implied 
freedom beyond discourse. (2002: 48) 
 
Butler maintains that the heterosexual matrix is vital in the production of 
discursive sex, rather than material sex. Her description of what she terms 
‘materialization’ in Bodies that Matter, is actually a description of the 
discursive production of a discursive construct, writing that ‘“sex” is an ideal 
construct’ (1993: 1). Butler’s theory of the construction of sex is one firmly 
lodged within the symbolic. That is not to say that Butler denies the impact of 
the heterosexual matrix on the real, but she certainly abstains from commenting 
on what this could be. Butler refers to the heterosexual matrix as a grid, writing 
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of ‘regulatory grids of intelligibility’ (1990: 166) and states that she uses ‘the 
term heterosexual matrix throughout the text to designate that grid of cultural 
intelligibility through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized’ (194). 
Where Wittig’s model of a heterosexual society is fundamentally material, 
what Butler means by her heterosexual matrix is a grid of intelligibility in the 
symbolic, like a web covering the real – affecting how we understand the real, 
but certainly nothing like the transitive interaction with matter that Wittig 
proposes. Wittig’s ‘heterosexual society’ and Butler’s ‘heterosexual matrix’ are 
ultimately very different things, a difference constituted by each author’s 
varying ideas of the relation between matter and discourse. 
 
 
 
Material Language: literature as a ‘Trojan Horse’ 
 
Wittig’s essay ‘The Trojan Horse’ explains how the materiality of words is 
essential to their use as a political weapon through literary writing. Wittig 
begins by offering a description of the Trojan Horse deployed by the Greeks, 
which she compares to the potential use of literature as a weapon:  
 
At first it looks strange to the Trojans, the wooden horse, off color, 
outsized, barbaric. […] Then, little by little, they discover the familiar 
forms which coincide with those of a horse. […] they still consider it 
with uneasiness. It is barbaric for its size but also for its form, too raw 
for them, the effeminate ones, as Virgil calls them. But later on they 
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become fond of the apparent simplicity, within which they see 
sophistication. […] They want to make it theirs, to adopt it as a 
monument and shelter it within their walls […] But what if it were a 
war machine? (1992: 68) 
 
Wittig’s imagery is striking, but one might well ask how literature could be 
deployed as the ‘war machine’ Wittig so powerfully describes. This, for Wittig, 
depends on two things. Firstly, just as the form of the Trojan Horse is key to its 
seduction of the Trojans, the unique medium of language deployed in all its 
materiality as both form and matter through literature is key. Secondly, the 
classification of literature as a war machine depends on an attempt to assault 
the universal with the particular point of view, to breach its borders. Wittig 
offers the work of Proust as ‘one of the best examples of a war machine with a 
delayed effect’, since by the end of À la recherche du temps perdu [In Search 
of Lost Time], ‘Proust has succeeded in turning the “real” world into a 
homosexual-only world’ (74) and it is ‘the attempted universalization of the 
point of view that turns or does not turn a literary work into a war machine’ 
(75). The two matters of form and universality are not separate; for it is through 
both the shock and allure of innovative literary forms that language is able to 
make such an assault.  
Wittig’s essay emphasises language as a ‘raw material’ (70), claiming 
that ‘language [is] already a form, but also matter’ (71). She asks her readers to 
imagine a statue of a Trojan horse and compares words to clay imbued with 
meaning through the form it takes on in sculpture, writing that:  
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Words lie there to be used as raw material by a writer, just as clay is at 
the disposal of any sculptor. Words are, each one of them, like the 
Trojan Horse. They are things, material things, and at the same time 
they mean something. And it is because they mean something that they 
are abstract. They are a condensate of abstraction and concreteness, and 
in this they are totally different from all other mediums used to create 
art. Colors, stone, clay have no meaning. (71) 
 
Words are unique as a medium – unlike clay, they already contain meaning 
even before the writer works with them. It is precisely this unique nature of 
words – as both abstract meaning and concrete form – that leads Wittig to 
outline their political potential in shocking the reader, something Wittig 
describes as ‘dealing a blow with words’ (72). It is only therefore through the 
kind of writing that acknowledges the materiality of words that they can be 
deployed to their full effect. For Wittig, this means literary writing that pays 
attention to form as well as content. She argues that much academic writing is 
unable to produce the political effect that literature can, since it does nothing to 
extricate language from ‘the domain of ideas […] issued directly from the 
mind’ and ‘still rest[ing] on the classical division of body and soul’ (73).  
Literature, then, is political in its anti-Cartesianism – that is, in its 
acknowledgement of both the form as well as the meaning contained by words. 
Literary writing’s use of the form renders it a tool in agitating against the 
abstraction through which universalism functions and is sustained. Thus, when 
Wittig writes that in ‘literature words are given to be read in their materiality’, 
she is making a claim about the political utility of literary writing (71-72):  
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Through literature, though, words come back to us whole again. 
Through literature, then, we can learn something that should be useful 
in any other field: in words, form and content cannot be dissociated, 
because they partake of the same form, the form of a word, a material 
form. (73)  
 
This attention paid to form and the materiality of words in literary writing 
results in its ability to shock the reader: the ‘shock of words is produced by 
their association, their disposition, their arrangement, and also by each one of 
them as used separately’ (72). Wittig shows a visual appreciation of words as 
they are written, and her thinking here, as well as her description of language 
as a grenade explored later, is undoubtedly informed by Dadaist and surrealist 
notions of shock.iii Acknowledging the influence of the Russian formalist 
Viktor Schlovsky, Wittig writes that she seeks to recreate ‘the first powerful 
vision of words […] the same shock as if they were being read for the first 
time’ (72).  
To return to the metaphor of the Trojan Horse, Wittig claims that 
literary work that is innovative in terms of form functions as a war machine, 
‘because its design and its goal is to pulverise old forms and conventions’ (69). 
Despite its strangeness, ‘eventually it is adopted, and, even if slowly, it will 
eventually work like a mine. It will sap and blast out the ground where it was 
planted’ (69). Her words are striking, and it is to this imagery of a mine blast, a 
sap clearing out old ground and a shock ‘pulverising’ convention that I now 
turn. How does Wittig deal a blow with words? 
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Wittig’s theoretical concepts could often quite justifiably be described 
as shocking, with both Butler and de Lauretis testifying to the effect her 
statement ‘Lesbians are not women’ had on those when Wittig presented her 
ideas at an NYU conference in 1979. De Lauretis describes her words as 
opening up ‘a conceptual, virtual space that was foreclosed by all discourses 
and ideologies left and right, including feminism’ (2005: 52). She describes 
this ‘conceptual space’ as something: 
  
that until then had been rendered unthinkable by, precisely, the 
hegemony of the straight mind – as the space called ‘the blind spot’ is 
rendered invisible in a car’s rear-view mirror by the frame or chassis of 
the car itself. (52) 
 
De Lauretis’s metaphor of the ‘blind spot’ captures the sense of new and 
unseen space opening up. Perhaps in this way, metaphor itself can open up new 
space by gesturing towards the unforeseen, towards something that perhaps 
there are no words for as yet. The concrete metaphor employed by de Lauretis 
demonstrates the way in which metaphor can be creative. can offer an 
understanding of something that familiar words cannot – familiar words of 
course, for Wittig, being immersed in the universalism of the straight mind. It 
is this notion of metaphor as accessing the material rather than as being an 
abstraction of the material, the capacity for metaphor to invent, to create new 
linguistic and material space that I explore later in the chapter in arguing for 
the use of metaphor as a political tool.  
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In this sense, then, Wittig’s statement that ‘lesbians are not women’ 
functions as a war machine of sorts; it produces a shock, opens up a new 
conceptual space and constitutes an assault on the universalism of the straight 
mind. It could certainly be likened to the mine blast clearing away old ground 
to make way for a new conceptual space. De Lauretis powerfully outlines the 
proliferation of yet unknown possibilities in what she describes as the 
disidentification inherent in Wittig’s infamous words:  
 
Such a shift entails displacement and self-displacement: leaving or 
giving up such a place that is known, that is ‘home’ – physically, 
emotionally, linguistically, epistemologically – for another place that is 
unknown, that is not only emotionally but also conceptually unfamiliar, 
a place from which speaking and thinking are at best tentative, 
uncertain, unauthorized. But the leaving is not a choice because one 
could not live there in the first place. Thus all aspects of the 
displacement […] are painful and risky for they entail a constant 
crossing back and forth, a remapping of boundaries between bodies and 
discourses, identities and communities. At the same time, however, they 
enable a reconceptualization of the subject, of the relations of 
subjectivity to social reality, and a position of resistance and agency 
that is not outside but rather eccentric to the socio-cultural apparati of 
the heterosexual institution. (2005: 53, my emphasis)  
 
In these few words, de Lauretis succinctly summarises the exciting and 
unforeseeable potentialities made possible by the disidentification inherent to 
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the statement ‘lesbians are not women’. Again, the action of disidentification 
described by de Lauretis could be compared to the mine blast of Wittig’s war 
machine. Her notion of the lesbian is also described as an assault on ‘the 
heterosexual institution’ by positioning itself in an eccentric relation to it rather 
than being outside of it, as Butler suggests in Gender Trouble. iv This attack on 
universality via a breach of its borders, through infiltration, is also indicative of 
the stealthy assault performed by a war machine such as a Trojan Horse. Yet, 
de Lauretis’s words here also note the difficulty and disorientation of speaking 
from the nascent positions produced by disidentification. To further her point, 
that this is ‘a subject in excess of its discursive construction, a subject of which 
we only knew what it was not: not-woman’, de Lauretis later refers to Wittig’s 
second line of Le Corps lesbien: ‘Ce qui a cours ici, pas une ne l’ignore, n’a 
pas de nom pour l’heure, qu’elles le cherchent si elles y tiennent absolument’ 
[‘There is not one who is unaware of what takes place here, which has no name 
as yet, let them seek it if they are determined to do so’ (15)]v (2005: 56). Wittig 
is certainly aware of the difficulties of speaking from this new position, of 
naming something as yet indefinable. Further to de Lauretis’s own example, 
there are numerous instances in Le Corps lesbien of an inability to speak names 
(1973: 147-149; 166), and repeated scenes featuring stuttering and animal 
sounds (116). Rather than visit these scenes from Le Corps lesbien, I examine 
instead the repeated imagery of arduous attempts at finding an explicitly 
material language linked to a political project – that of finding a utopia beyond 
the straight mind or heterosexual society in Wittig’s Virgile, Non.  
Virgile, Non is a reworking of Dante Alighieri’s La Commedia Divina 
[Divine Comedy] [1320] that sees its protagonist ‘Wittig’ being led by her 
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guide ‘Manastabal’ (rather than Virgil, as in Dante’s work) through Hell 
reimagined as the heterosexual society, an imagined Paradise and the Limbo of 
San Francisco’s lesbian bars and Pride parades. While Dante’s work refers to 
Hell, Paradise and Purgatory (from the latin purgatorium, to purge), Wittig 
refers to Limbo, from the latin limbus, meaning an edge or boundary. Rather 
than existing as three separate locations, these three domains shift into one 
another throughout the text, with Limbo appearing as an intermediary space. 
The description of Paradise is not straightforward, but is rather offered in much 
the same way as a disidentification: we are told what it is only in relation to 
what it is not. Indeed, its existence is uncertain, and ‘Wittig’ is told at one point 
by a mythical creature, ‘l’ulliphant’ that:  
 
il y a de l’autre côté du soleil une planète jumelle de la terre. C’est là 
qu’à l’en croire se situe le paradis, tandis que la terre c’est l’enfer. 
Comme il se trouve en opposition. (1985: 25)vi  
 
[‘on the other side of the sun there is another planet, a twin to the earth. 
It is there apparently that Paradise is situated, whereas the earth is Hell. 
The Paradise planet is located in opposition’ (22)] 
 
Just like a disidentification, then, Paradise is in some way beyond linguistic 
definition. It appears only fleetingly through much of the text and is only 
eventually fully reached by ‘Wittig’ at the end of the book after repeated scenes 
of painful linguistic failure, in a finale of music and plentiful food prepared by 
angels in the shadow of the Golden Gate Bridge. Spurred on by her 
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‘providence’ just as the protagonist in Dante’s work is by the figure of 
Beatrice, ‘Wittig’ journeys through Hell and Limbo in an attempt to reach 
Paradise.  
In earlier scenes, ‘Wittig’ has struggled to find words to describe 
Paradise, yet she is told by Manastabal that these words must be found or else 
it will disappear. ‘Wittig’, however, can only describe what she sees, 
‘piteusement’ [pitifully] and insufficiently, as ‘Beauté’ [Beauty] (23). Later, 
while words begin to appear to ‘Wittig’, she is only able to catches glimpses of 
them and is concerned they will disappear:  
 
Je tends vers toi, mon beau paradis, du plus profond de l’enfer, bien que 
je ne te connaisse que par éclairs et que si les mots me manquent tu 
disparais comme dans une hémorragie à l’envers. (Wittig, 1985: 64, 
my emphasis) 
 
[I reach out towards you, my beautiful Paradise, from the very depths of 
Hell, although I know you only in flashes, and if words fail me you 
disappear like a haemorrhage in reverse (55)] 
 
If ‘Wittig’ is unable to find the words to describe Paradise, it will disappear 
like ‘une hémorragie à l’envers’: its disappearance would be something like the 
stopping up of a flow of blood (hemostasis). The imagery here is violent, carnal 
and complex. The loss of words resulting in Paradise slipping away from the 
grasp of ‘Wittig’ is described as a shoring up of bodily borders, the stemming 
of a rupture. Conversely, finding the words for Paradise is linked to the violent 
 159 
imagery of a hemorrhage (bleeding): it is compared to a breach of bodily 
borders, to a flow or free movement across such borders. The passage 
underlines the difficulty, but also the necessity, of beginning to find a language 
that resists the status quo, with which new and oppositional possibilities can be 
opened up. But Wittig describes finding or losing Paradise – a space beyond 
the universal straight mind – not only through her ability to find words for it, 
but simultaneously through inescapably violent and bodily imagery. The 
metaphor is used forcefully to imagine a space beyond the universal – a new 
linguistic as well as material space – and ties this to corporeal materiality, 
emphasising universality as a materially violent rather than abstract system. 
Wittig reimagines the walls of Troy as capillary walls and describes an assault 
on the universal’s borders in carnal terms. The presence of words to describe 
Paradise is described similarly to the effects of Wittig’s literary war-machine – 
as a violent and physical shock, or a mine blast that can breach borders and 
open up space for new possibilities.  
In the recurring visits ‘Wittig’ and Manastabal make to Paradise 
throughout the text, the possibility for language to describe it appears 
gradually: ‘c’est alors mon beau paradis que je cherche parmi eux les mots 
pour te dire et au moyen desquels te donner forme une fois pour toutes’ (65, 
my emphasis) [‘it is then, my beautiful Paradise, that I search among them for 
words to describe you and give you shape once and for all’ (56)]. Language 
does not simply describe Paradise, but realises it. Later, when ‘Wittig’ meets 
her ‘providence’, she is unable to hear her: ‘tandis qu’elle ouvre la bouche pour 
me parler, je n’entends pas le son de sa voix, je ne distingue aucune parole’ 
(88-9) [‘when she opens her mouth to speak to me, I can’t hear the sound of her 
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voice, I can’t make out a word’ (76)]. A glass wall is imagined between them 
that prevents linguistic communication, but despite this it is language that is 
described as having the power to break the barrier down: ‘Si c’est une question 
des mots, il me manqué le sésame ouvre-toi de la fable pour casser la glace. Je 
reste là à me tourmenter de ne pouvoir rien inventer qui le vaille’ (89) [‘If it’s a 
question of words, I lack the Open Sesame of legend to break the glass, I 
remain there, tormented by my inability to invent anything useful’ (76)]. It is 
‘Wittig’’s inability to invent or create a new language that means it cannot be 
crossed with the ‘magic words’ of an ‘open-sesame’.  
Towards the end of the book, however, Wittig describes a scene set in 
Paradise where the words that have eluded the protagonist thus far rain down 
from the sky as material objects: ‘Des samares dans leur vol descendant, tels 
quels, les mots tombent par mille, l’air en est empoisée’ (126) ‘The winged 
seeds of the ash descending in their flight, just like that, the words fall in 
thousands, the air is laden with them’ (108)]. As well as to falling seeds or 
samaras (winged seeds such as those from the ash or elm), words are compared 
to butterflies’ wings, to leaves falling from trees – in short, to solid, material 
objects, described as ‘la chute des masses noirs’ (126) [‘the fall of the masses’ 
(108)]. Words appear as:  
 
Des flocons de dissemblable densité, obscurcissant le ciel visible entre 
leurs espaces en longs éclats bleus, tels quels ils s’appesantissent 
jusqu’à toucher terre. Jamais leur présence physique ne m’aura cause 
une joie plus parfaite. Je dis:  
(Je tends vers toi mon beau paradis.). (126, my emphasis) 
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[‘Flakes of dissimilar density, obscuring the sky that is visible between 
them in long blue flashes, become heavy enough, just like that, to touch 
down. Never will their physical presence have caused me more perfect 
joy.’ (108)] 
 
The phrase from ‘Wittig’’s previous attempt to reach paradise through words – 
‘Je tends vers toi, mon beau paradis’ – is repeated. The form of this phrase, 
enclosed within parentheses, conjures a kind of materiality of words and 
together with its repetition, it is rendered as a kind of Surrealist objet trouvé. 
Yet this time, rather than anxiety over words stultifying as if through ‘une 
hémorragie à l’envers’, an immense movement of words is described as they 
rain down as material objects. Words appear as a physical presence: weighty 
enough to become subject to gravity, a solid mass of varying densities able to 
obscure the sky. It is their weightiness that brings them to ‘Wittig’, ‘ils 
s’appesantissent jusqu’à toucher terre’. When this rain of words finally halts, 
‘Wittig’’s ‘providence’ appears and transports her ‘au septième ciel’ (127) [‘to 
the seventh heaven’ (109)]. This scene heralds ‘Wittig’’s ability to begin to use 
words to describe Paradise, to render it within her grasp and retain its presence. 
It also begins her eventual journey to Paradise where in the final scenes, 
‘Wittig’ is able to hear ‘la musique des anges et […] leur parler serein’ (138) 
[‘the music and serene speech of the angels’ (118)].  
While emphasising the difficulty in finding words, these scenes from 
Virgile, Non demonstrate the necessity of their invention and of their 
materiality to the project of creating a space in opposition to convention. In 
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1976, Wittig published a dictionary with her partner Sande Zeig, Brouillon 
pour un dictionnaire des amantes. This often humorous text forms a dictionary 
of an imagined lesbian society presented in the quintessentially universal form 
of a dictionary. Many entries re-write various figures from Ancient myth 
(Medusa imagined as lesbian, Medea offered a happy ending (1976: 168)) or 
more recent history (Marie-Antoinette and Marie-Laure de Lamballe imagined 
as ‘deux sales gouines à qui on a coupé le cou’ (168) [two dirty dykes who had 
their throats cut]) or create histories for Amazon warrior races. Others offer 
new definitions of, for example, ‘Cuir’ (68) [Leather] ‘Pois’ (201) [Peas] ‘Joie’ 
(142) [Joy], or definitions of words that have become obsolete (e.g. ‘Travail’ 
(236) [Work] and, unsurprisingly, ‘Femme’ (93) [Woman]). There are also 
words given entirely new meanings such as ‘Ocelle’ (‘On dit des pores de la 
peau qu’ils deviennent des ocelles quand ils s’élargissent’ (185) [When the 
skin’s pores enlarge, we call these ocelli, or eye-spots]). The text is not a 
simple attempt to produce and proliferate new vocabulary: Wittig’s and Zeig’s 
text also shows an awareness of the slipperiness and difficulties that the 
creation of new language poses. 
Wittig’s and Zeig’s entry on ‘Langue’ offers a mythical history in 
which a split between ‘les civilisations des mères’ [the civilization of mothers] 
and ‘les anciennes amazones’ [the Amazons of the past] resulted in the creation 
of multiple languages by the former group (150). These multiple languages are 
described as obfuscatory, having ‘des sens à dédoublement multiple, sorte de 
galeries des miroirs’ (150) [meanings of multiple dualities, a kind of gallery of 
mirrors]. They replaced an older, unifying and more truthful language 
described as infinitely powerful. Wittig creates a fantasy of finding this older 
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and universal language again, in the entry ‘Barrière’ [Barrier] in which she 
describes a magical ‘poudre d’escampette’ [vanishing powder] invented by the 
Gouines Rouges, which breaks down linguistic barriers and enables a universal 
lesbian language: ‘une langue familière à toutes. Cette langue très ancienne et 
retrouvée s’appelle la langue lesbienne. Gloire.’ (39) [a language familiar to 
all. This very ancient rediscovered language is called the lesbian language. 
Glory.].  
The myth (or fantasy) of an original and universal lesbian language 
rests in stark contrast to the difficulties Wittig describes for lesbians (and 
indeed all particular subjects) in using language as a result of the universal 
straight mind, as she outlines in ‘The Point of View: Universal or Particular?’ 
(1980, republished in The Straight Mind): ‘This (lesbian) poet generally has a 
hard battle to wage, for, step by step, word by word, she must create her own 
context in a world which, as soon as she appears, bends every effort to make 
her disappear’ (1992: 65). Just as writers can inflict violence through their 
words, writing can violently erase the minority writer who must adopt a 
universal position in order to speak. This violence of the universal creates a 
sort of positional push and pull, with the writer moving between particular and 
universal through attempts to speak:  
 
when you say I, speak as I, you must speak from the universal, not the 
particular. Women cannot say I – they have to occupy the I: ‘no woman 
can say “I” without being for herself a total subject – that is, 
ungendered, universal, whole.’ Or speak the master’s speech. (Wittig, 
1992: 80) 
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Despite this fundamental violence involved in language production, Wittig still 
attempts to create new possibilities through language, and even through 
individual words – nowhere more powerfully than through her experimental 
use of pronouns that she identifies as representing subject positions in 
language. Wittig ‘pulverizes convention’ and creates a linguistic assault on the 
universal through her use of pronouns. These single words act in the same way 
as the disidentification inherent to lesbian positionality (as not-women), 
encapsulating an assault on the straight mind delivered through the mutated 
pronominal forms Wittig creates. In short, through her manipulation of 
pronouns, Wittig is able to render even a single word a war machine.  
 
 
Pronouns as war machines 
 
Pronouns represent an important space in language for Wittig, representing the 
locutor and acting as ‘the pathways and the means of entrance into language’ 
(1992: 78). Wittig claims in ‘The Mark of Gender’ that pronouns are the 
subject of each of her books (except her dictionary) (1992: 82). Firstly, she 
discusses her use of ‘on’ in l’Opoponax (1964) as an attempt to universalise: 
‘One, on, lends itself to the unique experience of all locutors who, when saying 
I, can reappropriate the whole language and reorganize the world from their 
point of view’ (1992: 84). She writes that the final words of the book (a line 
from Maurice Scève, ‘Tant je l’aimais qu’en elle encore je vis’) use ‘je’ rather 
than ‘on’. This establishes an ‘understanding both global and particular, both 
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universal and unique’ and renders the novel’s lesbian protagonist ‘a lesbian 
subject as the absolute subject’ (88). Wittig claims that this pronominal shift 
from ‘on’ to ‘je’ ‘created a context for the ‘I’ in The Lesbian Body’, that ‘the 
opoponax appears as a talisman, a sesame to the opening of the world, as a 
word that compels both words and world to make sense, as a metaphor for the 
lesbian subject’ (1992: 88). Rather than a shower of words as in Virgile, Non, 
this ‘opening of the world’ can be achieved through the use of the single 
pronoun ‘je’ at the end of the text.  
 Wittig also writes on her use of the plural ‘elles’ to replace the universal 
‘ils’ in Les Guérillères: ‘I try to universalize the point of view of elles. The 
goal of this approach is not to feminize the world but to make the categories of 
sex obsolete in language’ (1992: 85). Together with an attempt to universalize 
– ‘faire basculer le pronom ils en tant que général, à connotation masculine et 
lui dérober son universalité, au moins dans l’espace du texte’ (1994: 119, 
emphasis in bold original) [to upset the pronoun ‘ils’ in so far as it signifies the 
general, while also denoting the masculine, to steal away its masculinity, at 
least in the space of the text] – Wittig writes: ‘I wanted to produce a shock for 
the reader entering a text in which elles by its unique presence constitutes an 
assault’ (1992: 85). This shock is inextricable from the form of the word on the 
page, a new form that constitutes an assault and asks readers to see familiar 
words anew. In addition to ‘on’ and ‘elles’, Wittig discusses her use of the 
barred first-person pronoun ‘j/e’ throughout Le Corps lesbien. Noting the 
influence of Benveniste’s writing on the ‘I’ as shifter in Problèmes de 
linguistique Générale [Problems in General Linguistics] (1966)), Wittig writes 
that:  
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The bar in my j/e is a sign of excess. A sign that helps to imagine an 
excess of ‘I’, an ‘I’ exalted in its lesbian passion, an ‘I’ so powerful that 
it can attack the order of heterosexuality in texts and lesbianize the 
symbols, lesbianize the gods and goddesses, lesbianize Christ, 
lesbianize the men and the women. (2005: 47) 
 
Just as the Trojan Horse is designed to breach the city walls of Troy, Wittig’s 
pronoun-as-war-machine ‘j/e’ is rendered as always in breach of its own 
borders. Just as Wittig’s lesbian performs a kind of contamination of 
supposedly natural binary sex, the particular point of view cannot be contained 
and spills over its borders in a relentless assault on the universal: the straight 
mind, gender categories and even Christ. Wittig describes the power held in a 
single pronoun:  
This ‘I’ can be destroyed in the attempt and resuscitated. Nothing 
resists this ‘I’ (or this tu, which is its same, its love), which spreads 
itself in the whole world of the book, like a lava flow that nothing can 
stop. (1992: 87) 
A perfect war machine, Wittig’s ‘‘j/e’ is unstoppable. The imagery of lava flow 
is reminiscent of the linguistic hemorrhage of Virgile, Non but this time there is 
no danger of shoring up borders to reverse its effects. Just as through Wittig’s 
corporeal metaphor, the shock caused by Wittig’s pronouns again results in an 
opening up of possibilities lying irreducibly in the form of the new word – the 
materiality of ‘j/e’ or ‘elles’ as it appears to the reader. Both in the necessity of 
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their materiality, in harnessing form in order to shock, and their unstoppable 
assault on universality, I suggest that Wittig’s experimentation with pronouns 
can epitomise the function of a war machine and distill it even into a single 
word. 
It is this assault on universality that renders Wittig’s particular 
experimentations with pronominal forms unique. While other such 
experimentations with gendered pronouns in French (for example, Hélène 
Cixous’s fusion of ‘ils’ and ‘elles’ into ‘illes’ in ‘Le rire de la Méduse’ [The 
Laugh of the Medusa] (1975), or more recent attempts to create the gender 
neutral pronoun ‘iel’ by transgender communities in France) may produce the 
shock of a new form, they do not constitute the displacement of the universal 
that is key to the force of Wittig’s deployment of new pronominal forms. 
Similarly orthography such as ‘lecteur.rice.s’ used by Auclerc and Chevalier 
show ‘la prégnance de la marque du genre en français’ [the importance of the 
mark of gender in French] (an effect these authors try to achieve by choosing 
‘la forme la plus spectaculaire’ [the most dramatic form]) but Wittig’s aim is 
much more far-reaching (Auclerc & Chevalier, 2012: 5). None of these 
pronouns or orthographies perform the same function as Wittig’s, which is to 
seek to displace universal pronouns (‘je’, ‘ils’, ‘on’) with the particular point of 
view; that is by replacing ‘ils’ with ‘elles’ as in Les Guérillères, by rendering 
an eventual lesbian ‘je’ as the universal ‘on’ as in L’Opoponax, or as in Le 
Corps lesbien by creating a monstrous and unstoppable ‘j/e’ which refuses to 
remain either particular or universal. Like Wittig’s statement that ‘lesbians are 
not women’, her pronouns can perform a disidentification key to destroying the 
borders between universal and particular. Like this statement, they are able to 
 168 
open up possibilities and conceptual space, to shock and deal a blow to the 
reader. Her pronouns, however, can deal this blow in a single word due to the 
shock produced by their material form that forces the reader to re-imagine the 
word anew, to see a pronoun as if for the first time. In this way, Wittig molds 
some of the most often used and seemingly benign words into linguistic 
grenades.  
 
 
The material body: universalism, language and metaphor in Virgile, Non; 
Les Guérillères; Le Corps lesbien  
 
How does Wittig describe the material body, and how does it relate to 
metaphor? Just as her experiments with pronominal forms ask readers to 
consider everyday words anew, Wittig’s uses of metaphor perform something 
similar. Her metaphors of lava flow and hemorrhage, just like de Lauretis’s 
description of ‘lesbians are not women’ through the metaphor of the ‘blind 
spot’, all gesture towards something beyond static language weighed down by 
universalist ideology, language constitutive of the straight mind. For Wittig, the 
‘straight mind’ functions through myth and metaphor, it ‘envelops itself in 
myths, resorts to enigma, proceeds by accumulating metaphors’ (1992: 28). 
Wittig explores metaphor on her own terms, in particular in relation to the 
material body, in Virgile, Non, Les Guérillères and Le Corps lesbien. Firstly, I 
examine Wittig’s statement ‘lesbians are not women’ in relation to questions of 
material sex: if sex is understood as a political class, what becomes of the 
materiality of sex? Wittig was clear that ‘Woman’ is not an ontological 
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category but a political and economic position in relation to men: ‘The 
category of sex is the political category that founds society as heterosexual. As 
such it does not concern being but relationships (for woman and men are the 
result of relationships)’ (1992: 5). For Wittig ‘sexual difference’ should be 
understood in Marxist terms as class struggle. But if sex is to be thought of as a 
product of a hierarchized political relationship rather than a natural fact, how 
then do we understand the material body? Are material sexed differences 
simply conservative political fictions? 
An early scene of Virgile, non stages a confrontation between the 
‘lavender menace’ of political lesbianism and a group of straight women in a 
San Francisco laundromat. In just a few pages, this short scene manages to be 
at times hilarious, moving and unsettlingly violent. While the (heterosexual) 
women verbally attack ‘Wittig’ at length for being a lesbian, the text presents a 
linguistic barrier between these women and ‘Wittig’. The lines of 
communication are not clear, with the women unable to pronounce ‘Sappho’ 
(over-pronouncing the final syllable), emitting wailing, whistling sounds and 
remaining ‘sourdes à [ses] exhortations’ (16) [‘deaf to my exhortations’ (14)]. 
Conversely ‘Wittig’ is unable to ‘atteindre leur compréhension’ (16) 
[‘penetrate their understanding’ (14)]. Eventually, in an effort to express a 
commonality, ‘Wittig’ strips naked between the rows of washing machines to 
display that ‘Je n’ai […] rien de spécial à exhiber si ce n’est pas la parfaite 
conformité humaine avec les personnes de mon sexe, une similitude de plus 
évidentes et banales’ (16) [‘I have nothing special to exhibit, only perfect 
human conformity with persons of my own sex, a most obvious and 
commonplace similarity’ (14)]. Despite ‘Wittig’’s intentions, what the other 
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women see is anything but the physical sameness ‘Wittig’ hopes to express. 
Rather, firstly they see a body ‘couverte de poils de pieds à la tête’ (17) 
[‘covered with hair from head to foot’ (15)]. ‘Wittig’ is astonished to see that 
the ‘duvet’ [down] that formerly covered her skin has indeed been replaced: ‘Je 
me regarde avec étonnement: c’est vrai, j’ai des poils longs, noirs et luisant qui 
me couvrent tout le corps’ (17) [‘I look at myself in astonishment: it’s true, 
long, black, glossy hairs cover my entire body’ (15)]. While ‘Wittig’ remains 
unperturbed, seeing this change only in terms of the warmth it will provide her 
in winter, the women then exclaim that she is covered in scales. ‘Wittig’ finds 
that her body is now indeed covered in scales, and again takes delight in ‘des 
écailles dures et brillantes que je trouve du plus bel effet et qui ne vont pas 
manquer de resplendir au soleil’ (18) [‘hard, shiny scales that I find most 
attractive. They won’t fail to glitter in the sun’ (15-6)]. Finally, the women 
exclaim ‘Regardez, il est long comme un long doigt. Coupez-le, coupez-le’ 
(18) [‘Look, it’s as long as a middle finger. Cut it off, cut it off.’ (16)]. ‘Wittig’ 
has no time to verify this new accusation since the women begin to attack her. 
The scene later prompts the protagonist to ask her guide if the laundromat is 
the first circle of Hell (20).  
This interaction shows something of Wittig’s understanding of the 
importance of discourse in shaping the way that the body’s materiality, 
including the sexed body, is viewed and understood. In her attempt to find a 
commonality between herself and the women, ‘Wittig’ appeals to what she 
imagines is their shared sexed physiology. Yet it is her body that provokes 
chaos and ultimately violence against her, with Manastabal hurriedly 
attempting to cover her with a piece of clothing that she has stolen from a 
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tumble-dryer, covering her ‘nudité, cause d’après elle de tout ce chahut’ (17) 
[‘nudity, the cause […] of all this uproar’ (15)]. What ‘Wittig’ imagines as a 
total equivalency in their sexed bodies – ‘la parfaite conformité humaine avec 
les personnes de mon sexe’ – is seen as anything but. ‘Wittig’’s body is seen by 
the women as monstrous, and monstrously different from their own bodies. 
‘Wittig’ herself begins to see what they see, and yet is able to appreciate the 
hair or the scales positively. Ultimately, ‘Wittig’’s attempt to express a 
commonality fails because her body is seen by these women as differently 
sexed, with the women locating the presence of a phallus on ‘Wittig’’s body.  
In the opening diatribe of the women in the laundromat it was obvious 
that they saw no commonality between themselves and ‘Wittig’ as a lesbian, 
who is described as a deserter, told to go back to the lesbian bars of 24th Street 
and Valencia, and that it would be better if all lesbians were drowned. In the 
following passages, however, it is clear that this sense of difference also 
extends to the physical body; the women cannot see ‘Wittig’’s body as the 
same as theirs. ‘Wittig’’s gesture of nudity and her body are both violently 
rejected and perceived as violent themselves – before articulating the 
monstrosities they read on ‘Wittig’’s lesbian body, the women are described as 
wailing like furies, calling out ‘au viol, au viol’ (17) [‘rape, rape’ (15)]. 
Lesbians are certainly not seen as straightforwardly female in this passage, but 
as possessing variously monstrous, alien or phallic bodies. The women’s words 
are inflected by the language of Freudian psychoanalysis – in a nod to penis 
envy and castration anxiety, they immediately want to cut off the phallus they 
perceive on ‘Wittig’’s body. ‘Wittig’ responds in the same language, noting 
that ‘pour ce qui est de le couper, elles se trompent de continent’ (18) [‘when it 
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comes to cutting it off, they’ve got the wrong continent’ (16)], alluding to 
Freud’s claim that female sexuality was the ‘dark continent’ of psychoanalysis. 
It is clear that the image they perceive of Wittig’s body, the image of a lesbian 
body, is constructed through numerous discourses, including psychoanalytic 
(one which Wittig had no particular time for) and sexological.vii Jack 
Halberstam notes the widespread consensus of 18th- and 19th-century 
sexologists on ‘tribades with enlarged clitorides’ (1998: 79) as well as Valerie 
Traub’s research in ‘The Psychomorphology of the Clitoris’ (1996) that 
examines anxieties over ‘clitorides capable of penetration’ in early-modern 
European and Ancient Greek culture (Halberstam, 1998: 60). Halberstam also 
refers to Havelock Ellis’s claim in ‘Sexual Inversion in Women’ (1895) that 
‘some kinds of excessive hairiness (hypertrichosis) and masculine distribution 
of hair can be associated with inversion’ (1998: 78). Wittig’s addition of 
scaliness to the supposed physical characteristics of lesbians simply forces the 
point: lesbians have been suspected of being in some way physiologically 
different from heterosexual women for centuries.  
In these scenes in Virgile, Non, ‘Wittig’ embraces the physical changes 
that appear on her body after they are read there by the group of heterosexual 
women. Wittig also repeats similar scenes of becoming monstrous or animal 
throughout Le Corps lesbien. Just as in the scene from Virgile, non, her 
protagonists grow hair or fur to become wolf-like, their skin is covered in 
snakes (1973: 125-126) or takes on the sleek, blue skin of a shark (67). Is there 
a way in which Wittig’s disidentification ‘lesbians are not women’ extends to 
the material body? If lesbians are not women, are they female? In his essay 
‘Gare à la Gouine Garou!’ [Beware of the were-dyke!] (2002), Paul B Preciado 
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reads these descriptions of physical mutation as Deleuzian becomings that 
embrace monstrosity, animality and being non-human. Preciado argues that 
they enact a corporeal disidentification from the catergory ‘woman’. Reading 
Wittig’s work in relation to what he sees as Simone de Beauvoir’s traumatic 
and wholly negative description of the process of becoming woman in Le 
Deuxième Sexe (1949), Preciado claims that Wittig is equally aware of the 
material, corporeal consequences of gendered discourse on the body and its 
formation, something he describes as ‘la déformation politique du corps 
féminin’ [the political deformation of the female body] (201). In discussing the 
‘gouine-garou’ of the essay’s title, Preciado sees embracing the ‘poil’ of the 
wolf, or the were-wolf (‘loup-garou’) in Le Corps lesbien as a resistance to the 
heterosexual construction of sex in terms more post-human than performative.  
Preciado also addresses the issue of what becomes of the sexed body 
given Wittig’s analysis that lesbians are not women and that sex is a political 
class. In the same collection of essays, Sam Bourcier offers an important point 
in terms of contextualization, noting that in the context of France the discussion 
of ‘gender’ simply did not (and continues not to) exist in the same way that it 
does in the Anglophone context, with an arguably greater intellectual support 
for essentialising ‘difference’ feminism in France. Thus, in France, the move to 
re-conceptualize sex as a political class by Wittig removed it from essentialist 
discourse entirely, something which even previous constructivist writing such 
as Beauvoir’s had not imagined (Bourcier & Robichon, 2002: 27). Preciado 
takes up the issue of materiality in the spirit of Wittig, insisting upon 
discourse’s radical influence in shaping material bodies. Preciado refers to Leo 
Bersani’s discussion of Wittig in Homos, in which he writes of the ‘poignant’ 
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yet ‘incomparably absurd’ moment in which Wittig responds to the question of 
whether or not she has a vagina at a lecture at Vassar College with the answer 
‘no’ (Bersani, 1996: 45). Bersani refers to Wittig as a ‘martyr, ready to 
sacrifice her own body to the logic of her lesbian passion’ (45). While Preciado 
claims Wittig reported that she was never in fact asked this question, he is 
nonetheless happy to take up the cause: ‘Ce n’est donc Wittig mais moi qui dis 
aujourd’hui: “Je n’ai pas de vagin”’ [It’s therefore not Wittig, but myself who 
pronounces today: ‘I do not have a vagina’] (2002: 205). Preciado affirms that 
one could only argue this through a ‘cadre hyper-constructiviste et surtout post-
féministe pour penser le corps’ [hyper-constructivist, and above all post-
feminist, framework for thinking about the body] (205). His position 
constitutes a war against the ‘natural’ body, but also the body as constructed by 
the discourse of heterosexuality. As does Irigaray in Ce sexe qui n’en est pas 
un [This Sex which is Not One] (1977), Preciado refers to the etymology of 
‘vagina’ from the latin vāgīnae, meaning ‘scabbard’. He argues that the vagina 
is defined in heterosexual terms, as a sheath for a penis. Building on Wittig, he 
claims that the straight mind organizes and defines bodily organs as much as it 
does economic realities or social relations. Refusing Bersani’s reading, 
Preciado argues that from a material position outside of straight sexuality, one 
can make a claim about the material body: ‘que l’on n’a pas de vagin et donc 
pas de corps qui puisse être appelé “femme”’ [that one does not have a vagina, 
and therefore does not have a body that can be called ‘female’] (205-6). 
Preciado thus shifts Wittig’s disidentification ‘lesbians are not women’ firmly 
onto the material body, reading multiple corporeal disidentifications from 
female/woman to animal in Wittig’s work, especially to the ‘gouine garou’ of 
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the essay’s title. Preciado’s reading offers insight into the way in which Wittig 
sees discourse as shaping the material body. Exploring this relationship further, 
I turn to Wittig’s use of metaphor around the sexed body in Les Guérillères, as 
well as her exploration of the violent battle for a lesbian body staged in Le 
Corps lesbien.  
Les Guérillères is an uncompromisingly violent epic poem, relating a 
war between a group of guerilla fighters referred to as ‘elles’ against a group 
referred to as ‘ils’. These pronouns do not correspond, as is often incorrectly 
assumed, to ‘women’ and ‘men’ with Wittig intending ‘elles’ to be understood 
as a universal pronoun. Indeed, Wittig was critical of David Le Vay’s English 
translation of the text, originally published in 1971: ‘When elles is turned into 
the women the process of universalization is destroyed’ (1992: 86). Wittig 
notes her displeasure at the result that ‘the word women appear[s] obsessively 
throughout the text’ (86). Similarly, Le Vay often translates ‘ils’ as ‘the men’, 
or even adds the qualifier ‘male’ when translating masculine nouns – for 
example, ‘les assiégeants’ (Wittig, 1969: 143) is translated as ‘the male 
beseigers’ (Wittig, 2007: 99). Thus, the importance of these translations as 
interpretations of Wittig’s French text relates not only to questions of 
universalisation, but to questions of material sex.  
Les Guérillères is a text divided into three chronologically complex 
parts, each beginning with a large black circle that fills a blank white page 
reflecting the circular chronology that follows. The third part, according to 
Wittig herself, is the ‘chronological beginning of the narrative’ and is the most 
disturbingly violent as it describes the war itself (1992: 85). The first two parts 
relate various scenes after this war. While the first describes ‘elles’’s use of 
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small books carried by ‘elles’, which list endless metaphors and similes 
relating to the vulva, by the second section these have become obsolete. The 
opening section displays an obsession with the vulva, clitoris and labia, with 
various scenes including descriptions of music evoking ‘le O, le zéro ou le 
cercle, l’anneau vulvaire’ (1969: 16) [‘the O, the zero or the circle, the vulval 
ring’ (22)];viii ‘elles’ taking pride in ‘l’emblème de la fécondité’ (42) [‘emblem 
of fecundity’ (53)]; comparisons of the clitoris ‘à un noyau de cerise, à un 
bourgeon, à une jeune pousse […]’ (42) [‘a cherrystone, a bud, a young shoot’ 
(53)]. These endless comparisons are often articulated after the much-repeated 
construction ‘Elles disent que…’ [They say that…] (appearing ten times over 
two pages alone (42-3)) and are linked to ‘féminaires’ [feminaries] that list 
these comparisons (‘Elles disent que dans les féminaires le gland du clitoris et 
le corps du clitoris sont décrites comme encapuchonnés […] Elles le comparent 
au mercure’ (29) [‘The women say that in the feminary the glans of the clitoris 
and the body of the clitoris are described as hooded […] They compare it to 
mercury’ (38)].  
These organs are generally idealised in the féminaires, no more so than 
in a scene where ‘elles’ describes the exposure of their genitals to the sun: 
‘Elles disent qu’elles exposent leurs sexes afin que le soleil s’y réfléchisse 
comme dans un miroir. Elles disent qu’elles retiennent son éclat’ (24) [‘The 
women say that they expose their genitals so that the sun may be reflected 
therein as in a mirror. They say that they retain its brilliance’ (30-1)]. Although 
at one point they are described in a potentially negative way (‘les vulves sont 
des pièges des étaux des tenailles’ (43) [‘vulvas are traps vices pincers’ (54)], 
this inscription is not from a féminaire but from graffiti on an old plaster-
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covered wall. Thus, while Erika Ostrovsky claims that it is obvious that these 
féminaires have been written by male authors, focusing on ‘women’s bodies as 
objects […] reducing women to their genitalia’ (1991: 56-7), I would argue that 
the imagined authorship of these books within Les Guérillères is less than 
clear-cut. Ostrovsky makes a link between the words ‘féminaire’ and ‘bestiaire’ 
[bestiary], with the imagined authors creating a derogatory association of 
women with animality (1991: 56). The féminaires do indeed have strong 
resonances with bestiaries by virtue of the way in which these texts often create 
myths and metaphors to attach to various animals. But Wittig’s description of 
féminaires as small books carried around by ‘elles’, together with the 
suggestion that ‘on peut réciter les comparaisons à la façon de litanies’ (43) 
[‘these comparisons may be recited like a litany’ (54)] also indicates a link 
between ‘féminaire’ and ‘breviaire’ [breviary]. It is equally possible that such 
litanies have been created by women, or by ‘elles’ in an attempt to valorise 
their sex (as indeed many French feminist texts contemporary to Wittig’s did). 
Despite most of the comparisons in the first part being positive (idealisations, 
in fact) Wittig’s protagonists come to reject this metaphor wholesale. At the 
end of the first part there is the suggestion that these féminaires may have 
fulfilled their function and have become obsolete. To avoid being restricted 
‘d’un savoir inutile’ (68), the handbooks are publicly burned.   
The second part of Les Guérillères describes ‘elles’ having moved on 
from the féminaires. ‘Elles’ must now begin to invent their own terms without 
resorting ‘aux herbiers ou aux bestiaires’ (74) [‘to herbals or bestiaries’ (92)]. 
This creation of terms is effected by the ‘grand registre’ [great register] – a 
large public book that is constantly being filled with writing by one of the 
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group of ‘elles’ (74). ‘Elles’ now reject the idealisation of the vulva in favour 
of ‘corps intègres’: ‘Elles disent qu’il faut alors cesser d’exalter les vulves […] 
Elles, corps intègres premiers principaux, s’avancent en marchant ensemble 
dans un autre monde’ (102) [‘They say they must now stop exalting the vulva 
[…] They, the women, the integrity of the body their first principle, advance 
marching together into another world’ (128-9)]. Wittig rejects the focus on 
genital sex in attempts to revalorise what has been disdained:  
 
Elles disent qu’elles ne privilégient pas telle de ses parties sous prétexte 
qu’elle a été jadis l’objet d’un interdit. Elles disent qu’elles ne veulent 
pas être prisonnières de leur propre idéologie […] elles ne comparent 
pas les vulves au soleil à la lune aux étoiles. Elles ne disent pas que les 
vulves sont comme les soleils noirs dans la nuit éclatant. (80-81) 
 
[They say that they do not favour any of its parts on the grounds that it 
was formerly a forbidden object. They say that they do not want to 
become prisoners of their own ideology […] they do not compare the 
vulvas to the sun moon stars. They do not say that the vulvas are like 
black suns in the shining night. (100-1)] 
 
 
 
Such attempts at revalorisation will again lead ‘elles’ to become victims of 
ideology, even if this time it is their own. When metaphor begins to become 
dogma, to shut down new possibilities, it is rejected. When vulvas are 
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discussed in this second part it is now often with the preceding phrase ‘elle ne 
disent pas’ [‘they do not say’]. There is an explicit rejection of idealisation and 
metaphor: ‘Elles n’utilisent pas pour parler de leurs sexes des hyperboles des 
métaphores […] Elles ne récitent pas les longues litanies, dont le moteur est 
une imprécation sans fin’ (93, my emphasis) [‘In speaking of their genitals the 
women do not employ hyperboles metaphors, they do not proceed sequentially 
or by gradation. They do not recite long litanies, whose refrain is an unending 
imprecation’ (116)]. The eventual understanding of the old litanies as ‘une 
imprécation sans fin’, as a curse, is telling. At this point, one might just as well 
read the rejection of the proliferation of positive metaphor around the vulva, 
labia, clitoris etc. as a rejection of feminist models based on sexual difference 
prevalent in much feminist thought during the time Wittig was writing. As 
Diane Crowder writes, Wittig’s aim is not an essentialist valorisation of the 
female sex by any means:  
 
The thrilling and horrifying war depicted in that novel is less a war of 
the sexes than a war on the notion of two sexes. If the guérillères 
initially glorify femaleness as a way to rediscover the history of female 
resistance to heterosexuality (by invoking a rich tapestry of myths and 
legends or by privileging female nonreproductive sexuality), they soon 
realize that no part of any body should be valued over any other. (2007: 
493) 
 
Wittig’s work constitutes a war against binary sex as located entirely in genital 
sex or sexual difference. Her eventual rejection of metaphor around the sexed 
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body in her text suggests that while such metaphors may be strategically useful 
in the creation of new material possibilities through experiments with linguistic 
form, they should never be considered an end point in themselves: attaching 
fixed rather than fluid meaning to the body will eventually amount to a curse.  
The ‘féminaires’ in Les Guérillères have been rejected because, pulled down 
by their own weight, they have ceased to open up possibilities of inventing new 
meaning. Their meaning has now been forgotten (‘À propos des féminaires 
elles disent par exemple qu’elles ont oublié le sens d’une de leurs plaisanteries 
rituelles’ (60) [‘As regards the feminaries the women say for instance that they 
have forgotten the meaning of one of their ritual jokes’ (76)]) and they are 
remembered only as a source of amusement: ‘Elles disent qu’elles ont trouvé 
des appellations en très grand nombre pour désigner les vulves. Elles disent 
qu’elles en ont retenu quelques’unes pour leur amusement. La plupart ont 
perdu leur sens’ (66) [‘The women say that they have found a very large 
number of terms to designate the vulva. They say they have kept several for 
their amusement. The majority have lost their meaning.’ (84)]. Indeed, 
commenting on the repetition of ‘elles ne disent pas’, Wittig has remarked: 
‘C’est une façon ironique de se défaire des féminaires de la première partie. 
Ces féminaires ambigus où sont répertoriés tous les termes décrivant les vulves 
ne servent plus maintenant, dans cette deuxième partie, qu’à informer et 
amuser les petites filles’ [It’s an ironic way to undo the feminaries of the first 
part. These ambiguous feminaries list all the terms describing vulvas in this 
second part, trems which are no longer of any use, except to educate and 
amuse little girls] (1994: 120, my emphasis). Wittig suggests again that 
metaphor is a temporary political tool, to serve a purpose rather than being the 
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goal itself. And yet, she also cunningly suggests her own text as a feminary in 
Les Guérillères itself. She describes the feminaries as containing lists in 
capitals at the centre of the page on a white background, just as the lists of 
capitalised names or the poem that frames Les Guérillères are set out (1969: 
17). Wittig here acknowledges the temporary utility of bodily metaphor in 
creating new space for bodily possibilities, in creating new meanings for 
bodies. She may even suggest (perhaps even hope) that one day her own text 
will be laughed at, considered obsolete just as the ‘féminaires’ within the text 
are, seen merely as a necessary but temporary step along the way.  
Wittig’s aim is not to solidify metaphor, then, and she is clearly aware 
of its political power as well as its dangers. Nevertheless, she writes of Le 
Corps lesbien:  
 
If I used the anatomical vocabulary to design the human body then I 
would appropriate it for my purpose. The whole vocabulary of the 
fiction The Lesbian Body is thus derived from a rigid anatomical 
vocabulary. Thus I acquired a precise set of words with which to talk 
about the body without metaphors, staying practical and pragmatic 
without sentimentality or romanticism. (2005: 46) 
 
Wittig is clear here in her intent to describe the body without metaphor, to use 
and appropriate anatomical terms for her own ends. Yet how is one to 
understand this statement when only on the following page she writes of Le 
Corps lesbien: ‘The book is thus formed of two parts. It opens and falls back 
on itself. One can compare its form to a cashew, an almond, to a vulva’ (2005: 
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47)? Wittig is well aware of the omnipresence of metaphor, and that 
supposedly neutral anatomical terms are not devoid of metaphoric force and 
violence, as Preciado’s comments on the etymology of ‘vagina’ demonstrate. 
In the final part of this chapter, I examine how Wittig interacts with the 
materiality of the particular body and these supposedly neutral anatomical 
terms in Le Corps lesbien.   
Le Corps lesbien is a lyric poem staging a series of meetings between 
its protagonists ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’, protagonists who, as I will discuss, are not clearly 
distinct but always appear in relation to the other. Wittig notes the influence of 
a huge range of works and authors on her text including Homer, the Song of 
Songs, Sarraute, du Bellay, Genet, Baudelaire and, especially, the poems of 
Sappho. Le Corps lesbien constitutes Wittig’s most in-depth and extended 
engagement with the material body in her literary work, addressing the effects 
of the straight mind on material bodies. This work is even more gruesome than 
Les Guérillères, with violent and graphic descriptions of bodily disintegration 
and reconstruction, generally inflicted by ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’ on each other. There are 
frequent descriptions of both ‘j/e’’s and ‘tu’’s blood, bodily fluids or organs 
spilling beyond their skins and merging with one another. The protagonists also 
merge in various other ways; for instance, through descriptions of body parts 
whose propriety is eventually rendered obscure. In one complex scene, ‘j/e’ 
carefully sets about devouring ‘tu’’s ear, from the outside inwards: ‘M/a très 
delectable j/e m/e mets à te manger’ (17) [‘M/y most delectable one I set about 
eating you’ (24)].ix The list of anatomical terms solely relating to the ear is 
already immense: ‘le pavillon’ [auricle], ‘l’anthélix’ [antihelix], ‘le tympan’ 
[tympanum], ‘le marteau’ [hammerbone], ‘le canaux circulaires’ [semicircular 
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canals], ‘le mastoïde’ [mastoid] (17). Reaching the inside of ‘tu’’s cheek, ‘j/e’ 
is suddenly poisoned, turns into a fly in ‘tu’’s mouth. Choking, ‘tu’ attempts to 
expel the fly in vain, this fly/’j/e’ still intent on eating ‘tu’ by applying ‘m/es 
ventouses contre ta douce luette’ (17) [‘m/y suckers to your delicious 
uvula’(24)]. 
In this scene, ‘j/e’ shifts from eating ‘tu’ to being eaten and back to 
eating again, even while within ‘tu’’s mouth – eventually, the issue of who is 
being devoured becomes totally confused. These repeated scenes involving 
merging, integration and expulsion with regards to ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’ describe the 
violent movement between universal and particular involved in the writing 
process for authors inhabiting the particular point of view; the violent push and 
pull of positionality that the act of writing involves for the lesbian poet. Wittig 
emphasises the materiality of this violence of the universal on bodies: the text 
offers numerous corporeal descriptions of the violence of occupying the 
universal position as the particular (lesbian, in this case) subject. This ‘j/e’ that 
is precisely not the universal ‘je’, but the occupation of the universal with the 
particular, is therefore inseparable from the ‘tu’ that accompanies it. These 
positions are at once inseparable, yet also often in tension or opposition – an 
antagonism and ambivalence accounting for much of the violence in the text.  
I have already cited Wittig’s claims about the pronoun ‘j/e’ in Le Corps 
lesbien: that it is ‘a sign of excess’ able to universalise the particular (to 
‘lesbianize’) (2005a: 47), that it may be ‘destroyed in the attempt and 
resuscitated’, that it is like ‘a lava flow that nothing can stop’ (1992: 87). 
Indeed, there are multiple scenes of death and resurrection throughout the text, 
often with one of the protagonists killing the other, or bringing them back to 
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life. As well as death, there are also repeated scenes of paralysis that appear in 
stark contrast to the way in which bodies are described for most of the text; that 
is, frenzied, dynamic and in motion. There are scenes, for instance, of ‘tu’’s 
body being frozen (103-104; 169-170) or set in plastic resin: ‘dans un bloc 
iridescent de plastique pétrifié tout ton corps’ (146) [‘Your entire body is fixed 
petrified in an iridescent block of plastic’ (129)]. Yet these often involve ‘j/e’ 
reviving ‘tu’ by encouraging motion and taking on paralysis herself – in one 
scene, ‘j/e’ attempts to rescue ‘tu’ from being encased in ice, trying to keep the 
water of the stream they are in moving (‘j//opère une traction […] j/e te pousse’ 
(170) [‘I exert traction […] I thrust you’ (149)]).  
The opposition of frenzied motion and paralysis of such scenes recalls 
Wittig’s opposition of hemorrhage/homeostasis in Virgile, Non as well as the 
unstoppable lava flow of her ‘j/e’. Both metaphors of hemorrhage and lava 
flow associate the ability to resist the universal with movement and invention, 
with stillness being linked to the paralyzing effects of the universal on 
particular subjects. Indeed, in this verse describing the freezing stream, when 
‘tu’ begins to move, ‘j/e’ becomes static herself in order to look at her: ‘j/e ne 
bouge pas pourtant’ (170) [‘yet I do not stir’(149)]. With ‘tu’ now trapped 
underneath the weight of ‘j/e’, the ice solidifies around them both (170). 
Conversely, a scene involving bleeding in Le Corps lesbien could be read as 
imagining a resistance to the universal that involves linguistic creation. ‘J/e’ is 
described as being forcibly and painfully bled out by ‘tu’, eventually leaving 
only a stretched-out skin that is described at one point as being as thin as the 
paper of a map, and at another as ready to be pinned up on a wall with drawing 
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pins. ‘Tu’ – the particular position – creates a parchment out of ‘j/e’’s body 
(141-142), a blank space upon which to create new words or images.  
The repeated, almost ritual, dismantling of the body and the revelry in 
anatomical terms may be read as a fantasy of reaching the material depth of the 
body; of reaching its organs, its bones, its cells, as opposed to describing the 
body’s surface, its representation or bodily affect. This fantasy of reaching or 
‘grasping’ the body may be seen in imagery of manipulating the internal organs 
(33; 98), and especially the brain (9). One particular verse sees ‘j/e’ tearing the 
skin from ‘tu’’s head, lifting the skin ‘pellicule par pellicule’ [‘layer by layer’ 
(17)] and finally crushing her skull before plunging her hands into the medulla 
and cerebellum (9). ‘J/e’ holds the brain in her hands rendering ‘tu’ immobile, 
silent and unconscious. The scene not only emphasises the materiality of the 
brain and of thought and language as belonging to such anatomical materiality, 
but again imagines the silencing and stultifying violence of the universal in 
shockingly, grotesquely carnal terms, as a material violence against particular 
bodies.  
The complex relation between ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’ is often imagined through 
the imagery of ruptured skin. Numerous scenes describe flaying (17; 56; 146; 
151), skin bursting open (109; 124) splitting (51) perforating (108) and the 
peeling back of muscles (32). One particularly powerful verse towards the end 
of the text describes skin bursting open to reveal cells:  
 
M/es cellules sous tes doigts m/a plus atroce s’élargissent. M/a peau se 
couvre d’occelles de plaques rouges marron clair, les globules de 
noyaux cellulaires grossis des milliers de fois provoquent des 
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perturbations considérables, ils franchissent les membranes nucléaires, 
ils roulent dans le cytoplasme de leurs cellules, ils en sortent avec une 
pression brutale […] (173)    
 
[M/y cells enlarge beneath your fingers m/y most atrocious one. M/y 
skin is covered with ocelli red lightbrown plaques, the globules of the 
cell-nuclei enlarged thousands of times provoke considerable 
perturbations, they transgress the nuclear membranes, they roll around 
in the cytoplasm of their cells, they emerge from it by brute force (154)] 
 
Wittig’s writing here offers a microscopic close-up of skin, upon which a 
display of frantic and blistering molecular activity unfolds. This passage 
describes the eruption of skin from within provoked by the touch of another, by 
the skin of ‘tu’’s fingers. The passage is notable for the position of the 
protagonists; while the previous scene of cranial manipulation and violence 
from the beginning of the text was performed by ‘j/e’ on or against ‘tu’, it is 
‘j/e’ whose skin now blisters and erupts simply as a result of the touch of ‘tu’’s 
fingers. This touch provokes an incredible motion, ‘des perturbations 
considérables’ that result in the build-up of ‘une pression brutale’ [brute force], 
and the reciprocity between ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’ is explored in ‘tu’’s startling and 
explosive response to it. Touch here is completely opposed to the Nancean 
notion of touch-as-separation, distance, as explored in chapter one: while touch 
here may begin at the surface, it provokes a frantic cellular motion beneath that 
cannot be contained, breaching the membrane’s walls. 
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Wittig thus explores numerous fantasies of reaching a cellular depth 
beyond skin: of tearing off skin layer-by-layer, gouging and cutting, ripping 
and biting. Wittig’s fantasy in this particular scene is one of epidermal 
manipulation, of provoking eruptions, movement and cellular explosions by the 
touch of ‘tu’’s fingers. The agency of these fingers, and the power of their 
touch, is important. ‘Tu’’s fingers do not simply manipulate the skin or work it 
as if it were a piece of clay. In the first instance a minimal touch provokes a 
vibration of molecules within ‘j/e’’s skin. These molecules burst to the surface 
to meet the fingers. While eventually ‘tu’s fingers take on their own motion, it 
is initially a simple proximity that produces a jubilant destruction that spreads 
to the entire body: 
 
un effondrement de surface m/e vient, de proche en proche il gagne 
l’ensemble de m/on corps m/es muscles m/on sang m/es os m/es 
organes essentiels m/es substances jusqu’à la décomposition complète. 
(176)   
[‘m/y surface caves in, step by step it affects m/y entire body m/y 
muscles m/y blood m/y bones m/y vital organs m/y substances until 
decomposition is complete.’ (155)] 
 
Rewriting the body requires its initial destruction. This destruction is effected 
by an initial contact between ’j/e’ and ’tu’ that provokes a contagious and 
explosive movement, and eventually this fragment or verse describes the 
collapse of ‘j/e’ via the surface of her skin. In comparison, and again 
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emphasising the ambivalence of the reciprocity of ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’s interactions, 
‘tu’ is left complete, described as ‘toi m/a plus intacte’ (173) [‘you m/y most 
intact’ (155)]. Notions of bodily disintegration and completeness are 
exchanged between ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’ – again provoked, I argue, by the exchange or 
the ‘push and pull’ between universal and particular that is both violent and 
productive at the same time.  
 It is ‘tu’’s touch that is described in the second line of the fragment that 
results in the presence of the ‘occelles’ that spread over ‘j/e’’s skin. The entry 
on ‘occelles’ in Brouillon pour une dictionnaire describes the skin’s pores 
when they become enlarged upon contact with another body, transforming the 
skin ‘de couleur bleue rouge verte sur tout la surface du corps’ (Wittig & Zeig, 
1976: 185-6). This blue/green ‘eye’ is described as the ocelli of peacock 
feathers, but could also perhaps suggest the more violent visible signs of skin 
contact evident as coloured bruising. These ‘occelles’ are contagious, spreading 
over the entire skin, and as an opening up of the skin’s surface at its pores they 
indicate vulnerable permeability. They might also indicate the necessarily 
tentative act of speaking from an unfamiliar subjective positions described by 
de Lauretis. This outlandish myth of the ‘occelles’ competes in Le Corps 
lesbien to displace stale universal ‘myths’ that create and sustain the straight 
mind. 
 In this passage, Wittig presents the hideous nuclear disintegration of the 
skin’s cells, the expulsion of globules of viscous cellular matter, in a beautiful 
and even jubilatory description: 
 
des bulles se forment sans arrêt à la surface de m/on corps touché par 
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tes doigts, j/e les vois crever en silence sur m/es bras dans de longs jets 
orange verts (176) 
[‘bubbles form continually at the surface of m/y body touched by your 
fingers, I see them burst silently on m/y arms in long orange green 
spurts’ (154)] 
 
The fizzing nuclei and the coloured bubbles of bodily matter are presented 
here almost as a firework display. Wittig’s microscopic perspective creates a 
new and technicolour universe out of cellular materiality, and the alien scale of 
the encounter engenders ambivalence in the aesthetic description of such 
matter that echoes the strange reciprocity between ‘j/e’ and ‘tu’. Colours 
enliven the molecules and nuclear matter, not only as ‘de longs jets orange 
verts’ or as ‘plaques rouges marron clair’ but through the striking luminosity 
evoked by ‘nucléoses brillants’ [‘shining nucleoli’] or the globules described as 
‘billes de verre’
 
(176) [‘glass marbles’]. Contrast this with the images of ‘du 
sang de la lymphe de la bile’ (177) [‘blood lymph bile’], adding similarly 
strange and ambiguous colours to Wittig’s palette. Sound is equally 
ambivalent: where initially ‘j/e’ witnesses the bubbles forming on her skin ‘en 
silence’ [‘in silence’], eventually this becomes a soft and intimate whispering, 
‘un bruit léger un chuintement des susurrements sont perceptibles’ (176) [‘a 
slight noise a hissing susurrations become perceptible’ (154)]. Eventually, the 
movement provoked in ’j/e’’s cells by ‘tu’ reaches a crescendo: ‘le phénomène 
s’accélère’
 
[‘the phenomenon accelerates’] and ‘le bruit devient une série de 
mugissements de sifflements cessant par à coups puis reprenant, j/e suis le lieu 
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d’un grand vacarme’
 
(176) [‘the sound becomes a series of bellowings of 
whistlings ceasing abruptly then beginning again, I am the site of a great 
hubbub’ (154)].
  
Wittig’s writing in this passage is dynamic, particularly when read 
aloud, with her piled up, rolling lists of nouns and her sparse use of 
punctuation. Yet even the frenetic molecular movement of the passage – 
’perturbations considérables’, ‘une pression brutale’ – is problematized by the 
encounter between the protagonists, with the cellular explosions of ‘j/e’’s skin 
displaced by a frantic motion in ‘tu’: ‘j/e deviens de plus en plus immobile, 
tandis que toi m/a très féroce m/a frénétique tu es d’une vélocité incomparable’
 
(176) [‘thus I become increasingly immobile while you m/y so ferocious one 
m/y frenzied one you have an incomparable speed’ (154)]. The crescendo of 
motion achieved by ’j/e’’s cells does not simply die down, but infects ’tu’ with 
a frenetic speed of her own, just as the asymmetry of completeness and 
destruction had also played out between the two protagonists. 
 In this fragment, Wittig creates a landscape on the skin of ‘j/e’’s 
body that is explored by ‘tu’’s hands: ‘tu vas et tu viens dans m/es pores élargis 
[...] dans m/es sillons dans m/es tranchées dans m/es crevasses, tu m/e mines’ 
(176) [‘you come and go in m/y widened pores […] in m/y furrows in m/y 
trenches in m/y crevices, you mine m/e’ (154-5)]. Here, the perspective shifts 
from the cellular to the expansive, from the particular to the universal. These 
landscapes of skin are created not with the contours of the body from the usual 
visual perspective, but within a microscopic universe of skin. In fact, the 
cellular scale and motion of skin here is so microscopically alien that it 
becomes cosmic. The movement of Wittig’s skin-scene is immense and other-
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worldly – a Brownian motion of cells beyond everyday human experience or 
comprehension and known only through the lens of a microscope. The fizzing 
molecular movement and speed of cells mirror the equally unknown and 
incomprehensible motion of orbiting planets, the explosions like a supernova. 
How do the cells become an entire universe here, one of equally alienating 
speed and scale? Wittig creates a new ‘universal’ on the skin. The microscopic 
becomes its own universe – a world-view of the up-close that obscures any 
notions of a flat, dull surface in favour of violent motion and epic proportions. 
Wittig uses this skin-universe to regain the universal, locating it on the skin of 
the lesbian body in an eroticised description of cellular motion. Wittig’s 
writing lesbianises the body’s cells with a speed and motion alien to familiar 
experience. The dynamism Wittig imagines here is vital to the political 
potential of her corporeal metaphor: for Wittig, accepting essentialism means 
‘no change, no movement’ and countering it will require an extraordinary 
motion (1992: 3). Wittig is able to subvert the universal in this way only 
through the specificity of the skin and the body’s cells as a site of metaphor; 
she displaces ‘neutral’, universal anatomical terms and creates lesbian cells, 
skin – versions of what a lesbian body could be.  
Wittig describes cells themselves here as breaching the borders of their 
membranes – Wittig’s metaphor of the Trojan Horse has finally reached the 
building blocks of the material body. The way the cells are described in these 
lines as pulsating and erupting makes it hard not to compare them to a grenade, 
to Wittig’s mine blast – can Wittig really make bodies’ cells erupt through the 
war machine of literary writing? Even Butler concedes that Wittig’s writing in 
this text conveys, in ‘erotic struggle’, the ‘reinscription of the body’. On 
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Wittig’s understanding, nothing – not even the brute matter of the body’s cells 
– is immune from resignification and the rupture of borders, the insistent 
encroachment of the lava flow against the universal. In this scene, Wittig 
describes the particularisation – the lesbianisation – of the body even down to 
its very cells. 
If Wittig’s fantasy is one of bodily depth, it is a cellular depth – an 
assault on the very foundations of bodily materiality, on the supposedly neutral 
or universal substance of a cell. At this point Wittig’s claim to use ‘a rigid 
anatomical vocabulary’ and ‘appropriate it for my purpose’ may be better 
understood: her claim to ‘acquir[e] a precise set of words with which to talk 
about the body without metaphors, staying practical and pragmatic without 
sentimentality or romanticism’ is entirely ironic (2005: 46). Wittig is well 
aware that words considered as utterly void of metaphor and partiality – in this 
case scientific or anatomical terms – are in fact not neutral at all but carry the 
weight of the universal with them for precisely that reason. Wittig’s work in Le 
Corps lesbien is to attach each of these universal anatomical terms to the 
lesbian, to stage an invasion of the universal body by lesbianising it each 
anatomical term at a time. Here lies the force of the title of Wittig’s work, the 
dissonance and destabilisation in attaching the particular (lesbian) to the 
universal (body), a feminine qualifier to the masculine noun ‘le corps’. It is this 
dissonance that Wittig found ‘hilarious’ in its irony, describing it as ‘a kind of 
paradox but not really, a kind of joke but not really, a kind of impossibility but 
not really’ (2005: 46).  
At this point we might recall Preciado’s desire to ‘pousser l’hypothèse 
performative dans le corps, jusqu’aux fluides, la faire passer dans les cellules’ 
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[push the hypothesis of performativity into the body, right up to its fluids, to 
channel it into its cells], through the infiltration of his body’s cellular depths 
with the absorption of topical testosterone through his skin (2008: 98). Wittig, 
in contrast to Preciado, feels no need for an intervention such as the molecule 
of testosterone in her text: the materiality of writing is enough. Wittig’s textual 
materialism means that she is able to lesbianise the body’s cells in all their 
materiality through writing alone. Preciado’s text metaphorises the insidious 
infiltration of the body through the permeability of his skin absorbing 
testosterone, but Wittig’s imagery in Le Corps lesbien is of skins violently torn 
off, blistering and erupting or removed completely. The startling consequences 
drawn by Wittig’s textual materialism should not be lost: for Wittig, 
lesbianising the body’s cells is precisely not metaphor, despite being performed 
through metaphor. She is describing and effecting a shock, a shift in conceptual 
space that is inseparable from material bodies, that is able to reorganise the 
body down to its very cells.  
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4  The constructed body of ORLAN’s “Art Charnel” 
 
Abstract 
French performance artist ORLAN pushes the limits of engagement with the 
material body, most famously in her surgical performances from 1990 
onwards, where she has aspects of famous art works ‘cited’ on her face through 
plastic surgery. I argue that ORLAN offers an example of a constructivist 
engagement with the material, sexed body throughout her work, exploring how 
sexed bodies are surrounded by and constructed through discourse, including 
psychoanalytic work. This chapter is structured by three instances of the head 
in ORLAN’s work – firstly, Femme avec tête (1996), in which ORLAN 
performs as a decapitated head resting on a table, reading theoretical texts 
aloud in front of another, digital composition of her head; secondly, La tête de 
la Méduse (1970), in which ORLAN displayed her genitals daubed in paint, 
framed by her trousseau sheets as a comment on Freud’s essay comparing the 
vulva to Medusa’s head; and finally, through the recurring images of the 
death’s head in ORLAN’s work. ORLAN denies the psychoanalytic and 
religious taboo of altering her flesh in what I read as a confrontation with the 
Real, and an exploration of how the material body-figured-as-Real overlaps 
with signification. It is this final aspect that I argue offers an engagement with 
Lacanian psychoanalytic constructions of sex and sexual difference which 
renders it more conducive to a productive relationship with transgender theory 
than has more recently been imagined in France.  
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This chapter explores the use of the body itself as an artistic medium in the 
work of the French artist ORLAN. For Jay Prosser, ORLAN figures as ‘an 
insane personification of the poststructuralist insistence on the absolute 
constructedness of the body’ (1998: 62). She is seen to embody the failure of 
poststructuralism (and later, of queer theory) to recognise the materiality of the 
body. Through her work, I hope to interrogate Prosser’s claims further: can 
theory, and queer theory in particular, ‘deal’ with, or account for, the material 
body? ORLAN’s work gets to the heart of the matter of this book: that of the 
possibilities of engaging with the material body through varying theoretical 
frameworks, and of how to do so when material bodies appear to resist 
representation, when words seem to refuse to ‘stick’ to materiality. 
While ORLAN does not engage directly with queer theory herself, her 
work is embedded in and conversant with the same theoretical groundings. She 
incorporates feminist, poststructuralist and psychoanalytic texts into her 
performances, reading the work of Michel Serres, Julia Kristeva and Eugénie 
Lemoine-Luccioni during her surgical performances. Queer and gender 
theorists have engaged with her work, from Dominic Johnson and Amelia 
Jones to Jay Prosser and Sandy Stone. There is an undeniably queer vein in her 
work, which provokes critical, feminist and anti-essentialist examination of the 
constructions and restrictions of gender and sex, with the effect of destabilising 
and denaturalising both.  
 Three very different instances of the recurring motif of the head in 
ORLAN’s work organise this chapter. Firstly, I consider Femme avec 
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Tête [Woman with Head] (1996), which stages the illusion of the decapitated 
head of ORLAN reading theoretical texts aloud to her audience. Alongside 
Amelia Jones’s writing on performance, I examine concerns of pervasive 
Cartesianism and universalism in this work, mounting a challenge to ORLAN’s 
provocative insistence that ‘the body is obsolete’. In my second instance of the 
head in ORLAN’s La Tête de la Méduse [Medusa’s Head] (1978), the 
Medusa’s head is reimagined as the vulva, commenting on Freudian concepts 
of sexual difference. What does ORLAN’s performance say about the 
materially sexed body? I use this work, as well as ORLAN’s claim to be a 
‘transsexuelle femme à femme’ [female-to-female transsexual], to consider 
interventions in ORLAN’s work from transgender theorists. Finally, I examine 
the recurrent figure of the Death’s Head in ORLAN’s work as signifying a 
confrontation with the Lacanian Real. What could ORLAN’s forceful rejection 
of the Lacanian prohibition against altering the Real mean for queer theory’s 
psychoanalytic investments? Could it in fact re-situate her work as allied to 
transgender concerns? 
 
 
ORLAN’s body of work: historical, theoretical and artistic context 
 
ORLAN is best known for her controversial project La Réincarnation de Sainte 
ORLAN ou Images nouvelles images [The Reincarnation of Saint ORLAN or 
Images New Images], a series of nine ‘opération-performance’i pieces 
incorporating surgical procedures carried out between 1990 and 1993. 
Throughout her career, ORLAN’s practice has included sculpture, 
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photography, video work and occasionally painting,ii as well as numerous 
performances that do not include surgical interventions. It is impossible to offer 
an overview of her work that is both succinct and comprehensive, but I offer 
below some examples of the themes, projects and also the specific materials to 
which ORLAN repeatedly returns in her work.  
 ORLAN’s first performance pieces took place in the mid 1960s. These 
included the first incarnations of her ‘measurings’ – public performances 
during which ORLAN measured public space and institutions (often art 
galleries, sometimes religious buildings or spaces) with the length of her body, 
marking out each ‘unit’ with a piece of chalk. A recurrent material used time 
and again in ORLAN’s practice began to appear in these works – during 
‘measurings’, ORLAN would wear the trousseau sheets given to her by her 
mother for a future marriage. As ORLAN repeatedly lay down on pavements, 
roads or public squares, the sheets became dirty, with an aspect of the 
performance including publicly washing them and bottling the dirty water, 
sealing the bottles with wax as physical testament to the performance (as 
‘relics’ as O’Bryan suggests, (2005: 5)). ORLAN continually returned to these 
trousseau sheets, incorporating them into her work for over a decade. These 
earliest performances of ‘measurings’ have been recently revisited by ORLAN 
with digital technology, in a series of video works including Bump Load 
(2013) and MeasuRages (2013), depicting the flayed body of ‘ORLAN’ 
performing the same measuring ritual, but incorporating the notion of 
subcutaneous flesh explored in the operation-performances. 
ORLAN’s work is consistently (if unorthodoxly) feminist in its critical 
exploration of sex, gender and societal or religious constraints on women. In 
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another use of the trousseau sheets in the installation Plaisirs brodés. Étude 
documentaire N°1. Couture-Clair/Obscur [Documentary Study No.1: Plaisirs 
brodés (Embroidered Dissipations, or, Chiaroscuro Couture, Collection] (1968) 
at the atelier Delaroa in Saint-Etienne, ORLAN asked male art dealers and 
gallery owners to stain these sheets with ejaculate, and traced the outline of the 
stains in embroidery – a violent rejection of the institution of marriage and 
domestic labour that the trousseau represented. Another of ORLAN’s most 
famous pieces, Le Baiser de l’artiste [The Kiss of the Artist] (performed in 
1976 at Caldas da Rainha Museum, Portugal and in 1977 at the FIAC (Foire 
internationale d’art contemporain) in Paris) again offered a critique of the 
male-dominated art world. The work asked spectators for 5F, inserted into a 
slot in a photo-sculpture of ORLAN’s naked torso, in exchange for a kiss from 
the artist herself.  
 ORLAN’s work evolved in France at the same time as that of feminist 
performance artists elsewhere, notably in the US, from the late 1960s to early 
1970s, from Carolee Schneemann to Gina Pane, Martha Rosler and Yoko Ono. 
Schneemann referred to the performance art group Fluxus as the ‘Art Stud 
Club’, noting the masculinism of the circle and in the art industry more 
broadly. ORLAN’s work shares particular resonances with feminist artists who 
engaged with the materiality of their body, not least Schneemann and Pane. 
However, ORLAN describes her work as ‘Carnal Art’ in distinction to ‘Body 
Art’ due to her lack of interest in pain, and dismisses the levels of pain 
involved in her surgical procedures.iii  
 Although ORLAN’s work must be situated in relation to the MLF and 
the wave of feminist activism and cultural production of the 1960s and 70s, her 
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engagement with the movement was one of critical distance. She staged an 
intervention at a feminist conference in Toulouse in 1971, where she held a 
placard with reversed gendered articles for ‘homme’ and ‘femme’: ‘j’ai troublé 
plusieurs fois des colloques féministes en me présentant avec une pancarte je 
suis une homme et un femme’ [I bothered feminist conferences many times by 
turning up with a placard reading I am a woman and a man] (1996: 85). 
ORLAN’s engagement with feminism has always been unorthodox and, I 
argue, consistently constructivist.  
 ORLAN has incorporated biomedical and communication technology 
into her sculptures and performances for longer than is generally 
acknowledged. Her first use of surgery in her work predates the Réincarnation 
project by over a decade, for example. When ORLAN was forced to miss a 
symposium in Lyon in 1979 due to an urgent surgical procedure, she filmed the 
operation and showed this instead of appearing in person. ORLAN continued to 
use the latest technology in her work; La madone au minitel [Madonna on the 
Minitel] was shown at the Palais de Tokyo in 1989, using France’s own pre-
cursor to the internet, the Minitel. During her seventh operation-performance 
Omniprésence [Omnipresence] (1993), which again revisited the character 
‘Sainte ORLAN’ and referenced Baroque imagery, ORLAN answered 
questions sent to her via fax during the surgery. This event at the Sandra 
Gering Gallery in New York was transmitted live via satellite to galleries 
worldwide including the Centre Georges Pompidou. ORLAN has since used 
cell cultivation in collaboration with the Australian laboratory SymbioticA on 
the Manteau d’Arlequin [Harlequin’s Coat] project from 2008. Referencing 
Michel Serres’s use of the Harlequin figure as a model for laïcité in Tiers-
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Instruit [The Troubadour of Knowledge] (1991), ORLAN uses her own skin 
cells, as well as those from bodies of other races and that of a foetus to create a 
hybrid skin.  
 Another constant in ORLAN’s work is the continued exploration of the 
relation between her body and texts, often engaging with theoretical and 
psychoanalytic works including that of Serres, Kristeva and Lemoine-Luccioni. 
In 1979 at the Galerie N.R.A., Paris, ORLAN invited viewers to bring a 
personally significant book with them, using these books to measure out the 
length of her body and promising not to leave the gallery space until she had 
read all of them. This performance, and the accompanying photographic series, 
was titled Un ORLAN corps-de-livres [An ORLAN body-of-books] (1979), 
speaking to the ‘thorough imbrication’ of writing and materiality that Kate Ince 
describes in Millenial Female. After ORLAN’s reading of Serres’s Le Tiers-
Instruit during a surgical performance in 1990, she produced a number of 
sculptural works titled Réliquaires, ‘Ma chair, le texte et les langages’ 
[Reliquaries, ‘My flesh, text and languages’] (1992-93). These pieces are 
comprised of glass engraved with citations from Serres’s text, with a metal 
receptacle containing twenty grams of ORLAN’s flesh extracted during the 
operations, welded shut ‘donnant une impression d’inviolabilité’ [giving the 
impression of inviolability] (ORLAN, 1996: 93). From these works, to reading 
critical texts aloud during the surgical performances themselves, or during the 
performance of Femme avec Tête at the ICA in 1996, ORLAN has continually 
staged meetings between texts and her body. Her work considers the relation 
between writing and bodies, contributing to what I consider a material 
engagement with constructivist feminism.    
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 This constant revisiting and reworking of projects, themes and even 
specific materials in ORLAN’s work suggests continual movement and an 
accumulation of meanings rather than the attachment of singular, fixed 
meaning to any particular work. It also creates an invitation to read ORLAN’s 
works backwards as well as forwards, or in a non-linear fashion entirely, with 
more recent re-engagements of a theme or material adding to the layered and 
multiple meanings imbued in their prior usage. For this reason, I have outlined 
ORLAN’s work via the themes and materials she returns to over time rather 
than offering a chronology of works. The effect ORLAN creates is one of 
open-endedness and possibility – contributing to what Kate Ince considers as 
constituting a ‘postmodern’ aesthetic:  
 
It is clear [...] that Orlan’s work possesses many of the characteristics of 
art and culture agreed on as ‘postmodern’ by the majority of 
postmodernism’s commentators; one striking example is the 
recombination and permutation of images from one work to the next, 
particularly in evidence in ‘Reincarnation’. (2000: 99) 
 
I agree with Ince that the layered, plural meanings created by repetition and 
revisiting works destabilises the notion of singular meaning in ORLAN’s 
works. I would also add that this ‘recombination and permutation’ in 
ORLAN’s work should be linked to the relation she sees between texts, her art 
practice and her body: not only does ORLAN use poststructuralist texts within 
her work, she also incorporates poststructuralist principles in her art practice. 
Poststructuralist texts are intertwined visibly with her art works and the 
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practice itself, just as her art practice – not only in her performance but in 
sculptural works using her flesh – is imbricated with her body. In ORLAN’s 
work, theory, practice and the material body become inseparable.  
ORLAN’s work, as her statement ‘je suis une homme et un femme’ 
suggests, has never been essentialist. On the contrary, it has consistently 
emphasised the cultural mediation and construction of the material body, 
nowhere more so than when she deploys her body in her work. Yet readings of 
ORLAN’s early work suffer from assumptions about feminist performance of 
this era of the kind Amelia Jones responds to in Body Art (1998). Jones objects 
in particular to Mary Kelly’s dismissal of feminist body art from this period as 
‘naïve essentialism’, and ‘necessarily reactionary’ (1998: 23).iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[NSERT FIGURE  2 HERE]  
 Strip-tease occasionnel à l’aide des draps du trousseau [Incidental Strip-Tease 
Using Sheets from the Trousseau], ORLAN (1974-5).   
 
 
 208 
Countering Kelly’s claims, Jones offers a reading of the work of Ana Mendieta, 
troubling the assertion that her engagement with her body, and indeed her 
female body, necessarily amounts to essentialism. Jones’s reading instead 
emphasises the aspects of Mendieta’s work that create multiple meaning in 
relation to her body, a ‘particular experience or identity that has no “essential” 
meaning in relation to her work’ (1998: 27). Similarly, ORLAN’s early work 
can be convincingly read as complicating the notion of an essential, 
unmediated body as opposed to presenting such a body in her performances. 
While critics have often overlooked the potential of reading ORLAN’s earlier 
works in this way, I foreground works such as Corps-Sculptures (1964) and La 
tête de la Méduse in my reading of the culturally mediated body presented by 
ORLAN, even in her very earliest work.  
As I explore through La tête de la Méduse, when ORLAN incorporates 
her genitalia into her work, it is not to present an essentialist female bodily 
presence but rather to interrogate constructions of femaleness and femininity. 
ORLAN’s earlier work has always shown the body precisely not as pure 
unadulterated presence; rather, she explores constructions and representations 
of the body. For instance, Strip-tease occasionnel à l’aide des draps du 
trousseau (1974-5) records ORLAN gradually removing her trousseau sheets 
from her body. Yet ORLAN does not strip away these layers to reveal an 
authentic, natural bodily presence beneath. Far from it: in the final shot 
ORLAN’s body has disappeared entirely. She does not reveal a bare body, but 
the sheets themselves. In the penultimate frame, ORLAN’s body without the 
trousseau is just as stylized as in the first: her eyes turned upwards in 
supplication echo the religious connotations of previous shots; her pose is 
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identical to Botticelli’s Venus. ORLAN writes of the piece: 'The idea is that 
striptease for a woman is impossible because, even as she undresses, she is re-
dressed by other images, thoughts, preconceived ideas and prejudices, none of 
which she can remove. Viewers don’t see a nude woman – they see what’s in 
their own head’ (2016).  
ORLAN frequently uses screens in her work to this effect. In Le baiser 
de l’artiste (1976) and in S’habiller de sa propre nudité (1981), ORLAN’s 
‘nakedness’ is not present ‘in the flesh’ but as a photographic image printed 
onto clothing or the sculpture of her torso. In Le baiser de l’artiste, three 
‘ORLANs’ are present – two photographic representations, one ORLAN-
Madonna and one naked torso – and the artist who sprang out to offer a kiss 
when 5F were inserted into the slot in the centre of the torso. None, I argue, are 
presented as any more authentic than the other, rather, they comment on the 
multiple cultural constructions of femininity. In S’habiller de sa propre nudité, 
ORLAN walked through the streets of Lisbon wearing a life-size photographic 
print of her naked body, provoking a police officer to attempt to arrest her for 
public indecency.v That the joke is on the police officer, who relented when 
convinced by ORLAN that her attire was simply the height of fashion, 
underlines my point – ORLAN presents an image of the (naked) body that is 
precisely not the body itself. She does not attempt to present the body as pure 
presence, and this is nowhere more evident than when she uses representations 
of nudity in her work.  
Ince has suggested that a development in ORLAN’s work can be traced; 
associating ‘authentic physical presence of the body’ with her early work in the 
1960s as opposed to postmodern accounts of subjectivity in her work from the 
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1990s. She writes that ORLAN’s ‘career is a particularly good illustration of 
the evolution of performance art from its 1960s essentialist modernism to its 
thoroughly postmodern 1990s mediatization’ (2000: 105). Ince writes further:  
 
Orlan’s career as a performance artist spans both the first and 
contemporary generations of body artists. The immediate, authentic 
physical presence of the body espoused in the art of the 1960s and 
1970s is obviously a value in her early actions, which did not use any 
electronic media; her very early ‘slowed-down walks’ in the street, her 
measurings of public spaces with her body, and her early appearances 
as Saint Orlan demonstrate this type of bodily presence. The arrival of 
poststructuralist theory in the 1970s, and in particular of Derridean 
deconstruction, posed a head-on challenge to the aesthetics of presence, 
and simultaneously to this phenomenological approach to performance. 
(2000: 103)  
 
Ince here uses ORLAN’s ‘measurings’ as an example of her investment in the 
notion of an unadulterated bodily presence, and one could indeed compare 
them to the kind of body presented in Bruce Nauman’s filmed walks and 
repeated movements from this period (e.g. Slow Angle Walk (Beckett Walk) 
(1968) or Walking in an Exaggerated Manner Around the Perimeter of a 
Square (1967)). Yet I would emphasise, in contrast to work such as Nauman’s, 
ORLAN’s use of the ‘dirty’ trousseau wrapped around her body, the bottled 
relics in this performance that allude to the complex layers of meaning through 
which her particular, French Catholic, female body must be read. I would like 
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to consider an alternative reading of ORLAN’s early work as offering an 
engagement with the body not as pure presence or ‘whole’ but as always 
culturally mediated, always inseparable from layers of gendered, religious and 
cultural meaning. 
Referring to Jeff Rian’s article in Flash Art, ‘What’s All This Body 
Art?’ (1993), Ince writes:  
 
Taking Kiki Smith, Charles Ray, Robert Gober, Cindy Sherman, 
Matthew Barney and Sue Williams as his examples, Rian affirms that in 
1990s body art, technology has usurped nature. The body can no longer 
be celebrated as an unmediated site of identification for the artist, or as 
an authentic pre-representational physical presence that can be affirmed 
as present in performance. Works by Kiki Smith, Cindy Sherman and 
Charles Ray show a fascination not with a pre-technological ‘natural’ 
body, but with mannequins and automata, as often dismembered as they 
are unified into a whole human form (Rian, 1993: 52). (2000: 102) 
 
Rian categorises the use of technology and prosthetics – particularly 
mannequins – as characteristic of work from the 1990s as opposed to the work 
of the 1960s/1970s depicting the body as ‘unmediated site of identification’, as 
‘authentic pre-representational physical presence’. ORLAN’s work does not fit 
at all easily into this division or ‘evolution’, especially because of her constant 
re-working of themes and projects. ORLAN’s body is presented throughout her 
career as a prosthetic entity – whether through the use of actual prosthetics or 
the technē of writing and texts. Specifically in relation to Rian’s remarks cited 
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above, ORLAN used mannequins long before Cindy Sherman, in Orlan 
accouche d’elle-m’aime [ORLAN pregnant with herself]vi and Shiva in the 
‘Corps-Sculptures’ [Body-Sculptures] series from 1964. She used masks or 
prosthetics in some images for this series, but not all – and yet the shapes into 
which ORLAN contorts her body in those images without prostheses render 
them no more ‘organic’ than those incorporating prosthetic limbs.  
The use of dismembered mannequins in and of itself at this time was 
not in itself innovative; Hans Bellmer had famously used them in the 1930s 
(most famously in La Poupée [The Doll] (1936)). Bellmer’s work, however, 
did not use mannequins in the way that Rian discusses, as juxtaposed with the 
artist’s body itself as an interrogation of subjectivity and bodily integrity, as in 
Cindy Sherman’s work. ORLAN’s work does, and pre-dates Sherman’s work 
by some thirty years. ORLAN writes of the ‘Corps-Sculptures’ series:  
 
I juxtapose myself with objects [...] Objects become grafts, prosthetic 
extensions of my body.  
 
I turn my body into an absorbent substance for external materials at 
the same time as I imprint my organic carnality onto those external 
materials. Nothing is fused, nothing is divided. I enter into a dialogue. 
Interior and exterior copulate. The camera pursues this copulation as its 
position with respect to my body conceals or reveals fragments of those 
assemblages. (2010: 104) 
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While it could be argued that ORLAN is commenting here on work produced 
early on in her career some thirty-five years later, having absorbed the later 
work of Haraway on cyborgs and Deleuze on assemblages – and she certainly 
does echo terms from both here – the works themselves clearly do trouble 
notions of pure, organic bodies. ORLAN does not present the body in her work 
– even and especially the naked body – as ‘stripped bare’; rather, the body is 
displayed to emphasise its imbrication with technology, texts or ideas.  
ORLAN describes her body in the quote above as an ‘absorbent 
substance’ – a substance that is not closed but permeable. Her representation 
of the body has partly evolved with the technologies available to her. While 
the surface of the body in Corps-Sculptures is permeable to prosthetics, and 
the body in Le baiser de l’artiste, La tête de la Méduse and S’habiller de sa 
propre nudité [Dressed in her own Nudity] is permeable to cultural, 
theoretical and political signification, ORLAN’s bodily representations 
increasingly use technology to explore this permeability. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 Shiva ou tentacules de bras multiples [Shiva or tentacles of many arms], 
‘Corps-sculptures’ series, ORLAN (1965). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
ORLAN accouche d'elle m’aime [ORLAN pregnant with herself ], ‘Corps-
sculptures’ series, ORLAN (1965). 
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This development has meant that ORLAN’s work increasingly interrogates 
the representation of material bodies’ interiority, their cells and flesh. 
However, as ORLAN acknowledges above, the notion of permeability, of 
subjectivities and bodies that are not closed-off, natural or essential has been 
present in her work from the beginning. As it is for Wittig and Preciado, I 
argue, this notion of the body’s permeability is linked to her understanding of 
the meeting between her work and politics.   
Key to understanding this notion of the body as absorbent, as well as 
the exchange between the material body and texts presented in her work, is an 
understanding of ORLAN’s political motivations: 
 
l’art […] doit bousculer nos a prioris, bouleverser nos pensées, Il est 
hors normes. Il est hors la loi. Il est contre l’art bourgeois.  
Il n’est pas là pour nous bercer, pour nous resservir ce que nous 
connaissons déjà. (1996: 87)  
 
[art […] must jolt us from preconceived ideas, upset our beliefs, it must 
be outside of the norm. Outside of the law. It is against bourgeois art.  
It is not there to comfort us, to make us think we know it all already.]  
 
ORLAN is well aware of art as an industry, yet she claims that art can and 
should be political. In a statement strikingly similar to Wittig’s writing on 
poetic language, art exists to ‘bousculer’, to ‘bouleverser’. While poetry for 
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Wittig can produce violent shocks in the reader, ORLAN makes similar 
comments about the violence of a certain kind of visual art:  
 
Peu de sortes d’images nous obligent a [sic] fermer les yeux: La mort, 
la souffrance, l’ouverture du corps, certains aspects de la pornographie 
(pour certaines personnes) ou pour d’autres l’accouchement. Ici, les 
yeux deviennent des trous noirs dans lesquels l’image est absorbée 
comme de gré ou de force, ces images s’engouffrent et viennent taper 
directement là où ça fait mal sans passer par les habituels filtres, comme 
si les yeux n’avaient plus de connections avec le cerveau. (1996: 83-4) 
 
[Few images force us to close our eyes: death, suffering, the opening of 
the body, certain kinds of pornography (for some people) or for others 
childbirth. In these instances, the eyes becomes black holes into which 
the image is absorbed whether we like it or not, these images rush in 
and directly hit the point where it hurts without passing through the 
usual filters, as if the eyes no longer had any connection with the brain.]  
 
Certain images penetrate the viewer directly, as if bypassing any protective 
filter in the brain. If ORLAN imagines herself as an absorbent surface, the 
viewer is no less permeable, absorbing the image with or without consent. In a 
particularly violent account of the relation between viewer and art object that 
turns the concept of the male gaze on its head, ORLAN imagines her viewer as 
passive, unable to mount a defense to discomfiting images, and unable to avoid 
her message. Even more strikingly, ORLAN describes the prosthetic bumps she 
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has inserted beneath the skin of her temples during the surgery-performance 
Omniprésence as ‘les deux petites bosses qui dépassent de mes tempes, deux 
volcanes en éruption sur l’idéologie dominante...’ [two little lumps protruding 
from my temples, two volcanos erupting over dominant ideology] (2001: 50), 
recalling Wittig’s notion of poetry and language as an unstoppable lava flow 
threatening universalist ideology.  
If art attempts to effect material change, conversely (and again just as 
for Wittig), ORLAN insists that ideology acts materially on the body. When 
asked in one interview whether her engagement with her body is a way to 
‘prouver la radicalité de votre engagement artistique’ [prove the radicality of 
your artistic engagement], she replies: ‘Que cela s’imprime directement dans 
les chairs, là était la vraie bataille. L’idéologie dominante s’imprime dans les 
chairs. Toutes les civilisations ont fabriqué non seulement les corps, mais aussi 
les logiciels qui sont à l’intérieur’ [That it imprints itself directly onto the flesh, 
there is the real battle. The dominant ideology imprints itself onto the flesh. All 
civilisations have fabricated not only bodies but the software inside] (2004: 
120). ORLAN considers her work is an attempt to shift this ideology. Her 
understanding of prosthetic permeability – what Ince, following Rian, sees as 
characterising the postmodern – is thus informed by her understanding of 
politics, and perhaps even materialist feminist politics in the notion that 
ideology shapes material bodies. ORLAN’s work brings together a materialist 
political impetus and a postmodern or poststructuralist exploration of bodies, 
texts and subjectivity. For this reason, her work is particularly useful in 
responding to the question of how queer theory can account for material 
bodies, in bringing adequate accounts of materiality to queer thought.  
 217 
 
  
 218 
Cartesianism, Bodies and Texts: Femme avec Tête (1996) 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]  
    Femme avec tête, ORLAN (1996).  
 
 
In 1996, ORLAN gave a performance as part of ‘Totally Wired: Science, 
Technology and the Human Form’, at London’s Institute of Contemporary 
Arts. The programme included Franko B, Stelarc and Bruce Gilchrist and 
explored the relationship between the human body and contemporary 
technology. The English title of ORLAN’s performance was Woman with 
Head... Woman without Head, with the rather different Femme avec Tête et 
Illusion, Simulation, Virtualité... [Woman with Head and Illusion, Simulation, 
Virtuality] used in French.vii A collaboration with the illusionist Paul Kieve, 
video artist Dean Bramnagann, and musician Robin Rambau, the performance 
presented the illusion of ORLAN’s disembodied head atop an otherwise empty 
chrome table. This lone head with cropped blonde hair and a distinctive blue 
quiff sat a metre away from a lectern and read texts by Kristeva, Artaud, Serres 
and Lemoine-Luccioni. Projected behind this scene was a digitally rendered 
three-dimensional image of ORLAN’s head, composed of rapidly changing 
scenes of her previous work. The digital head asked the head upon the table the 
‘usual’ questions ORLAN claims to receive: ‘es-tu la copie ou l’original? crois-
tu en Dieu? es-tu folle?’ [are you the copy or the original? Do you believe in 
God? Are you mad?] (2001: 49). Rather than reply, the head resting on the 
table continues to read critical texts aloud, soberly facing the lectern. 
ORLAN described the performance thus:  
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J’ai [...] utilisé un tour de magie datant de 1893 grâce auquel il est 
possible de faire semblant de n’être qu’une tête posée sur une table pour 
les spectateurs et soi-même, de ne plus avoir de corps mais simplement 
une tête posée sur une table. (2001: 48) 
 
[I used a magic trick dating from 1893 thanks to which it was possible 
to appear just as a head resting on a table for spectators as well as 
oneself, to no longer have a body but simply be a head resting on a 
table.]  
 
 
This particular technique of illusion is known as ‘The Sphinx’, created by 
Thomas Tobin at the end of the 19th century, as ORLAN states. The original 
performance featured an Egyptian head upon a table, smiling, reading verse 
and responding to questions. A contemporary review of ORLAN’s version, by 
Judith Palmer for the broadsheet The Independent, finds the ‘initial effect [of 
the performance] stunning’ but complains that shortly  
after, it becomes possible to work out how the illusion is staged. For Palmer, 
the performance ultimately fails since ‘a glimpse of leg, then a familiar ringed 
hand, sneak out from behind the mirror’ (1996), with the presence of ORLAN’s 
body shattering the illusion.  
This interpretation of ORLAN’s performance, however, rests on the 
assumption that ORLAN seeks to present a kind of corporeal transcendence in 
her piece, to preserve the initial illusion of a head existing without a body 
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rather than disturbing it. On the contrary, ORLAN performs the undoing of the 
illusory ‘tête pensante’ of Cartesian rationalism, questioning the relation 
between her body and the philosophical texts she reads out, as well as the way 
in which the rationalist subject is gendered. This performance also specifically 
confronts the ways in which contemporary technology can display the 
Cartesian desire to ‘master nature’, to transcend the limitations and constraints 
of the flesh.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]  
Femme avec tête, ORLAN (1996). 
 
In my second chapter, I discussed Preciado’s use of the motif of auto- 
decapitation in Testo Junkie to consider the legacy of Cartesianism in 
theoretical writing. Preciado imagines a splitting of an irrational body and a 
‘tête pensante’, a head that has no need of hand in order to write, but produces 
text as if automatically (2008: 375). ORLAN deploys this motif similarly, 
exploring body’s relation to theoretical texts. While it is impossible to know 
whether the glimpses of ORLAN’s body during her performance were 
intentional, staged photographs of the piece are less ambiguous. These 
photographs depict ORLAN with her head resting on her hand curled into a 
fist, or making gestures as if to illustrate her speech. In these photographs 
ORLAN clearly does not intend to hide her hand – in fact, in one image this 
fragment of her otherwise invisible body props up the decapitated head that is 
supposed to exist without it. In another image of the performance, ORLAN’s 
hand appears to enhance her reading of philosophical texts, her index finger 
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lightly touching her thumb, animating her words. ORLAN’s head and her 
reading of texts depends upon her hands and her body, and her photographs 
acknowledge that the rational mind depends upon the existence of the body, 
that the head is part of the body and inseparable from it. 
In a sense, Palmer is right: ORLAN’s performance is one of failure, but 
it is the failure of the Cartesian desire to separate mind from body. ORLAN 
uses the Sphinx technique to ‘faire semblant de n’être qu’une tête’ [to appear 
just as a head]: she highlights that the neutral, disembodied mind of rationalism 
is always a pretense. Ultimately, ORLAN offers a performance of rationalism 
that is bound to fail – as noted in my first chapter, Judith Butler notes that 
Descartes’s attempt to deny his body in the Meditations ‘fails because the body 
returns, spectrally, as a figural dimension of the text’ (1997: 14). ORLAN’s 
body also returns here as a spectre within her performance. Femme avec Tête 
emphasises that the disembodied rationalist subject is a fiction, an illusion that 
is never quite convincing. ORLAN performs this subject with a flickering 
corporeal presence that simultaneously undoes it. If Descartes writes that he 
cannot deny his hands, ORLAN does not want to, including them in her 
photographs as integral to the image.  
While Preciado’s ‘tête pensante’ is male, despite claiming to be 
‘neutral’, ORLAN’s performance also highlights gender by performing the 
Cartesian head as a woman, commenting on the historical binary of masculinity 
associated with the rational head and women with irrational corporeality.viii 
This is reflected by Palmer in her review, which describes ORLAN as 
‘haughty’, ‘emotionless’, ‘inscrutable and dour’; words which perhaps might 
not have been so easily aimed at a male artist displaying similar behaviour. It is 
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true that Femme avec Tête is much more sombre than ORLAN’s surgery-
performances, which often deploy camp humour and carnivalesque elements. 
This could be read as part of ORLAN’s performance of ‘emotionless’ 
disembodied rationalism. Both the French and English titles of ORLAN’s 
performance emphasise that ORLAN’s head is gendered, yet are more complex 
than they may at first appear. Although linking ‘woman’ and ‘head’, they do 
not offer the straightforward possessive implied by ‘Tête de Femme’. By using 
the preposition with/avec, a separation between the two is also indicated, the 
head potentially becoming an adjunct, with this possibility emphasised in the 
English title by the use of ‘without’. One might also consider the ‘two’ 
ORLANs presented in the piece: the head upon the table and the digital head. 
ORLAN’s use of digital technology in her piece not only comments on issues 
relating to identity and new technologies; it also draws links between the bodily 
transcendence sought by both rationalism and technology.  
In her essay ‘The Virtual and/or the Real’ ORLAN writes:  
  
Sometimes I do an art work and/or a performance that permits me to 
highlight my critical distance in relation to new technologies. For 
example, the performance I did at the ICA in London in 1995, ‘Woman 
with a Head and Illusion, Simulation, Virtuality’, was inspired by an 
observation: new technologies promise to get rid of the body, they 
promise a dematerialization, but for a mortal body like mine, that 
remains inaccessible. (2002: 169, emphasis in bold original)ix 
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If the body cannot be wished away by rationalism, digital technology is no 
more able to ‘get rid of the body’. Despite her provocative statement that the 
‘body is obsolete’, too often taken at face value, ORLAN takes a critical stance 
in relation to technology here. ORLAN’s essay ‘Ceci est mon corps...’ 
elaborates her claim:  
 
Je pense que le corps est obsolète. Il ne fait plus face à la situation.  
 
Nous mutons à la vitesse des cafards, mais nous sommes des cafards qui 
ont leurs mémoires dans les ordinateurs, qui pilotons des avions, des 
voitures que nous avons conçus bien que notre corps ne soit pas conçu 
pour leur vitesse et que tout va de plus en plus vite. (1996: 92) 
 
 
[I consider the body to be obsolete. It is outdated. We evolve at the pace 
of cockroaches, but we are cockroaches with memories in computers, 
who fly planes, drive cars we have invented even though our bodies 
were not designed for such speeds, and everything moves faster and 
faster.] 
 
 
 
ORLAN does not argue that we no longer have a need for the material body, 
but rather remarks on the growing gap between the capabilities of the material 
body and those of technology, which is evolving at a much faster pace.x She 
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links her concept of the body’s obsolescence to the Australian artist Stelarc, 
who also performed as part of ‘Totally Wired’.xi Both artists’ work is often 
read together in what is seen as their unambiguous embrace of technology.xii 
Yet both can be read in a more nuanced way as critically exploring new 
technologies and the Cartesian impulse to become ‘masters and possessors’ of 
nature (Descartes, 1943: 166), as discussed in chapter one.  
In Second Skins, Prosser writes of attending a video screening of 
Omniprésence at the Sandra Gering gallery in New York. He writes of a 
‘bloody robe’ pinned up on the wall of the gallery bearing the phrase ‘The body 
is but a costume’ (61).xiii He reads this as a ‘disavowal of the body’s 
materiality’ and sees ORLAN as embracing this statement: ‘In her surgical 
performance of the body [...] in her literalization of the body as costume, Orlan 
appeared to provide an insane personification of the poststructuralist insistence 
on the absolute constructedness of the body’ (61-2). Prosser sees this as 
indicative of what he reads as ORLAN’s treatment of the body as surface – a 
skin or costume that may be easily modified, her work a ‘skin deep’ 
transformation rather than a deeper process of altering identity. This, he claims, 
allows ORLAN to claim she is a ‘transexuelle femme-à-femme’ since she 
misreads transsexuality as a similar ‘phenomenon of the body’s surface’ (63).xiv 
Rather than ORLAN misreading the corporeality of transsexual transformation, 
imagined as ‘depth’ opposed to surface by Prosser, I suggest that ORLAN 
offers a provocative account of material corporeality in her surgical 
performances. Her statement that ‘the body is a costume’ should be understood 
as a similar provocation to her statement that ‘the body is obsolete’. In contrast 
to Prosser’s assessment of the performance, the blood on the robe in question 
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neatly betrays the sentiments of the phrase he picks up on. Indeed, ORLAN in 
fact states that while she ‘would truly wish the body to be a costume’ this is in 
fact ‘something that is not definitive’ (O’Bryan, 2005: 141). ORLAN is 
deliberately confrontational in these works, and it is of course no coincidence 
that Prosser turns to ORLAN’s work as an example. Investigating Prosser’s 
concerns in Second Skins through ORLAN’s work may seem obtuse, but I 
suggest that ORLAN is in fact asking many of the same questions as he does 
with regards to the material body.  
ORLAN’s statement ‘The body is but a costume’ must also be 
understood in relation to Lemoine-Luccioni’s La Robe [The Dress] (1983): 
ORLAN read parts of this text aloud at the beginning of the performance of 
Omniprésence and during Opération Réussie [Operation Accomplished] 
(1990). During the latter, her reading of the following passage is recorded:  
 
Mais il n’y a rien à l’intérieur de la statue; il n’y a rien non plus à 
l’intérieur du sujet qui dise au sujet qui il est. Il faut que le regard ou le 
sourire de sa mère lui dise, de quelque façon: te voilà; sinon l’enfant ne 
voit rien; parce qu’il n’y a rien à voir; pas d’objet. Il n’y a qu’un regard 
maternel qui enveloppe l’enfant; alors l’enfant voit, et se voit. Mais il 
ne sait pas qu’il voit rien. Il y a donc trois instances au moins qui 
s’articulent dans cette machinerie optique: la mère, l’enfant et le miroir 
(1983: 82)  
 
[But there is nothing inside the statue; there is nothing either inside the 
subject which tells the subject who they are. The look or the smile of 
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the mother must tell him or her, in some way: there you are; otherwise 
the child does not see anything; because there is nothing to see there; no 
object. There is but a maternal gaze that envelops the child; so the child 
sees, and sees him/herself. But the child does not know that sees 
nothing. There are at least three bodies at play in this optical 
machination: the mother, the child and the mirror]  
 
 
The recording then immediately cuts to a statement from ORLAN herself: ‘le 
corps n’est pas autre chose qu’un costume’ [the body is nothing but a costume]. 
Rather than a disavowal of the body’s materiality, ORLAN comments on the 
potential for the body’s surface to become the cover (the English ‘cover’ added 
in dubbed translation to ‘costume’) for the subject whose experience of self is 
fragmented, an hommelette.xv She refers, via La Robe, to the fantasy of a 
coherent image of the body as Lacan describes in ‘Le stade du miroir’ (1936). 
The fantasmic image of the whole body is a cover that allows the fiction of a 
discrete and coherent subject.xvi Images of the corps morcelé expose this fiction 
– and it is this fragmented body ORLAN presents through her surgical 
actions.xvii Rather than any denial of the body as such, she rejects the body as 
the harbour of a stable and sovereign subject. ORLAN’s operation-
performances, and the photographs and sculptures surrounding them, do not 
deny the body. Rather, they emphasise its materiality and again engage with 
technologies and the Cartesian desire to do without the body, or to manipulate 
and shape it. ORLAN repeatedly renders visual the resistance of the material 
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body to this manipulation: puffy eyes, bloodied sheets, facial bruising, 
extracted flesh.   
The evening before ORLAN’s Femme avec Tête was performed at the 
ICA, ORLAN read aloud her essay ‘Ceci est mon corps, ceci est mon logiciel’ 
in the same venue, with the video of her seventh operation-performance 
Omniprésence projected onto a twelve-foot-high screen behind her. The 
audience would have heard her recite the same excerpts from critical texts in 
the video of Omniprésence as she read during Femme avec Tête. In juxtaposing 
these performances, ORLAN may be seen as encouraging their reading 
alongside one another. Indeed, Omniprésence and Femme avec Tête share more 
than just the critical texts ORLAN chose to read during their performance: 
ORLAN’s operation-performances explore medical technologies to address 
similarly Cartesian issues of (in)corporeal existence as Femme avec Tête.  
Amelia Jones (1998) has claimed that body art has been key to the 
dislocation of a Cartesian modernist subject, and that that this dislocation is 
characteristic of postmodern art. Technology has been identified, by Rian and 
others, as a way to effect this disruption of the subject by challenging the 
notion of unmediated bodily presence. ORLAN’s use of digital technology in 
Femme avec Tête, and her use of medical technology in her operation-
performances questions this; exploring the ways in which technology can 
repeat the Cartesian fiction of bodily transcendence. Her work interrogates this 
in a way that is nuanced and provocative, using her body to push the limits of 
this neo-Cartesian promise. 
Omniprésence is the seventh surgery-performance of ORLAN’s project 
La Réincarnation de Sainte ORLAN ou Images nouvelles images. These 
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performances are recorded on video and through other work such as 
photographs and sculpture. They often employ props (including plastic grapes, 
devil horns, lobsters) and elaborate costumes, using various technologies such 
as fax and live-streaming. While each performance is unique, there are 
continuities in the project as a whole. ORLAN has stated that each surgical 
performance is based on a theoretical text,xviii and while these are read aloud 
during each surgery, Dominic Johnson claims that it is ORLAN’s body itself 
that speaks. Commenting on the photograph Seconde bouche [Second Mouth] 
(1993), he writes:  
 
What is it to peer into the second mouth that seems to speak from 
beneath her chin in Omnipresence, before the uncanny insertion of a 
polymer structure? [...] Conspicuously, ORLAN repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of being conscious during her operations, reading texts 
aloud and giving stage directions, even while surgeons sculpt her face 
with scalpels and sutures. Indeed, ORLAN’s body speaks relentlessly. 
(2010: 90)  
 
Johnson also notes that while ORLAN presents herself as a speaking body, she 
also reads and choreographs the performance live, inserting agency and control 
into the medical procedure. ORLAN describes the development of this 
‘conspicuous’ performance of agency:  
 
In 1986 I organized another surgical event Cheri’s Bloc, to evaluate 
how much control I could instil in a context that is not an emergency. I 
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worked with a surgeon to simulate a surgical operation in which I could 
devise and inscribe visual components drawn from my own artistic 
practice: masks and costumes that bring the fictional and parodic nature 
of my art into the operating theatre. (2010: 110)  
 
ORLAN is insistent on this assertion of agency, which is clearly key to her 
operation-performances: ‘I do not abandon my body to the surgeon’s hands, I 
remain conscious and active: I read texts, I enter into dialogues, I orchestrate 
the accessories and costumes of the surgeons’ (2010: 111).xix Despite this, a 
number of critics of ORLAN’s work overlook this aspect. Julie Clarke writes 
that in her operations ORLAN is ‘virtually a cadaver’ (2002: 43); Hannah 
Westley argues that ORLAN embraces female objectification in these works to 
the extent that she ‘render[s] herself redundant as [a] practicing artist [...] 
offering up her flesh as the raw material from which [the surgeons] fashion an 
image of femininity’ (2008: 191-2). When Paul Virilio repeated this reading of 
her performances in a somewhat tense interview, ORLAN corrected him: ‘I do 
not undergo the surgery-performances, I orchestrate them’ (2010b: 193). 
Furthermore, she writes:   
 
Je lis de textes le plus longtemps possible pendant l’opération, même 
lorsque l’on m’opère le visage. Ce qui donnait dans les dernières 
opérations l’image d’un cadavre autopsié dont la parole continuait 
encore, comme détachée du corps. (1996: 90) 
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[I read from texts for as long as possible during the operation, even 
when they operate on my face. This gave the last operations the 
impression of an autopsied cadaver that continued to speak, as detached 
from the body.] 
 
What is at stake in ORLAN’s presentation of herself as an autopsied cadaver, 
simultaneously speaking or reading aloud? ORLAN’s use of ‘cadavre’ leads 
back to the discussion in my first chapter of the dissections performed by 
Descartes, described in detail in his Discours. Descartes describes the 
rationalist subject of deductive science examining the inanimate body as his 
object of study, in the pursuit of rationalist principles that can be used to allow 
this subject to become master and possessor of nature. In her surgical 
performances, ORLAN appears as both the object (as body/cadaver) and the 
rational subject, reading philosophical texts aloud and emphasising her agency 
throughout every aspect of the performance.xx 
Johnson also suggests that ORLAN’s body – the flesh itself – speaks 
during her performance. Gianna Bouchard similarly describes the appearance 
of ORLAN’s skin as the process of liposuction takes place. In ‘Orlan 
Anatomised’, she describes ORLAN’s flesh coming alive, as ‘animated flesh’; 
as flesh ‘rendered animate below the surface of the skin, as if another organism 
resides within ORLAN’s body. Her flesh ripples and undulates with the 
intrusion of the technology’ (2010: 69). Finally, she writes that ‘the flesh is 
also strangely and shockingly animate through the insertion of the cannulae’ 
(2010: 69). Her use of ‘animate’ to describe flesh three times over one page of 
writing is significant, and strengthens Johnson’s claim that ORLAN’s body 
 231 
itself speaks. Given that ‘animate’ is derived from the Latin anima, meaning 
vital breath or soul, Bouchard describes ORLAN’s flesh as taking on its own 
movement, appearing to possess its own agency.  
In a video recording of ORLAN’s fourth operation Opération Réussie, 
she at first appears motionless. Later, as the surgeon penetrates her skin and 
tissue with the liposuction cannula, her body is jolted and she is prompted to sit 
up and read the text she has chosen for the piece. The effect is startling; if 
ORLAN indeed appears initially as motionless ‘cadaver’, her sudden 
movement – prompted by the movement of medical technology that should 
mean she remains motionless, unconscious – dramatically disrupts this idea. In 
fact, as the shot pans out, the viewer becomes aware that ORLAN was reading 
all along, that she has never in fact been the lifeless body that would be more 
congruous with the scene. With the camera having previously only focused on 
the surgeon as ‘active’, agency is transferred to ORLAN. Later in the film, the 
shot is framed so that ORLAN’s mouth appears in close up, continuing to 
speak while a clear liquid, presumably botox, is injected into her cheek to the 
right of the frame. The juxtaposition heightens Johnson’s sense that ORLAN’s 
body speaks, as the increasingly awkward movement of ORLAN’s tongue 
appears twinned with, even overshadowed by the movement provoked in her 
cheek by the syringe.  
It is as the small wound made by the cannula is sewn shut that ORLAN 
reads the line ‘the body is only a costume, a covering’ (le corps n’est pas autre 
chose qu’un costume). Rather than a disavowal of the material body, this 
statement appears in the video alongside the depiction of ORLAN’s body in all 
its grisly corporeality. The recent stitches concealing ORLAN’s flesh are 
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untidy, barely concealing the flesh underneath. The final shot of the film shows 
five images of ORLAN’s head, initially four in each corner of the screen as the 
shot spins at a dizzying pace around the operating theatre. Accompanied by a 
somewhat menacing soundtrack, the final image of ORLAN’s head appears at 
the centre of the screen smiling and wearing sunglasses, with no signs of post-
surgical trauma. Yet after the excruciating scenes of ORLAN’s body violently 
gouged with various surgical implements the viewer is abundantly aware that 
this is a fiction, the all-too-cheerful title ‘Succesful Operation’ [sic] seeming far 
too neat and tidy.  
In the works surrounding the Réincarnation project, particularly the 
performance Omniprésence, ORLAN presents the material consequences of 
this intervention to her body. In Présentation par le médecin de prélèvement de 
sang effectué sur la feuille jaune [The doctor presents a blood stain on a yellow 
sheet] (1993), the surgeon reveals ORLAN’s face as a bloodied sheet is lifted 
away. Her lips and jaw are badly swollen, the lines in marker pen that have 
guided the surgeon’s scalpel adorn her face, the ‘second mouth’ on her chin 
puckers where the stitches have sewn it shut. In Portrait No.1 fait par la 
machine-corps quatre jours après la 7e opération-chirugicale-performance 
[Portrait no.1 by the body-machine four days after the 7th surgical-operation-
performance] (1993), ORLAN’s lips are perhaps even more swollen, and 
dramatic bruises cover her eyes. Omniprésence: No. 1 (1993) is comprised of 
forty-one diptychs of ORLAN, the top row consisting of photographs taken of 
ORLAN’s face daily as she recovers from the surgery, beginning with her 
bruised face and her head covered in bandages. Saint suaire n°9 [Saint’s 
Shroud no. 9] (1993) uses a blood-soaked piece of gauze, while the Réliquaires 
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(1993) each preserve ten-gram pieces of ORLAN’s flesh within resin, soldered 
metal or security glass. ORLAN does not deny the material impact of surgery 
in her work, neither does she treat her bodily interventions lightly, or as a 
surface phenomenon. On the contrary, her engagement with the materiality of 
her body could produce a much more productive engagement with transgender 
theory than Prosser imagines.   
 
Constructions of Sexual Difference: Étude Documentaire: La Tête de la 
Méduse (1978) 
 
In my second, very different, instance of the head in ORLAN’s Étude 
Documentaire: La Tête de la Méduse I explore the meeting between textuality 
and materiality in ORLAN’s work. In this performance, ORLAN engages with 
a line from Freud’s essay ‘The Medusa’s Head’: ‘At the sight of the vulva even 
the devil runs away’ (2010: 3943). The ‘Medusa’s head’ in ORLAN’s 
performance is the vulva, partially painted and displayed through a magnifying 
glass and a hole cut into her trousseau sheets, stretched out as a canvas. Here, 
ORLAN’s work displays a sensitivity to the constructed nature of material, 
sexed bodies. 
Étude documentaire: La tête de la Méduse, is a key performance in 
which ORLAN stages a confrontation between text and body. Staged at a 
performance symposium at the Musée S. Ludwig, Aix-la-Chapelle, ORLAN’s 
piece involved her trousseau sheets covered in traces of her blood, as well as 
yellow and blue paint. These were pinned to a four-metre high canvas, and 
through a hole at the centre, those in attendance viewed ORLAN’s vulva:  
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This involved showing my sex (of which half my pubic hair was 
painted blue) through a large magnifying glass – and this, during my 
period. Video monitors showed the heads of those arriving, those 
viewing, and those leaving. Freud’s text The Head of Medusa was 
handed out at the exit, stating: ‘At the sight of the vulva even the devil 
runs away.’ (ORLAN, 1996: 84) 
 
ORLAN’s work appeared three years after Hélène Cixous’s ‘Le Rire de la 
Méduse’ (1975), and may be read as following its call to use the body to create 
new meaning. It also appears to reference Luce Irigaray’s Speculum: De l’autre 
femme [Speculum of the Other Woman] (1974), sharing Irigaray’s critique of 
psychoanalytic discourse on women, but not what many read as its 
essentialism. The Freud essay ORLAN refers to locates in the myth of Medusa 
an early exploration of the castration complex, which he imagines as 
heightened by the homosexual tendencies of Greek society, resulting in the 
representation of a monstrous woman, both frightening and repellant. For 
Freud, the Medusa’s head stands in for a ‘representation of the female genitals’ 
isolating ‘their horrifying effects from their pleasure-giving ones’ (2003: 85). 
The full line ORLAN references from Freud’s essay reads: ‘We read in 
Rabelais of how the Devil took to flight when the woman showed him her 
vulva’ (2003: 85), in which Freud specifically considers the display of the 
vulva as a defensive or apotropaic act. He writes: ‘To decapitate = to castrate. 
The terror of Medusa is thus a terror of castration that is linked to the sight of 
something’ (2003: 84). Of course in the original myth of Medusa, those who 
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gazed upon her face turned to stone – Freud reads this as a similar affect 
provoked by the male child upon the first instance of viewing ‘the terrifying 
genitals of the Mother’ (2003: 85).   
ORLAN’s piece responds to many of the themes in Freud’s work. 
Firstly, her work plays with the gaze and Freud’s understanding of castration 
anxiety as ‘linked to the sight of something’. As in Freud’s scene of castration 
anxiety, unaware of what is behind the canvas, viewers of ORLAN’s work 
have no control over what they are about to see. The viewer’s gaze is 
emphasised by the magnifying glass, which alludes to the title ‘Étude 
documentaire’, with ORLAN’s genitals being the object of study. Conversely 
these viewers are recorded themselves by video camera, with images of their 
heads appearing on video monitors as they become object of the gaze 
themselves. If Freud saw the fragmentation of the female body in fetishism as a 
response to the inability to overcome the fear provoked by the initial instance 
of viewing the vulva, it is the vulva that is viewed here in isolation, as a 
fragment, through the frame of the canvas.  
While ORLAN’s display of her genitals could quite easily render her as 
vulnerable, ORLAN shows none of the vulnerability that nakedness represents 
in performances such as Yoko Ono’s Cut Piece (Kyoto, 1964), in which 
viewers became participants in the piece by accepting an invitation to cut into 
Ono’s clothing (a vulnerability emphasised by the aggression of white 
viewer/participants, both male and female, when Ono performed the piece in 
New York in 1965). Yet when ORLAN’s viewers become unexpected 
participants by appearing in the piece on video monitors, they take on a 
vulnerable visibility themselves. ORLAN’s presentation of her genitalia is, by 
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contrast, confrontational, even aggressive; the Medusa’s head/vulva presented 
as more powerful than the viewers’ head appearing unknowingly on the 
monitors. Rather than feminist accounts of the objectifying male gaze, 
ORLAN’s use of the myth of Medusa emphasises the potential violence of the 
gaze suffered by its subject rather than its object, of seeing rather than being 
seen.xxi She thus confronts Freud’s comment that the horror understood as 
provoked by the vulva holds a certain apotropaic power. ORLAN clearly 
confronts Freudian discourse on the vulva in this piece, offering what Ince 
describes as a ‘knowing and fun-poking mise-en-scène of castration anxiety’ 
(2000: 68).xxii The fun-poking, I suggest, could even extend to the viewers, 
who, by receiving the Freud quote on exiting the performance and viewing 
each other’s reactions on the video monitors, are forced to question their own 
absorption of Freudian (and other) discourses of bodies sexed as female evident 
in their reaction to the piece.  
While ORLAN does not directly reference Lacan in the same way as 
she does Freud, his comments on the Medusa’s head are important to note. 
Lacan describes the Medusa’s head in his second seminar, Le moi dans la 
théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse [The Ego in Freud’s 
Theory and the Technique of Psychoanalysis] (1954-55). He comments on 
Freud’s analysis of his dream known as ‘Irma’s injection’, discussed in The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1899). Freud describes a dream during which he 
examines a patient, Irma, staring into her throat. Lacan writes:  
 
l’image terrifiante, angoissante, de cette vraie tête de Méduse, à la 
révélation de ce quelque chose d’à proprement parler innommable, le 
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fond de cette gorge, à la forme complexe, insituable, qui en fait aussi 
bien l’objet primitif par excellence, l’abîme de l’organe feminine d’où 
sort toute vie, que le gouffre de la bouche, où tout est englouti, et aussi 
bien l’image de la mort, où tout vient se terminer (1978: 196)xxiii  
 
[the terrifying anxiety-provoking image, to this real Medusa's head, to 
the revelation of this something which properly speaking is 
unnameable, the back of this throat, the complex, unlocatable form, 
which also makes it into the primitive object par excellence, the abyss 
of the feminine organ from which all life emerges, this gulf of the 
mouth, in which everything is swallowed up, and no less the image of 
death in which everything comes to its end (trans. Tomaselli, 1991: 
164)] 
 
Lacan links the gaping abyss of the throat Freud examines to ‘l’abîme de 
l’organe féminin’, swallowing everything and symbolising death; in short, 
Lacan uses it to set up a discussion of the Real. If the vulva, also Lacan’s ‘tête 
de Méduse’, represents the Real, it represents a threat to engulf meaning, 
language and the Symbolic: being ‘innommable, le fond de cette gorge [...] 
insituable’. Where Lacan renders the vulva as lack, absence of meaning, 
ORLAN emphasises its presence.  
ORLAN incorporates the notion of the screen into her work in La tête 
de la Méduse. This Lacanian concept, elaborated in his eleventh seminar, uses 
Pliny the Elder’s tale of a competition between two painters, Zeuxis and 
Parrhasius, over who can produce the most lifelike painting. While Zeuxis’s 
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painting renders grapes so realistic that birds attempt to eat them, Parrhasius 
paints a curtain. Lacan explores this depiction of a curtain that conceals 
nothing; the screen becomes a veil just as the Symbolic covers the nothingness 
or lack of the Real. Even when presenting her genitalia in La tête de la Méduse, 
ORLAN does not present a ‘Real’ unadulterated sexed body behind the 
trousseau-screen: this body is permeated by Freud’s words, drawing on 
Rabelais, the constructed body signified by the touches of paint on her labia. In 
contrast to Lacan’s account, here there is indeed something behind the screen, 
and that something is touched by the daubs of paint; it is nothing pure, nothing 
that is not also culturally constructed. There is no neat separation indicated by 
the veil, as the screen becomes permeable in ORLAN’s work. 
If in La tête de la Méduse the canvas through which the representation 
of the Real offered by ORLAN’s vulva may be read as a screen; that is, the 
screen of the Symbolic which masks the Real, ORLAN’s previous use of her 
trousseau sheets in Couture en clair obscure (1968) discussed earlier left them 
stained with ejaculate, adding to the sense that the canvas with these sheets 
pinned onto them represents the nom du père, the phallic law of the Symbolic. 
It is through this materialised phallogocentricism that her genitals are observed. 
Viewed through a magnifying glass, the image of her painted genitals would 
have appeared distorted at most viewing angles (the curved lens producing a 
‘barrel’ distortion), thus creating its own kind of anamorphosis. The deformed 
image would also have appeared in close-up, appearing to jump out and 
traverse the screen of the canvas – just as Lacan writes of the vagina as 
representing the Real that threatens to engulf meaning. ORLAN enacts a 
staging of the ‘Real’ acknowledging the cultural construction of the material 
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female body, a construction in which psychoanalytic notions of the Real have 
played no small part. ORLAN confronts this psychoanalytic reading of female 
genitalia; while for Lacan, the vulva is made to represent the unrepresentable 
itself, the presence of the magnifying glass in ORLAN’s performance 
comically references the degree of attention awarded to it by psychoanalysis, 
which simultaneously claims it exists only as a lack. The magnifying glass 
belies these claims; firstly emphasising the mediation involved in viewing the 
images through such an instrument, and secondly inviting viewers to take a 
look for themselves: is this truly the terrifying abyss Lacan writes of? Or is it a 
material organ, the vulva and pubic hair painted with blue and yellow, also red 
with blood?  
These touches of paint, especially the dramatic Cruella de Vil-style 
makeover given to her pubic hair, make it clear that ORLAN is not in any way 
presenting her genitals as a kind of unmediated bodily essence; neither does she 
present a female essence. She does not attempt to ‘go beyond’ the weight of 
meaning and discourse surrounding them, to something organic. Rather, she 
confronts one particular discourse in psychoanalysis and the image of the 
Medusa’s head, exposing not ‘raw flesh’ but rather the way in which 
psychoanalysis metaphorises the female body and the vulva. ORLAN’s work is 
above all anti-essentialist, destroying the notion that there is any essence to 
femaleness located in the body or indeed the genitals. Rather, she emphasises 
layer upon layer of representation, discourse and meaning attached to the 
genitals in support of various and competing accounts of sexual difference, not 
least the myth of Medusa and the concept of castration anxiety. Both Freud and 
Lacan locate the castration complex as the moment the child identifies sexual 
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difference and begins to take up a sexed position: ORLAN thus focuses on this 
moment, interrogating the construction of sexual difference. Just as Preciado’s 
reading of Wittig turns the statement ‘lesbians are not women’ to the material 
body with his statement ‘Je n’ai pas de vagin’, arguing that the material, sexed 
body is defined in heterosexual terms and affirming this statement as part of a 
hyper-constructivist framework (2002: 205), ORLAN is similarly staunchly 
constructivist, and despite expectations this is most visible when she includes 
her genitals in her work. In this way, ORLAN’s work can be read as allied to 
transgender theory – illustrating that the body’s materiality can indeed be 
explored without essentialising, but understood as always loaded with and 
constructed through meaning and (gendered) discourse.  
Transgender theorist Sandy Stone offers a rather different assessment of 
ORLAN’s work to Jay Prosser in Second Skins. Stone embraces ORLAN’s use 
of cyborg imagery and the monstrous in her work, claiming she embodies a 
‘myriad of alterities [...] unanticipated juxtapositions’ – Haraway’s promises of 
monsters (1993: 14). Stone sees this as opening up new possibilities for the 
body, and ORLAN indeed shares this goal, referring for instance to the 
‘bumps’ she has inserted under the skin of her temples in Omniprésence as 
‘aesthetic possibilities’ (2010a: 184), or writing that she modifies her body to 
highlight ‘the socio-cultural boundaries of bodies’ representation’ (2010: 183). 
Stone also credits ORLAN’s work with a powerful anti-essentialism, a key 
element of Stone’s thought, which is able to undermine the possibility of the 
body becoming a refuge for identity. Finally, and in stark difference to Prosser, 
Stone sees ORLAN as confronting and engaging with the body’s materiality 
rather than ignoring it.  
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Allucquére Rosanne ‘Sandy’ Stone wrote what is generally considered 
to be the inaugural work of transgender theory, a response to Janice Raymond’s 
The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (1979). Raymond’s 
book included personal attacks on Stone due to her work as a sound engineer in 
an all-women collective, Olivia Records. In 1993, Stone published 
‘The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto’ with the theoretical 
influence and personal support of Donna Haraway. Three years later, Stone 
contributed to the first collection of essays on ORLAN written in English, Ceci 
est mon corps... Ceci est mon logiciel (1996). Much theoretical work has of 
course been done in the recent and not-quite institutionalised field of 
transgender studies since Stone’s early work, yet it is at the roots of transgender 
theory, and ORLAN’s work from a similar period holds much in common with 
it. Firstly, Stone’s manifesto shares ORLAN’s distaste for borders and binaries. 
Both embrace Haraway’s figure of the cyborg and the monstrous – with 
ORLAN taking on not only Medusa, but Frankenstein’s monster in her Official 
portrait in Bride of Frankenstein wig (1990).xxiv A performance artist as well as 
an academic in the field of communication technologies, Stone’s essay in Ceci 
est mon corps... is titled ‘Speaking of the Medium: Marshall McLuhan 
Interviews Allucquére Rosanne Stone’. Here, she stages an interview between 
herself and the philosopher of communication McLuhan, who died in 1980 but 
is imagined in the text as a disembodied online identity.xxv Just as in ORLAN’s 
work, Stone’s essay raises questions relating to Cartesianism, identity and 
contemporary communications technology. 
Stone writes that she is ‘in awe’ of ORLAN’s ‘ability to wrestle syntax 
and grammar from the stubborn and recalcitrant flesh’, echoing ORLAN’s 
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claim to enact the principle of chair faite verbe [flesh made word], or Dominic 
Johnson’s sense that ORLAN’s body speaks (1996: 46). Her assessment of 
ORLAN’s suggestion that she is a ‘transexuelle femme-à-femme’ is much 
more positive than Prosser’s. She writes:  
 
in regard to blasphemy, I am particularly fond of [ORLAN’s] 
appropriation of the hot-potato word Transsexual for an unholy purpose 
for which it was never intended. [...] I saw this remark as playful and 
ironic, because of the way it stands binary opposition on its head. Once 
the idea of female-to-female transsexuals is possible, the lid is off the 
worm can. Of course the purpose of Transgender Theory (Note: 
Advertisement) is also to do just that (1996: 47).  
 
Stone is writing of the fairly recent adoption of the word ‘transgender’ at this 
moment as opposed to ‘transsexual’. She hopes that this neologism will widen 
out the possibilities for gender variant individuals from what she sees as 
restrictive and essentialist narratives that she locates in the four biographical or 
autobiographical accounts of transition she writes of in ‘The Empire Strikes 
Back’. These include Niels Hoyer’s relatively early account of Lili Elbe, Man 
into Woman (1933), which he wrote at her request after she died, with the aid 
of her diaries.xxvi Stone’s assessment of Hoyer’s account of Elbe is of particular 
interest. Stone comments on a kind of Cartesian essentialism in the description 
of Elbe’s surgical procedure, one of the first of its kind: 
The first operation...has been successful beyond all expectations. 
Andreas has ceased to exist, they said. His germ glands – oh, mystic 
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words – have been removed. 
Oh, mystic words. The mysterium tremendum of deep identity hovers 
about a physical locus; the entire complex of male engenderment, the 
mysterious power of the Man-God, inhabits the ‘germ glands’ in the 
way that the soul was thought to inhabit the pineal. Maleness is in the 
you-know-whats. (1993: 7) 
 
Stone is concerned with the way in which sexual essentialism ties a whole 
person or identity to specific body parts; how a person (Andreas) can be 
thought of as ceasing to exist with the removal of a particular material body 
part into which that identity, apparently reducible to maleness, is distilled. 
Returning to her comments on the word ‘transgender’, Stone writes that while 
its use avoids ‘the lethal essentialism of sex’, it may also evade the issue, 
leaving the matter of sex ‘to the whims of the essentialists’ (1996: 50). Thus 
Stone, like Prosser, sees an engagement with material sex as indispensable to 
transgender theory. Rather than leaving embodied sexed identity to 
essentialising perspectives, anti-essentialist accounts of material sexed bodies 
must be sought.  
Like Prosser, Stone recognises a move away from the body in 
postmodern theory, and finds in late capitalist society ‘an assumption that the 
human body becomes obsolete’ (1996: 49). Yet, she writes: ‘beneath all of the 
uneasy sense that the body is obsolete, in the subterranean cellars of the 
symbolic the link between body and self – or intellect, as an imperfect term for 
the sake of this discussion – becomes forged ever more tenaciously’ (1996: 49). 
As stable identity is eroded, she argues, it takes refuge in the body, just as 
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‘deep identity hovers about a physical locus’ – ‘the germ glands’ – in the 
written account of Elbe. In Stone’s assessment, ‘this is what gives Orlan’s 
performances their singular power. By repeatedly attacking the link between 
her body shape and her self-identity, Orlan threatens the last remaining place in 
which the sovereign self may take refuge’ (1996: 49). Stone sees the force of 
ORLAN’s surgical performances as ‘finding our own identities annihilated’ 
(1996: 50), evacuating the body as the last grounding for retreating claims to 
stable identity, sexed identity or the ‘sovereign self’ of the subject – the ‘cover’ 
for Lacan’s hommelette or corps morcelé. In contrast to Prosser, then, Stone 
sees ORLAN’s work as allied to transgender theory: in her anti-essentialist 
engagement with the body, in evacuating the lingering notion of stable (sexed) 
identity that the body harbours. Her assessment of ORLAN’s work as 
powerfully anti-essentialist is emphasised nowhere more clearly than in works 
such as Tête de la Méduse. 
Approaching the Real: The Death’s Head 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE]  
                                    EXOGÈNE 
[EXOGENE], ORLAN (1997).  
 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE]  
 
Still from Bien que… oui mais… [Although… Yes but…], ORLAN (2003).  
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If ORLAN’s work in Tête de la Méduse explores psychoanalytic discourse in 
relation to the material, sexed body, I return to the question of the Lacanian 
Real to interrogate further its implications for how theory is able to account for 
the body’s materiality. Lacanian psychoanalysis has been influential not only to 
early queer thought in the work of Judith Butler, but also in the writing of queer 
theorists including Tim Dean, Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman. Yet French queer 
theory has by and large rejected psychoanalysis entirely; Preciado largely 
ignores it in his work and Sam Bourcier engages with it only in order to 
critique what he sees as the more politically conservative elements of Butler’s 
thought,xxvii or its treatment of transgender people in France.xxviii While Prosser 
takes issue with Butler’s interpretation of concepts such as melancholia in her 
account of sexual identity, he does not reject psychoanalytic theory but deploys 
it himself in Second Skins. He embraces the decidedly non-Lacanian Didier 
Anzieu and his notion of a moi-peau in particular, which he sees as identifying 
a way to account for material embodiment and identity. Prosser identifies a 
problem with Butler’s use of Lacan’s ‘conceptualization of the body as illusory 
psychic projection’ (1998: 42) as opposed to a Freudian ‘bodily ego’; that is, 
the psyche’s ‘corporeal dependence’ that he reads in Freud’s The Ego and the 
Id (1923) (1998: 40). In considering Prosser’s assessment that aspects of 
Lacanian thought (including those integrated into queer work such as Butler’s) 
constitute part of the problem he identifies in queer theoretical accounts of the 
material body, I turn to ORLAN’s recurrent motif of the Death’s Head in her 
work, as used by Lacan in his discussion of the Real.  
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ORLAN not only displays flesh beneath the flayed skin of her face 
during her surgery in Omniprésence and digitally in Bump Load and 
MeasuRages; she also frequently uses images of the human skull. This image 
of the Death’s Head is used by Lacan to represent the Real in distinction to the 
Symbolic in his reading of Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533) briefly in 
seminar seven, L’éthique de la psychanalyse [The Ethics of Psychoanalysis] 
(1959-60), and more fully in seminar eleven, Les quatre concepts 
fondamentaux de la psychanalyse (1973).xxix Lacan sees an illustration of the 
relation between the Symbolic and the Real in Holbein’s use of anamorphosis 
in the painting. When standing in front of the painting the viewer is immersed 
in the scene, captivated in particular by the instruments of human 
communication and measurement signifying the Symbolic, what Lacan refers 
to as symbols of vanitas. From this angle, the anamorphic skull that represents 
the Real cannot be seen. Lacan elaborates:  
 
Alors, qu’est-ce donc, devant cette monstration du domaine de 
l’apparence sous ses formes les plus fascinantes, qu’est-ce donc cet 
objet, ici volant, ici incliné? Vous ne pouvez le savoir – car vous vous 
détournez, échappant à la fascination du tableau. Commencez à sortir de 
la pièce où sans doute il vous a longuement captivé. C’est alors que, 
vous retournant en partant – comme le décrit l’auteur des 
Anamorphoses – vous saisissez sous cette forme quoi? – une tête de 
mort. (1973: 83) 
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[What, then, before this display of the domain of appearance in all its 
most fascinating forms, is this object, which from some angles appears 
to be flying through the air, at others to be tilted? You cannot know – 
for you turn away, thus escaping the fascination of the picture. Begin by 
walking out of the room in which no doubt it has long held your 
attention. It is then that, turning round as you leave – as the author of 
the Anamorphoses describes it – you apprehend in this form. . . What? 
A skull. (trans. Sheridan, 1998: 88)]  
 
While immersed in the Symbolic, the viewer is unable to see the skull that 
represents the Real. When the viewer moves to the angle at which the skull 
may be perceived, the rest of the image (the two figures, the instruments of 
measurement) is obscured. Lacan states that ‘Holbein nous rend ici visible 
quelque chose qui n’est rien d’autre que le sujet comme néantisé’ (1973: 83) 
[‘Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply the subject as 
annihilated’ (trans. Sheridan, 1998: 88)], and continues:  
 
le secret de ce tableau est donné au moment où, nous éloignant 
légèrement de lui, peu à peu, vers la gauche, puis nous retournant, nous 
voyons ce que signifie l’objet flottant magique. Il nous reflète notre 
propre néant, dans la figure de la tête de mort. (1973: 86)   
 
[the secret of this picture is given at the moment when, moving slightly 
away, little by little, to the left, then turning around, we see what the 
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magical floating object signifies. It reflects our own nothingness, in the 
figure of the death’s head. (trans. Sheridan, 1998: 92)]  
 
 
While anamorphosis renders the representation of the Real by the Death’s Head 
separate to the Symbolic, once the skull is seen it is able to transform the way 
in which the entire painting is viewed. Lacan emphasises the movement of the 
viewer in his description; while the Real and Symbolic appear within the same 
painting, it is through the mechanism of anamorphosis that they are rendered 
entirely separate, depending on the perspective of the viewer. Lacan thus 
outlines the Real as opposed to the Symbolic, as the lack of castration and as 
resistance to meaning itself (Lacan, 1973: 83). The separation of Real and 
Symbolic is such that both cannot be perceived simultaneously; they exist in 
different positions to one another.  
The motif of the skull recurs in ORLAN’s works including Opération 
Réussie Omniprésence, EXOGÈNE (1997), Bien que... Oui mais... (2003), and 
most recently in Bump Load et Memento Mori (2013). ORLAN’s operation-
performances may be read as staging or literalising a ‘cut into the Real’ with 
her surgeon’s knife. The viewer is asked to make sense of the trauma of flesh – 
forcing a meeting between meaning and the Real, testing the limits of both. 
Hannah Westley has argued that ORLAN’s work shows the ‘the return of the 
real body’ (2008: 12), that her work ‘witnesses the return of the real converging 
with the return of the referential’ (198-9). She cites Hal Foster’s The Return of 
the Real (1996) in support of her claim, particularly his argument that in 
response to material events including the AIDS crisis, there exists a 
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‘dissatisfaction with the textualist model of culture as well as the 
conventionalist view of reality – as if the real, repressed in poststructuralist 
postmodernism, had returned as traumatic’ (Foster, 1996: 166, cited in 
Westley, 2008: 198). Parveen Adams’s essay ‘Operation Orlan’ in The 
Emptiness of the Image (1996) also links ORLAN’s work to the Lacanian Real:  
 
Confronted with the horrifying spectacle of the rawness of passion, of 
the jouissance of the body as such, the jubilation of meat, [ORLAN] 
produces a confrontation with the Real and a fear that we will be 
swallowed into the full space of plenitude in which there is no room for 
us. (156) 
 
When ORLAN’s body is cut into, the structured, organised and mechanical 
bodily interior that Descartes describes in his dissection (the heart likened to a 
timepiece, the body as a whole compared to an impressively fashioned 
machine), the Symbolic body, is nowhere to be found. Rather, the viewer is left 
with the ‘jubilation of meat’ of the body-as-Real. Adams argues that when 
ORLAN’s skin is peeled away from her face, she ‘undoes the triumph of 
representation’ (145) exposing the fiction of coherent subjectivity harboured by 
the image of the face. The representation of the Symbolic is revealed as 
fraudulent; just as Jean-Luc Nancy exposes the cogito as a mask harbouring the 
subject with nothing lying beneath, Adams reads ORLAN’s work as exposing 
that ‘there is nothing behind the mask’ (145). Furthermore, Adams writes that 
‘Orlan is not unveiled or stripped bare. There is no signifying interior to be 
discovered. Rather, the detachment of her face, a manoeuvre which reveals it as 
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pure exteriority, is one which casts a doubt on representation, which insists on 
its emptiness’ (146-7).  
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE] 
Seconde bouche, ORLAN (1993).  
 
For Adams, the ‘refiguration [of the body] touches on the psychotic’ 
(144). ORLAN herself writes of this prohibition against altering the body in 
psychoanalysis, linking it to religion, presumably to the Christian notion of the 
sanctity of the body created in God’s image (Genesis 1:27):xxx  
 
La psychanalyse et la religion s’accordent pour dire: ‘il ne faut pas 
attaquer le corps’, il faut s’accepter soi-même. Ce sont des pensées 
primitives, ancestrales, anachroniques, nous pensons que le ciel va nous 
tomber sur la tête si nous touchons au corps!  
 
Pourtant bon nombre de visages accidentés ont été refaits. De 
nombreuses personnes ont eu des greffes d’organes. Et combien encore 
de nez redressés ou raccourcis hument l’air sans problèmes tant 
physiques que psychologiques? 
 
[…] 
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Mon travail est en lutte contre l’inné, l’innéxorable [sic], le programmé, 
la nature, l’ADN 
 
(qui est notre rival direct en tant qu’artiste de la représentation) et Dieu!  
 
(1996: 92)  
 
[Psychoanalysis and religion agree enough to say: ‘One must not 
attack the body’, one must accept oneself. These are primitive, 
ancestral, anachronistic thoughts, we think the sky will fall on our 
heads if we touch the body!  
And yet a good number of disfigured faces have been rebuilt. So 
many people have received organ transplants. And how many nose 
jobs sniff the air with no physical or psychological problems? 
[…] 
My work is at war with the innate, the inexorable, the programmed, 
nature, DNA 
(which is our direct rival as an artist of representation) and God!]  
 
 
ORLAN describes her modification of the body here as an attempt to counter a 
kind of static essentialism; a war with DNA. She insists, against religion, 
science and psychoanalysis, that the body can be modified – not only at the 
level of representation, but at that of the Real. In some senses this appears as a 
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kind of recalcitrant assertion of agency against nature, a Cartesian attempt to 
master nature and the body. Yet ORLAN’s statement also amounts to a 
rejection of the Lacanian identification of flesh, of bodily matter, with the Real 
that places it beyond symbolic or imaginary signification.  
Adams’s association of ORLAN’s work in Omniprésence with the Real 
leads her to Lacan’s reading of Irma’s dream (discussed earlier), and she uses 
similar imagery to Lacan to argue that when viewing Omniprésence, the 
audience is ‘swallowed up’. In the section of Lacan’s second seminar to which 
Adams refers, he includes three references to ‘chair’ to describe the Real: 
 
Il y a là une horrible découverte, celle de la chair qu’on ne voit jamais, 
le fond des choses, l’envers de la face, du visage, les secrétats par 
excellence, la chair dont tout sort, au plus profond même du mystère, la 
chair en tant qu’elle est souffrante, qu’elle est informe, que sa forme par 
soi-même est quelque chose qui provoque l’angoisse. (Lacan, 1978, 
186)xxxi  
[There’s a horrendous discovery here, that of the flesh one never sees, 
the foundation of things, the other side of the head, of the face, the 
secretory glands par excellence, the flesh from which everything 
exudes, at the very heart of the mystery, the flesh in as much as it is 
suffering, is formless, in as much as its form in itself is something 
which provokes anxiety. (trans. Tomaselli, 1991: 154)]  
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This flesh is mysterious, ‘la chair qu’on ne voit jamais’, and like the Real it is 
closed to signification. Lacan uses ‘la chair’ three times in this section. If ‘la 
chair’ literally refers to the soft tissue of an organism, it is of course 
overdetermined. The biblical connotations of ‘flesh’ oppose it to the immaterial 
soul.xxxii But Lacan here specifically describes flesh as opposed to the symbolic 
body: it is to ‘la chair en tant que’ [flesh in as much as it is] formlessness, the 
unrepresentable, or mystery that he links to the Real. It is this equation of flesh 
with the Real and its absolute separation from representation in the Symbolic 
that ORLAN continually confronts and troubles in her work, signaled not only 
by her use of her own flesh but by the Death’s Head as well.  
The image of the Death’s Head has recurred repeatedly in ORLAN’s 
work since her Réincarnation project began in 1990. In the video recording for 
one of the first works in this series, Opération Réussie, ORLAN appears 
clutching a skull with red plastic devil horns stuck on top of it, ORLAN 
holding a small pitchfork.xxxiii This skull appears as a provocation; how far is 
ORLAN prepared to push her body (and her audience)? Adorned with the devil 
horns, it also alludes to her supposedly blasphemous act in cutting into human 
flesh, God’s creation in his image. The campiness of the red plastic and the 
trashy carnivalesque aesthetic of the performance as a whole only adds an 
overall sense of profanity to the scene, as ORLAN refuses to treat the operating 
theatre, the surgeons or the act itself with any sense of gravity. Finally, the 
skull also alludes to the flesh as the Real – the threat of death, of nothingness 
and lack of meaning. Since Opération Réussie, this same skull (without the 
horns) has appeared in the video work as well as the staged photographs for 
Omniprésence, to which I will return.  
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A number of digital works by ORLAN similarly employ the 
juxtaposition of her face with the image of the skull or the Death’s Head. 
Firstly, ORLAN’s EXOGÈNE merges a photographic image of her head with 
an x-ray of a skull. This grainy black and white image overlays ORLAN’s head 
with the image of the skull, her eyes appearing as sunk deep into the bone of 
the sockets. ORLAN’s hairline is missing, covered behind the cranium, her 
familiar blunt bob framing the sides of the skull’s ‘face’, producing the bizarre 
effect of a clown-like image, emphasised by the pale white ‘face’ of the bone. 
And yet, the effect of this image is far from the humour evoked by the skull in 
the video of Opération Réussie. EXOGÈNE is an intensely unsettling image, 
the sunken eyes offering little sign of animation that would dismiss the 
macabre allusions of the skull that has merged with ORLAN’s face. The 
inversion of an exterior cranium thus overlays the face with a lifeless 
exoskeleton, as referenced by the title, the capitalised ‘exogène’ [exogenous]. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the image is the absence of the lips: while 
the eyes remain, lifeless though they are, the open mouth appears only as a 
void. In this image, rather than masking the nothingness beneath it, the face 
barely registers, trapped as it is between the deathly exterior and the interior 
void of the mouth. ORLAN does not depict the stripping back of the Symbolic 
to reveal the Real in this image. Rather than the Real (symbolized by the skull) 
presented as gap or interruption in meaning, ORLAN presents the Symbolic 
image of the face as overlaid with it, inseparable from it. She offers an 
uncomfortable representation of the omnipresence of the Real. Rather than the 
separation of the Real from the Symbolic effected by the technique of 
anamorphosis in The Ambassadors, ORLAN presents a layering of Real and 
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Symbolic, of the skull and the image of her face. If Adams reads ORLAN’s 
surgery as performing the same separation of Symbolic from Real as 
anamorphosis, having ‘the effect of splitting the body from the signifier as a 
ceaseless re-enactment of castration’ I suggest a layering of meaning with flesh 
(1995: 156). ORLAN’s piece renders the representation of the Real via the 
skull as inseparable from the Symbolic.  
Similarly, in the video piece Bump Load et Memento Mori, a digital 
image of a skull, possessing the outline of the ‘bumps’ ORLAN has inserted 
under the skin of her temples, is juxtaposed with a face. This ‘face’ is not 
recognisable as ORLAN’s, however – it is a flat, white, digital model that 
resembles the blank mask of a mime, its eyes also white blanks. The skull and 
the mask face each other, touching as if cheek-to-cheek. As the video 
progresses, the tone of the black and white image shifts, and another ‘face’ 
appears overlaying and formed by the other two images. If this new face 
appears to be more substantial, the viewer is only too aware that it is composed 
only of a blank mask and a skull. To the left, the shifting images are repeated, 
this time with an almost perceptible skeleton and a kind of cyborgian outer 
layer, with stumps on its shoulders and the familiar bumps on each temple. In 
this scene, ORLAN repeats the ‘emptying out’ of the coherent image 
supporting identity referred to by Adams, applying it to the whole body rather 
than just the face. And again, ORLAN presents a layering of Real and 
Symbolic in opposition to the separation entailed by anamorphosis.  
An earlier video work, Bien que... Oui mais..., offers an extended 
exploration of themes related to the Real. The piece begins with effervescent 
red globules, coursing across the screen like red blood cells sweeping though 
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arteries. At first the motion is organic, yet these ‘cells’ begin to pulsate in time 
with the industrial soundtrack provided by the French sound artist Frédéric 
Sanchez. Rings of light also begin to pulsate, and a mechanical Catherine 
wheel rotates creating circles of white light. The traces of an image of 
ORLAN’s head appear, fading in and out of visibility until white light engulfs 
the entire screen. ORLAN’s head reappears, in colour, fading to an image of a 
painted Death’s Head, and then appearing again, with these changes 
interspersed with white light. Eventually these images of ORLAN’s face and 
the skull appear simultaneously, overlapping one another. Once more, ORLAN 
presents a layering of images of her face with images representing the Real. 
These images include the skull, the intermittent white light expulsing all 
images and meaning from the screen and also the ambiguously organic 
movement of what appear to be red blood cells – the physical matter of the 
body that Lacan links to the Real, and that Parveen Adams describes as the 
‘jouissance’ of the body.  
One particular staged photograph of ORLAN’s Omniprésence features 
two figures in black robes. One of these figures appears to be communicating 
in sign language, the other (ORLAN) is sitting facing the viewer, holding an 
open book and resting a keyboard on her lap. Two clocks are visible, mounted 
on the garish green wall behind these figures; also a saline drip and surgical 
lamp; finally, ORLAN’s face marked in pen with the lines that will guide her 
surgeon’s scalpel. Looming in the foreground at the bottom of the photograph 
is the Death’s Head, with the blue plastic implants ORLAN will have inserted 
at her temples attached to it. The picture bears many similarities to Holbein’s 
The Ambassadors, particularly to the elements Lacan uses to illustrate the Real 
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in opposition to Symbolic representation. Both paintings feature two figures in 
black robes, the green background, as well as the foregrounded skull at the 
bottom of the scene. In Holbein’s painting, the various objects presented on the 
shelves between the two figures are tools of communication and measurement 
(a celestial globe, a sundial, an open book), tools that Lacan associates with the 
Symbolic in his reading. The objects in ORLAN’s picture represent the same: 
the keyboard, book and sign language representing communication; the two 
clocks indicating different time zones (Tokyo and Bangkok), as well as the 
saline drip, all being tools of measurement. ORLAN has staged a number of 
tableaux-vivants of well-known paintings; Grande Odalisque in 1977 
representing the work of Ingres, Naissance d’ORLAN sans coquille [Birth of 
ORLAN without Shell] in 1974 and Strip-tease occasionnel referencing 
Botticelli’s Birth of Venus, and more recently a digitally flayed ORLAN 
staging part of Delacroix’s La Liberté guidant le peuple [Liberty leading the 
People] (1830) as La liberté en écorchée [Liberty Flayed] (2013). Indeed 
‘citing’ canonical works of art is a recurrent aspect of ORLAN’s practice.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE – image to be printed in colour]  
Seconde bouche, ORLAN (1993) 
 
 
 [INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE – image to be printed in colour]  
The Ambassadors, Hans Holbein the Younger (1533)  
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There is, however, one highly significant difference between ORLAN’s 
image and that of Holbein: crucial to Lacan’s reading of The Ambassadors is 
the anamorphosis of the skull, which renders it as little more than a stain when 
viewing the painting head-on. Just as the previous works featuring the Death’s 
Head discussed in this section depict a layering between the Real and the 
Symbolic rather than their separation performed by anamorphosis, the skull in 
ORLAN’s scene indicates an important diversion from Lacan’s account. This 
skull is adorned with bright blue plastic implants on the brow, the cheeks and 
the chin that contrast strikingly with the bone. These plastic embellishments are 
explained by ORLAN’s piece Imaginary Generic: Successful Operations 
(1990), exhibited at the very beginning of the Réincarnation project, and 
illustrating her plans to physically cite facial features from five well-known 
paintings. The blue plastic implants refer to these physical citations, including 
the chin of Botticelli’s Venus and the brow of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa. The skull 
in ORLAN’s photograph, then, is far from the absence or lack of meaning that 
it represents for Lacan in The Ambassadors. Here it is embellished with all the 
weight of meaning attached to these historical artworks, another kind of 
layering of Symbolic meaning with the representation of the Real. 
ORLAN smiles knowingly into the camera; the skull with its prosthetic 
implants clearly visible in front of her is a provocation. She acknowledges that 
the surgery-performance she is about to enact breaks the psychoanalytic taboo 
of touching the material body, the blue plastic implants emphasising that the 
Real of the material body represented by the skull can indeed be altered or 
‘resignified’. As prosthetics, and particularly as implements of medical 
technology, they allude to Donna Haraway’s cyborgian resistance to the rigid 
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dualism of nature/culture. Like Preciado with his use of the hormonal 
prosthetic testosterone, ORLAN may be seen as following Haraway’s call to 
use prostheses as a way to blur the boundaries between such dualisms, in 
rejecting the notion of a brute and inaccessible organic block in favour of a 
continuity between organic and inorganic. ORLAN’s act of surgery pushes the 
limits of the border between language and that which it represents. With the act 
of surgery, ORLAN not only questions how far we can represent the 
materiality of the body, but renders the material body as far more accessible to 
signification than in its Lacanian formulation as an impermeable block resistant 
to meaning, a formulation similar to Nancy’s opposition of ‘sens’ and matter, 
his concept of language as ‘a hard, extended block of meaning’ impenetrable to 
bodies (2000a: 51).xxxiv ORLAN’s work disputes the Lacanian association of 
bodily matter with a total resistance to representation (the Real); the material 
body, the flesh is not entirely in excess of signification.  
 ORLAN’s forceful rejection of the prohibition against altering the 
material body as synonymous with altering the Real allies her work with 
transgender concerns, in particular through her questioning of the principles of 
some psychoanalytic discourse that has often been so damaging in accounts of 
transsexuality. If Lacan locates sexual difference in the Real, with its 
reification in the Symbolic, any attempt to touch the Real is understood as 
psychotic. Indeed, even writing about or ‘arguing with’ the Real has been 
understood by followers of Lacan as psychotic: in Beyond Sexuality (2000), 
Tim Dean argues that Judith Butler’s engagement with Žižek in Bodies that 
Matter is itself psychotic:  
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To state my disagreement with Butler in its strongest terms, let me just 
say that in her rhetoricalizing of psychosis, in ‘Arguing with the Real,’ 
Butler’s argument and the politics it implies are psychotic […] Butler’s 
project to ‘resignify’ the symbolic order by means of psychosis is not 
political but psychotic. (2000: 206) 
 
Dean is of course not claiming that Butler is herself psychotic, but is critical of 
her suggestion in ‘Arguing with the Real’ that psychotic utterances can have 
political power. Fundamentally, his criticism is that ‘Butler’s argument with 
the real depends upon her substantializing the real as reference […] attributing 
a content to that zone of pure negativity that Lacan calls the real’ (2000: 212). 
Trying to make sense of the Real is psychotic. When Adams claims in her 
reading of ORLAN that the ‘refiguration [of the body] touches on the 
psychotic’, she suggests that ORLAN’s project ‘works differently’ to that of 
‘the transsexual’ (1996: 144). While her reading of ORLAN is otherwise 
incisive and engaging, Adams unfortunately follows the Lacanian analyst 
Catherine Millot’s understanding of transsexuality outlined in Horsexe: Essai 
sur le transsexualisme [Horsexe: Essay on Transsexuality] (1983).xxxv Millot 
writes:  
 
le transsexuel vise à incarner La femme. Non pas une femme, du côté 
du ‘pas toute’, qui implique qu’aucune femme n’est Toute, toute entière 
femme, qu’aucune ne vaut pour toutes les femmes – en effet la position 
du transsexual consiste à se vouloir Toute, toute entière femme, plus 
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femme que toutes les femmes […] La Femme avec un grand F, celle 
précisément dont Lacan pose qu’elle n’existe pas. (39) 
 
[the transsexual seeks to incarnate Woman. Not a woman, including 
‘not everything’, which implies that no woman is Everything, a 
complete woman who is everything, that no woman stands for all 
women – in effect, the position of the transsexual consists of wanting to 
be Everything, a complete woman who is wholly and entirely woman, 
more of a woman than any other woman […] Woman with a capital 
‘W’, that which Lacan claims does not exist.] 
 
 
Millot herself is strongly influenced by Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire, 
and her psychoanalytic understanding of transsexuality follows Raymond’s 
paranoid reading of transsexuality as an attempt by men to usurp the place of 
women.xxxvi This understanding of transsexuality is also undoubtedly 
influenced by Freud’s reading of Judge Daniel Schreber’s writing, taken up by 
Deleuze and Guattari at the very beginning of L’anti Œdipe [Anti-Oedipus] 
(1972). During his illness, Schreber believed that he was to be changed by God 
into a woman and impregnated with divine rays in order to give birth to a new 
race of humans. The unique case of Schreber is, however, read as examplary, 
leading psychoanalysts to associate the desire to become a woman with a desire 
they locate in Schreber for omnipotence and completeness linked with 
megalomania. It is this combination of Raymond and Schreber that has come to 
signify a singular, wholy innaccurate and generalised reading of transsexuality 
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as a phallic desire for completeness.xxxvii  
Following Millot, then, Adams claims that ‘the transsexual act […] 
involves not the empirical wish to become a woman rather than a man, but the 
omnipotent denial of sexual difference as such. For frequently the urge to 
refiguration involves a wish not to become a woman, but to become The 
Woman’ (1996: 144). ORLAN ‘works differently’ because she does not 
attempt to ‘cross the frontier of sexual difference, but as a ‘woman-to-woman’ 
transition – that is from her individuality […] to what she artfully chooses’ 
(144). Secondly, following Millot, ‘the question of psychosis touches on the 
issue of completeness’: where ‘the transexual’ seeks to become The Woman, to 
become the phallus ‘turning the knife against castration’: Adams reads 
ORLAN’s project as undoing any claims to wholeness or complete identity 
(144). The ‘transsexual’ thus becomes the foil against which Adams reads 
ORLAN’s work. Diane Morgan makes this argument in ‘What Does a 
Transsexual Want?’ (1999),xxxviii the final section of which touches on Parveen 
Adams’s essay on ORLAN. Morgan criticises Adams for ‘explicitly engag[ing] 
Orlan against transsexuals’ (237). She describes the distinction Adams makes 
between ORLAN’s actions and transsexuality, which ‘apparently demonstrates 
[ORLAN’s] sophisticated superiority to those other, megalomaniacal, 
transsexuals who aim to abolish sexual difference’ (238). Where Adams sees 
transsexuals as seeking to deny sexual difference and embracing an essentialist 
notion of  completeness, she reads ORLAN’s actions as undoing such notions. 
And, importantly for Adams, ORLAN’s work apparently does not confront 
sexual difference. The frequent contradictions of Lacanian discussions of the 
Real with regards to sexual difference and its status as Real (beyond language) 
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and yet somehow also defined (as material, binary sex) are exposed in this 
treatment of transsexuality: not only are transsexuals psychotic because they 
deny the symbolic fact of castration, they also deny the necessity of sexual 
difference, embodying a psychotic attempt to become wholly Woman. 
Transsexuals simultaneously take material sex too seriously and not seriously 
enough. 
Closer attention given to the Adams article is rewarding. She writes that 
ORLAN ‘is changing, not from one thing into another – metamorphosis – but 
from one register to another’ (144). The use of the linguistic term ‘register’ 
fascinatingly betrays her Lacanian grounding; Adams understands ORLAN’s 
surgical procedures as working in the realm of representation, of the surface 
and the Symbolic rather than attempting to change the ‘thing’, the Real of 
sexual difference. Adams’s theoretical framework allows her to read ORLAN’s 
work in such a way, rendering her surgical performance one of shifting register 
rather than a confrontation with the bodily matter of sex. Such a reading 
epitomises the way in which the discussion of bodily matter is shifted to the 
realm of language and discourse within a Lacanian framework. It also reflects 
the same concerns Prosser holds over queer theory; concerns which should 
indeed be addressed in relation to its theoretical groundings. While Prosser and 
Namaste both identify poststructuralism as the source of the problem for queer 
theory, I suggest that careful attention should also be paid to certain 
interpretations of Lacanian psychoanalysis which equate the Real with the flesh 
or the material body. These Lacanian positions see sexual difference as beyond 
question due to its place in the Real and equate it simply to binary biological 
sex.  
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Judith Butler raises the important question of how it is decided (and 
who decides) what exactly it is that resists representation and constitutes the 
Real, given that it can only be accessed by a failure in the Symbolic. She writes 
in Bodies that Matter:   
 
The problem here is that there is no way within this framework to 
politicize the relation between language and the real. What counts as the 
‘real,’ in the sense of the unsymbolizable, is always relative to a 
linguistic domain that authorizes and produces that foreclosure, and 
achieves that effect through producing and policing a set of constitutive 
exclusions. (201) 
 
Butler sees Lacan’s account of sexual difference as conservative, existing 
‘either as a normative barrier erected by a policing discourse seeking to 
circumscribe the limits of social and sexual acceptability, or as a discursive 
after-effect reifying itself as prediscursive law’ (Kollias, 2012: 158). Yet 
Lacan’s early exposition of sexual difference does hold radical potential as a 
constructivist account. In ‘L’instance de la lettre dans l'inconscient’ [The 
Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious] from 1957 (published in Écrits), 
Lacan is clear that sexual difference is culturally produced. After discussing the 
male and female symbols accompanied by ‘Hommes’ and ‘Dames’ 
respectively regulating ‘la ségrégation urinaire’ [urinary segregation] (500), 
Lacan recounts a story:  
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Un train arrive en gare. Un petit garçon et une petite fille, le frère et la 
sœur, dans un compartiment sont assis l’un en face de l’autre du côté où 
la vitre donnant sur l’extérieur laisse se dérouler la vue des bâtiments du 
quai le long duquel le train stoppe: ‘Tiens, dit le frère, on est à Dames! 
– Imbécile! répond la sœur, tu ne vois pas qu’on est à Hommes’. (500) 
 
[A train arrives at a station. A little boy and a little girl, brother and 
sister, are seated across from each other in a compartment next to the 
outside window that provides a view of the station platform buildings 
going by as the train comes to a stop. ‘Look,’ says the brother, ‘we’re at 
Ladies!’ ‘Imbecile!’ replies his sister, ‘Don't you see we're at 
Gentlemen.’ (trans. Fink, 2006: 417)]  
 
The failure of the brother and sister to understand each other here is placed 
firmly in the Symbolic, understood as resulting from the signifier (the symbols 
that denote gendered bathrooms). Lacan also comprehends the violence of this 
epistemic failure, writing further that:   
 
Car il va porter la Dissension, seulement animale et vouée à l’oubli des 
brumes naturelles, à la puissance sans mesure, implacable aux familles 
et harcelantes aux dieux, de la guerre idéologique. Hommes et Dames 
seront dès lors pour ces enfants deux patries vers quoi leurs âmes 
chacune tireront d'une aile divergente, et sur lesquelles il leur sera 
d’autant plus impossible de pactiser qu’étant en vérité la même, aucun 
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ne saurait céder sur la précellence de l’une sans attenter à la gloire de 
l’autre. (500-1) 
 
[For the signifier will raise Dissension that is merely animal in kind, 
and destined to the natural fog of forgetfulness, to the immeasurable 
power of ideological warfare, which is merciless to families and a 
torment to the gods. To these children, Gentlemen and Ladies will 
henceforth be two homelands toward which each of their souls will take 
flight on divergent wings, and regarding which it will be all the more 
impossible for them to reach an agreement since, being in fact the same 
homeland, neither can give ground regarding the one’s unsurpassed 
excellence without detracting from the other's glory. (trans. Fink, 2006: 
417)]  
 
Lacan elucidates here what he means by his repeated claim that ‘il n’y a pas de 
rapport sexuel’, that sexual difference manifests only as a failure in the 
Symbolic. Lacan is clear that sexual difference is a position taken up in the 
Symbolic and that what is ‘real’ about it is not known. In this instance he does 
not by any means make any essentialist claims regarding binary sexual 
difference, with the Symbolic sexual position not being yoked to material sex 
(placed as it is in the Real and unknowable). Furthermore, Lacan clearly claims 
in ‘La signification du phallus’ [The Signification of the Phallus] (1958 [1966]) 
that the phallus is not the penis: 
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La phallus ici s’éclaire de sa fonction. Le phallus dans la doctrine 
freudienne n’est pas un fantasme, s’il faut entendre par là un effet 
imaginaire. Il n’est pas non plus comme tel un objet (partiel, interne, 
bon, mauvais etc...) pour autant que ce terme tend à apprécier la réalité 
intéressée dans une relation. Il est encore bien moins l’organe, pénis ou 
clitoris, qu’il symbolise. (690) 
 
[The phallus can be better understood on the basis of its function here. 
In Freudian doctrine, the phallus is not a fantasy, if we are to view 
fantasy as an imaginary effect. Nor is it as such an object (part-, 
internal, good, bad, etc.) inasmuch as ‘object’ tends to gauge the reality 
involved in a relationship. Still less is it the organ—penis or clitoris—
that it symbolizes. (trans. Fink, 2006: 579)]  
   
 
Mitchell and Rose have, in Feminine Sexuality (1982), long since made the 
case for Lacan’s work as a non-essentialising account of sexual difference on 
these grounds. Lacan’s thesis can indeed have radical possibilities for 
constructivist accounts of sexed embodiment and gender that have more 
recently been exploited in relation to transgender studies, as I will go on to 
discuss. Lacan was, however, ambiguous enough on the issue that numerous, 
often essentialising and normative, interpretations of his work exist – 
particularly in France. As Gayle Salamon asks in Assuming a Body (2010) 
during a discussion of the post-Lacanian Luce Irigaray, ‘is sexual difference 
just “natural” binary and determinist sex?’ (146). By seminar twenty, Encore 
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(1975), Lacan is able to write that ‘Rien ne distingue comme être sexué la 
femme, sinon justement le sexe’ (13) [‘Nothing distinguishes woman as a 
sexed being other than her sexual organ’ (Fink trans. 1999: 7)].  
Dylan Evans summarises what has been seen as the ‘apparent confusion 
and semantic slippage’ in the ‘highly unstable’ distinction between penis and 
phallus in Lacan’s work,xxxix as well as noting the vital role the penis as sexual 
organ and not the phallus plays in central concepts such as the Oedipus 
complex (1996: 144).xl Rather than identifying instances of slippage between 
penis/phallus (something she is herself accused of by Prosser), Judith Butler 
asks in her essay ‘The Lesbian Phallus’ (1993), ‘what is the status of [Lacan’s] 
assertion of ontological difference [between phallus and penis] if it turns out 
that this symbol, the phallus, always takes the penis as that which it 
symbolizes?’ (84). With reference to Lacan’s use of language and the logical 
construction of his argument, she convincingly claims that despite Lacan’s 
assertions otherwise ‘the phallus is bound to the penis’ (84):  
 
the phallus is fundamentally dependent upon the penis in order to 
symbolize at all. Indeed, the phallus would be nothing without the 
penis. And in that sense in which the phallus requires the penis for its 
own constitution, the identity of the phallus includes the penis, that is, a 
relation of identity holds between them (84). 
 
Here Butler argues Lacan’s use of ‘phallus’ renders it fundamentally dependent 
on the real ‘penis’ as sexual organ, to the extent that one can question how the 
two may in fact be separated or separable at all.  
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While there are certainly radical possibilities for the understanding of 
sexed embodiment to be drawn from certain aspects of Lacan, there is a great 
deal of ambiguity in his work concerning the status of sexual difference. At 
worst, the implications of his association of biology and matter with the Real 
are that Lacan (and later Butler) is able to say far too much about the body 
while simultaneously claiming that nothing can be said about it at all. The 
Lacanian association of matter with the Real results in a kind of agnosticism 
towards the material body that engenders metaphor, allowing layers of meaning 
to accumulate with impunity. Since the Real resists meaning, statements about 
its representation can neither be verified nor indeed falsified, rendering 
interpretations or accounts of the material body beyond question 
and unchallengeable. Lacan is therefore able to metaphorise the vagina as 
Medusa’s Head and the penis as phallus without reproach. An essentialism 
lingers in his work, unchallengeable.   
In many ways Lacan’s privileging of language or the Symbolic has 
been incredibly productive, not least for queer theory, and not least because of 
the anti-essentialist potential it holds. And yet, it has also led to accusations of 
an implicit idealism in his work.xli If queer theory does seek to account for 
transgender bodies, and the materiality of bodies in general, it must pay notice 
to these concerns of idealism and essentialism. While ostensibly Lacan does 
not ignore the body, borrowing biological concepts, and drawing on animal 
studies ranging from pigeons to locusts or his terrifying image of the praying 
mantis, these discussions take such material examples and render them firmly 
as metaphor. In other ways, Lacan’s replacement of Freud’s use of the term 
penis in the Oedipus complex with the term phallus does raise questions for the 
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place of the material body in his work. As for Butler’s engagement with 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, this issue comes to a head in her attempts to account 
for bodies, perhaps nowhere more so than in Bodies that Matter. Her attempts 
to reconcile Lacanian notions of the bodily materiality with the discussion of 
sensitively political material concerns inevitably and repeatedly fall flat, and 
her slippage between Lacanian metaphors and biological sexed terms when 
writing about transsexual individuals in her reading of Paris is Burning, as 
Prosser so effectively points out, highlights the inadequacies of the equation of 
the material body with the Real. In contrast, ORLAN’s work reaffirms the 
materiality of the body, clearly rejecting the equation of bodily matter with the 
Real. Rather, she asks her viewers to make sense of her flesh – forcing a 
meeting between meaning and the materiality of the body, testing the limits of 
both. ORLAN’s work is critical of the Lacanian Real to the extent that it 
becomes a way of ignoring the body and preserving Christian notions of the 
inviolability of flesh. ORLAN breaks this taboo, repeatedly staging complex 
and provocative meetings between meaning and the material.  
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Stelarc. 1992. Exoskeleton. [multimedia performance]. 
 
— 1998. Extra Ear. [biomedical project]. 
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— 1992. Virtual Arm. [multimedia].  
 
 
Works by ORLAN:  
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1964. Action Or-lent: Les marches au ralenti [performance].  
 
1964-7. Corps-Sculptures series: - 1965. Orlan accouche d’elle-m’aime [black and white photograph]. - 1965. Shiva ou tentacules de bras multiples [black and white photograph]. - 1976. Veste de Littérature droit sur le corps [black and white photograph]. - 1976. Littérature pour se lever droit [black and white photograph]. 
 
1968. Couture en clair obscure [photograph]. 
 
1974. Naissance d’ORLAN sans coquille [black and white photograph on plywood]. 
Espace Lyonnais d'art contemporain. 
 
1974-5. Strip-tease occasionnel à l’aide des draps du trousseau [eighteen black and 
white photographs taken in 1974 and reassembled in 1975]. Lyon: Nouveau 
Musée de Villeurbanne. 
 
1976. Le Baiser de l’artiste [sculpture with performance]. Caldas da Raina: Maison de 
la culture.  
 
1977. La grande Odalisque [black and white photograph].  
 
1978. Étude Documentaire: La Tête de la Méduse [performance].  
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1979. Étude documentaire: Le Drapé-le Baroque [performance]. Lyon: Espace 
lyonnais d’art contemporain.  
 
1981. S’habiller de sa propre nudité [performance]. Caldas da Rainha, Portugal.  
 
1986. Cheri’s Bloc [surgical performance]. 
 
1989. L’Origine de la Guerre [aluminium backed-cibachrome]. 
  
1989. La madone au minitel [multimedia]. 
 
1990. Art Makes Your Mouth Water [photograph]. 
 
1990. Official portrait in Bride of Frankenstein wig [cibachrome on aluminium]. Photo 
by Fabrice Levêque. 
 
1990-3. La Réincarnation de Sainte ORLAN ou Images/nouvelles images operation-
performances: 
 - 1990 Première Opération Chirurgicale-Performance: ‘Art Charnel’. Paris, 21 
July. - 1990 Deuxième Opération Chirurgicale-Performance: ‘la licorne’. Paris, 25 
July. - 1990 Troisième Opération Chirurgicale-Performance. Paris, 11 September. 
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- 1990, Quatrième Opération Chirurgicale-Performance: ‘Opération Réussie’. 
Paris, 8 December 1990. - 1991. 5ème Opération Chirurgicale-Performance. Opération Opéra. Paris, 6 
July. - 1993. 6ème Opération Chirurgicale-Performance: ‘Sacrifice’. - 1993, 7ème Opération chirurgicale-performance: ‘Omniprésence’. New York, 
21 November 1993. - 1993, 8ème Opération chirurgicale-performance. New York, 8 December. - 1993, 9ème opération chirurgicale-performance. New York, 14 December.  
 
Associated works:  
 - 1993. Courtroom Exhibit: Costume for the Seventh Surgery-Performance 
[surgical robes with photographs]. - 1993. Seconde bouche [cibrachrome in Diasec mount]. Photo by Vladimir 
Sichov for SIPA Press. - 1992-3. Réliquaires: Ma chair, le texte et les langages [soldered metal, high-
resistance safety glass, ORLAN's flesh preserved in resin].  - 1993. Présentation par le médecin de prélèvement de sang effectué sur la 
feuille jaune [cibrachrome in Diasec mount]. - 1993. Portrait No.1 fait par la machine-corps quatre jours après la 7e 
opération-chirugicale-performance [cibachrome in   Diasec mount]. 
Photograph by Vladimir Sichov for Sipa Press.  - 1993. Omniprésence: No. 1 [forty-one diptychs of metal and eighty-two color 
photographs]. New York: Sandra Gering Gallery.  
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- 1993. Saint suaire n°9 [photo transferred to gauze imbued with blood, 
plexiglass box].  
 
 
1996. Femme avec Tête et Illusion, Simulation, Virtualité.... / Woman with Head ... 
Woman without Head [performance]. London: Institute of Contemporary Arts.  
 
1997. EXOGÈNE [Self Hybridization with ORLAN's portrait and forensic image of 
skull].  
 
1998. Will You Take Some . . . Contents Monsieur Greenberg [multimedia].  
 
2003. Bien que... Oui mais... [video].  
 
2007. Laïcité / Suture [performance]. The Modern Art Museum of Saint-Etienne.   
 
2008. Manteau d’Arlequin [multimedia].  
 
2013. Bump Load et Memento Mori [3D video].  
 
2013. Bump Load [mixed media: resin, aluminium, infrared cell, LED, programmed 
electronics, luminous fibre-optic fabric].  
 
2013. MeasuRages [3D video]. 
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2013. La liberté en écorchée [3D video]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i This is how ORLAN herself describes these pieces, for instance in her essay 
‘Ceci est mon corps... Ceci est mon logiciel’ [This is my body… This is my 
software] (1996: 90). 
ii ORLAN used paint on her body and on sheets during performance, as in La 
Tête de la Méduse, as well as in creating her series of posters for imaginary 
films throughout the 1980s. Yet she references canonical paintings including 
Gustave Courbet’s L’Origine du monde [Origin of the World] (1866) with 
photographic work rather than paint; her L’Origine de la Guerre [Origin of 
War] (1989) uses cibachrome printing and takes a penis rather than a vagina as 
its object.  
iii See Dominic Johnson’s essay ‘Psychic Weight’ (2010). Despite this, 
ORLAN’s work is often spoken of in the same breath as body art practitioners. 
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iv See Mary Kelly’s ‘Re-Viewing Modernist Criticism’ (1981).  
v This performance is described by Ince (2000: 32). 
vi This title includes a pun that is impossible to translate: ‘elle-même’ is 
replaced with the similar-sounding ‘elle m’aime’ [she loves herself].  
vii Femme avec Tête has gained notoriety recently as one of two major works 
(the other being the sculpture Bumpload (1989)) that ORLAN has referenced in 
attempting to sue Lady Gaga for plagiarising her ‘monde artistique’. Lady 
Gaga’s video and cover for her 2011 single Born This Way feature Gaga with a 
blunt blonde bob, two ‘bumps’ on either temple similar to those ORLAN 
inserted during Omniprésence, as well as her decapitated head similar to 
ORLAN’s in Femme avec Tête.  
viii Ince remarks similarly of ORLAN’s use of the head in a previous work: ‘I 
would suggest that there is a double gesture behind Orlan’s representation of 
her head in work since her photo portrait as the Bride of Frankenstein, which 
works firstly to assert women’s capacities of vision and language (capacities 
associated with the head and traditionally viewed as masculine), and secondly, 
to drive home that there is no rigid opposition between these attributes and 
those traditionally viewed as feminine. The head is a part of the body’ (Ince, 
2000: 88). 
ix The performance actually took place in April 1996, rather than in 1995 as this 
quotation states.  
x Kate Ince offers the following interpretation of ORLAN’s statement: ‘It 
seems much wiser and more appropriate not to endorse Orlan’s speculation 
about the obsolescence of the human body, but to consider cyborg as one of the 
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many identities she employs in her continuous process of discursive identity 
construction’ (2000: 98).  
xi ‘The body is obsolete, Stelarc and I spoke of this at the same time, at the 
same moment, it’s an idea we both agree upon. Effectively... our body is not, 
among other things, made for speed, is not made in order to speak several 
languages’ (O’Bryan, 2005: 142). A number of essays in Zylinska’s Cyborg 
Experiments (2005) explore this connection between ORLAN and Stelarc, and 
both Ince and O’Bryan briefly comment on it. 
xii Stelarc’s work integrates robotics and information and communications 
technologies with his body for instance in Exoskeleton (1992). Like ORLAN, 
he has also used medical technology in his project Extra Ear, which began in 
1998. His use of prosthetics here and in Third Hand (1990) and Virtual Arm 
(1992) claims to ‘augment the body’s architecture, engineering extended 
operational systems of bodies’ (this text from ‘Ear on Arm’ is published on 
Stelarc’s website).  
xiii Courtroom Exhibit: Costume for the Seventh Surgery-Performance (1993) 
records the robe as Prosser recalls, with ‘The body is but a costume’ 
emblazoned on its sleeve and with photographs of the surgical procedure 
pinned to it.  
xiv Prosser links his reading of ORLAN’s statement to Catherine Millot’s views 
on transsexuality in Horsexe (1989): ‘For transsexuals a book may be read by 
its cover, and the bodily frame is thought of as another article of clothing, to be 
retouched at will’ (1998: 63). Prosser explores the replication of these views in 
popular culture, for instance in the ‘transsexual’ serial killer of Silence of the 
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Lambs (1991), Buffalo Bill, who literally wears the skin of women he has 
killed.  
xv Lacan refers to ‘l’Hommelette’ in ‘Position de l’inconscient’ (Écrits, 1966).  
xvi Transgender theorist Sandy Stone alludes to a similar reading of ORLAN’s 
work, as I explore in the next section.  
xvii Lacan writes of the subject’s experience of ‘une image morcelée du corps’ 
[a fragmented image of the body] in ‘Le Stade du Miroir comme formateur de 
la fonction du Je’ [The Mirror Stage as formative of the function of the I], 
published in Écrits (1966: 97).  
xviii ‘Chaque opération-performance a été construite sur un texte philosophique 
ou psychanalytique, ou littéraire’ [Each operation-performance has been based 
on a philosophical, psychoanalytic or litterary text] (ORLAN, 1996: 90).   
xix O’Bryan interprets ORLAN’s consciousness as an attack on psychoanalysis: 
‘In short, Orlan should be applauded for insisting that consciousness, rather 
than unconsciousness, be the text of her performance surgeries. Consciousness 
is her ultimate weapon against psychoanalysis’ (O’Bryan, 2005: 141).  
xx ‘I have made myself both an object and a subject: I have searched for a 
certain flexibility in identity in order to reinvent myself. I inhabited the 
trenches separating flesh and imagery, the body and identity. I created 
ORLAN’ (ORLAN, 2010: 118).   
xxi Lacan discusses this distinction in Le Seminaire, livre XI: Les quatre 
concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse [Seminar XI: The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis] (1973). 
xxii Ince also understands ORLAN’s piece as critical of the Freudian 
understanding of the female body: ‘Orlan’s performance appears to have been a 
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direct allusion and challenge to the phallocentric representations of the sexed 
body found in Freud’s writings, and concentrated in ‘Medusa’s Head’ (2000: 
67).  
xxiii O’Bryan cites part of this quote in English translation in her chapter 
‘Beauty/The Monstrous Feminine’ as part of her reading of ORLAN’s Tête de 
la Méduse, which she links to the female grotesque and monstrosity.  
xxiv This figure is also adopted by Susan Stryker, in another foundational essay 
of transgender theory, ‘My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of 
Chamounix’ (1994). 
xxv McLuhan famously predicted the creation of the internet decades before its 
existence.  
xxvi Hoyer was the pen name of Ernst Ludwig Harthern-Jacobson.  
xxvii ‘F*** the Politics of Disempowerment in the Second Butler’ (2012).  
xxviii See Queer Zones 2: Sexpolitiques (2005a), 251-71. 
xxix Lacan’s discussion in this seminar appears in parts six and seven.  
xxx The most explicit instance of this prohibition is Leviticus 19:28, which 
forbids the memorialising of the dead by marking the body: ‘Ye shall not make 
any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you’. 
xxxi Dylan Evans’s summary of the Real in his Dictionary of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis links it to matter, biology and bodily materiality: ‘The real also 
has connotations of matter, implying a material substrate underlying the 
imaginary and the symbolic (see MATERIALISM). The connotations of matter 
also link the concept of the real to the realm of BIOLOGY and to the body in 
its brute physicality (as opposed to the imaginary and symbolic functions of the 
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body). For example the real father is the biological father, and the real phallus 
is the physical penis as opposed to the symbolic and imaginary functions of this 
organ’ (1996: 163).  
xxxii For example ‘For the flesh craves what is contrary to the Spirit, and the 
Spirit what is contrary to the flesh’ (Galatians 5: 17); or ‘Those who live 
according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh; but those who 
live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit’ (Romans 
8: 5). 
xxxiii Kate Ince writes that this skull was given to ORLAN by David Bowie 
(2000: 22).  
xxxiv Despite their similarity in this respect, Lacan and Nancy famously did not 
see eye to eye. Ian James notes Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
criticism in Le Titre de la lettre [The Title of the Letter] (1972), continued in 
Ego Sum, of Lacan’s account of subjectivity, to which Lacan responded by 
describing the pair as Derrida’s “underlings” (2006: 49). 
xxxv In La robe, the psychoanalytic work taken up by ORLAN, Lemoine-
Luccioni offers the refreshingly different opinion among Lacanian analysts that 
transsexuals are not psychotic: ‘le transsexuel n’est, par lui-même, ni forcément 
pervers, ni forcément psychotique’ [the transsexual is not, fundamentally, 
perverse, nor psychotic] (1983: 127). 
xxxvi Psychoanalytic accounts almost invariably focus on male-to-female 
transsexuality. 
xxxvii While Millot’s account remains the best-known thesis on transsexuality in 
psychoanalysis, it is useful to note Patricia Elliot’s overview of psychoanalytic 
clinicians’ divergent attitudes towards transsexuality. See Elliot’s entry 
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‘Psychoanalysis’ in the ‘Keywords’ issue of TSQ: Transgender Studies 
Quarterly (2014). 
xxxviii Morgan offers an overview of psychoanalytic discourse on transsexuality, 
beginning with the Freudian account of Schreber in 1911 and culminating in 
Millot’s Horsexe.  
xxxix Evans writes: ‘Lacan usually uses the term ‘penis’ to denote the real 
biological organ and reserves the term ‘phallus’ to denote the imaginary and 
symbolic functions of this organ. However, he does not always maintain this 
usage, occasionally using the term ‘real phallus’ to denote the biological organ, 
or using the terms ‘symbolic phallus’ and ‘symbolic penis’ as if they were 
synonymous (S4, 153). This apparent confusion and semantic slippage has led 
some commentators to argue that the supposed distinction between the phallus 
and the penis is in fact highly unstable and that ‘the phallus concept is the site 
of a regression towards the biological organ’ (Macey, 1988: 191)’ (1996: 144). 
xl ‘the real penis has an important role to play in the Oedipus complex of the 
little boy, for it is precisely via this organ that his sexuality makes itself felt in 
infantile masturbation; this intrusion of the real in the imaginary preoedipal 
triangle is what transforms the triangle from something pleasurable to 
something which provokes anxiety (S4, 225–6; S4, 341)’ (Evans, 1996: 144). 
xli Lacan’s claims that his theory of the signifier is a materialist theory are 
disputed by Derrida, who argues that Lacan’s concept of the letter betrays an 
implicit idealism. See ‘Le facteur de la vérité’ [The Postman of the truth], in La 
carte postale: De Socrate à Freud et au-delà [The Post Card: From Socrates to 
Freud and Beyond] (1980).  
 290 
Conclusion  
 
Queer Directions: Lessons from the French Context  
 
Abstract 
 
Given the unique and specific nature of the French political and theoretical 
context, the development of queer thinking within France offers wider lessons 
for queer thinking globally. This conclusion draws on my examination of the 
works of Paul B Preciado, Monique Wittig and ORLAN throughout this book 
to offer four key considerations for wider queer thought. I first ask how French 
queer activists negotiate the anti-identitarian impulse of queer theory given 
their pre-existing battle against the dominant political model of French 
Republican universalism. Secondly, I consider the roots of queer thinking in 
political anger – a bodily anger provoked by the HIV/AIDS crisis. Has the 
institutionalisation of queer thinking within the academies of the Anglophone 
world diluted this politically productive anger, and what can be learnt from the 
dynamism of queer thinking from France that has remained embedded in 
activist circles? Thirdly, I examine the ‘real-life’ impact of politically 
conservative readings of Lacanian thinking around sexual difference in France 
today, from debates on gay parenting to hostility towards transgender people 
and ‘gender theory’. I advocate creative and disobedient readings of figures 
such as Lacan, considering a more productive engagement between transgender 
theory and psychoanalysis. Finally, I argue for the importance of embracing the 
utopian ideals running through the works of Preciado, Wittig and ORLAN.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This book has asked what queer theory can learn from the French theoretical 
and political context. It has examined the emergence of queer thought in 
France, its response to Anglophone queer theory and the criticisms leveled 
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against it, particularly from the field of transgender theory. French queer 
thought is not simply a translation of pre-formed ideas imported wholesale 
from one discrete national context to another. Over the course of this book, I 
have demonstrated the ways in which queer theory in France has evolved 
within its specific national and linguistic context, informed by its own political 
climate and theoretical heritage. This conclusion offers some of the ‘lessons’ 
that queer theory more broadly can learn from considering the unique French 
context: lessons regarding identitarianism and universalism; the 
institutionalisation of queer theory; the ongoing political and subversive 
potential of queer work; queer theoretical directions and the tensions between 
anti-social and utopian tendencies in queer work. My thesis is that French 
queer work, due to its marginalised position on the fringes of the academy and 
within activist communities, offers a return to the roots of queer work in the 
US. These roots are embedded in the activism, political awareness and anger of 
the early years of the HIV crisis, as well as the utopianism of those working for 
change. 
 The dominant political model of Republican universalism in France is 
fiercely opposed to expressions of particularity – especially from either sexual 
or religious minorities. French queer writers are therefore particularly sensitive 
to universalising tendencies within queer theory (and adjacent disciplines 
including psychoanalysis). The AIDS crisis in the US also made clear the logic 
of, and violence effected by, universalist thinking. French queer work, 
likewise, offers strategies for negotiating the anti-identitarian impulse of queer 
theory alongside this deep suspicion of universalism. Following these models, 
it becomes clear that anti-identitarian politics need not mean universalism, but 
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rather should embrace the particularity and specificity of material bodies and 
contexts. 
Queer work from the French context displays an extraordinary 
dynamism, energy and appetite for subversion, including a disdain for 
academic conventions of either style or genre. This seems to have waned in the 
Anglophone context, and I ask whether this might be explained by the 
increasing institutionalisation of queer studies within universities in the UK, 
North America and Australia. Through work by Wojnarowicz from the midst 
of the HIV/AIDS crisis in the US, as well as early work from transgender 
theorist Susan Stryker, I suggest harnessing the productive potential of queer 
political anger from marginalised voices.  
The French context forcefully demonstrates that theory is not somehow 
removed from ‘real life’ or material violence – particularly against 
marginalised (particular) bodies. The influence of conservative readings of 
Lacan in France, and the real dangers this poses for queer sexualities and 
transgender individuals, illustrates this. It would be dangerous – not to mention 
ironic – to read queer theory’s ‘forefathers’, including Lacan, as the ‘Law’, the 
nom du père. But, rather than an oedipal drama in which Lacan must be 
dismissed entirely, as queer work in France often contends, work such as 
ORLAN’s, as well as that produced by transgender theorists, offers a model of 
playfully creative, disobedient and unfaithful readings that are happy to break 
the rules, disdainful of theoretical dogma. As such, criticisms from transgender 
theorists such as Prosser (that queer theory is inherently incapable of 
accounting for materiality due to its theoretical roots in poststructuralism) may 
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be answered: queer work need not remain faithful to theoretical edicts, 
including that of poststructuralism in its division of language and materiality.  
Finally, French work comments on the debates between anti-social and 
utopian tendencies in queer theory, epitomised by Lee Edelman’s No Future: 
Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004) on the one hand, and José Muñoz’s 
Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (2009) on the other. 
The rich history of socialist and feminist utopian thinking in the French 
context, as well as the commitment of French queer writers to activism and 
politics (for why engage in politics if you have no hope of a better future?) tips 
the balance towards the latter in French queer work. Preciado’s and ORLAN’s 
work both insist on radical political action in their work, putting their bodies on 
the line in the process. Wittig’s work in particular offers a model for a queer 
utopianism, insisting on the necessity of keeping one’s eye on the potentiality 
of blank spaces, the words that are yet to come.     
Drawing on the work of the authors and artists examined in this book, 
queer permeability offers an approach attuned to the material dimensions of 
theoretical work. Inspired by meetings between new materialist thinkers and 
queer work, it refuses the Cartesian separation of language and matter, instead 
following a monist account of discourse inseparable from material processes, 
environments and bodies. Its capacity to account for materiality is politically 
motivated, offering the ability to account for the material violence of discourse 
as it affects those on the margins of (or outside) society. In this way, queerness 
necessitates the unsecured borders of permeability and, conversely, recognises 
something particularly queer about the vulnerability of permeability. Queer 
permeability is not interested in the purism of untainted wholes, but rather 
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looks toward meetings of what may seem to be opposing systems 
(poststructuralism and new materialism, for instance). It is not interested in 
ideals, or universal abstractions (other than to dismantle them), but is 
committed to material particularity as well as to infidelity, creativity and 
thinking outside of the usual parameters.   
 
The Lesson of French Republican Universalism: The Importance of the 
Particular  
The impetus for this book came from identifying French queer theory’s 
concern for particular, material bodies. The political dominance of Republican 
universalism in France has resulted in forceful opposition to anything deemed 
‘identitatarian’; anything that would put ‘individual’ concerns before that of the 
state. This blindness to the particular remains dominant in France today, as 
evidenced by the language in which resistance to gay marriage was voiced, or 
by the law banning face coverings voted through in 2010. It is also evident in 
the ways in which queer theory has been viewed as tainting academia in 
France, as an outside (imperialist, or racialised)i threat, or as infecting the 
values of the Republic. Given the French state’s fiercely anti-identitarian 
position, queer theory’s dismantling of identity could be read as unwittingly 
allied to conservative French Republicanism’s silencing of difference. There 
has been forceful resistance from French queer writers to what is seen as the 
universalist tendencies of more recent Anglophone queer theory (Bourcier, 
2012), or of psychoanalysis. But anti-identitarianism need not mean 
universalism if we make a commitment to recognising particularity. Bourcier 
and Preciado take their lead from Wittig’s commitment to particularity 
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addressed most directly in her essay ‘The Point of View: Universal or 
Particular?’ (1980, republished in The Straight Mind). In addition, queer 
organising in France often uses the collocation of identity terms 
transpédégouine [transfaggotdyke], cleverly provoking the French distaste for 
specific groups while merging qualifiers to create a single noun, an anti-
identitarian umbrella term for sexual and gender dissidence. 
The HIV/AIDS crisis in the West underlined the deadly logic of 
universalism. In the US and the UK, the demographics seen to be at risk of 
HIV/AIDS were recognised as a particular threat to the universal ‘general 
public’. In France, however, the political dominance of Republican 
universalism meant a refusal to recognise particular demographics at all, with 
equally deadly consequences. In the US, the desire to neutralise this threat was 
evidenced by proposals for quarantine camps for homosexuals,ii or by elected 
politicians advocating shooting gay men as a way to prevent the spread of 
HIV.iii While these specific demographics were recognised, they were so only 
then to be deemed outside of the ‘general public’, as a particularity that might 
literally (materially) infect the universal. Both contexts can elucidate the logic 
of universalism, with the political environment in the US exposing the ways in 
which a virus or its symptoms (the lesions caused by Kaposi’s sarcoma, for 
instance) can become material signifiers of particularity.  
David Wojnarowicz’s writing describes the immense corporeal pressure 
of living with HIV and embodying particularity in this way, as well as a desire 
to impart it to the universal. He imagines spitting blow darts tipped in infected 
blood at health officials, politicians, and religious leaders. He imagines his 
body as a ‘blood-filled egg’ exploding outwards:  
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I’m carrying this rage like a blood-filled egg and there’s a line between 
the inside and the outside a thin line between thought and action and 
that line is simply made up of blood and muscle and bone (1991: 161) 
 
 
Wojnarowicz imagines his particular, HIV-infected blood breaching the 
borders of his skin; the ‘thin line’, ‘very thin line’ between exterior and interior 
may explode at any moment (1991: 161). In essence, he threatens to infect the 
universal with his particularity, rendering the borders of the universal 
permeable by breaching those of his own body. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 12 HERE]  
     
Andreas Sterzing: David Wojnarowicz (Silence=Death) (1989)   
Courtesy of the artist and P.P.O.W. Gallery, New York   
 
The logic of universalism is one that silences the particular, refusing its 
existence. The title of Andreas Sterzing’s portrait of Wojnarowicz, Silence = 
Death, makes clear what is at stake in universalism’s blindness to particularity. 
The material violence of this logic is confronted in the portrait above: if at first 
the violent image of Wojnarowicz’s lips sewn together suggests that he is 
silenced, the way in which his gaze arrests the viewer certainly does not. But 
furthermore, the very mechanism that would silence him fails: the wounds 
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around the stitching in his lips are not staunched, but flow with his blood that 
carries the HIV virus, exuding a material signifier of particularity that cannot 
be contained. Universalist logic is not ‘watertight’, but dependent on silencing 
the particularity that would undermine it. The dominant political climate of 
Republican universalism in France has led thinkers emerging from this context 
(including Preciado, Bourcier and, especially, Wittig) to cultivate methods of 
undermining universalism, of developing insights into how the silencing effects 
of universal reason and politics might be identified and resisted. The works I 
have examined in this book not only acknowledge particularity, but use it to 
dismantle the edifices of the universal.   
The question of the body has been explored extensively in 20th-century 
French thinking especially, challenging the legacy of Descartes’s dualist 
account of bodies that had dominated French thought. By privileging 
universalist rational thought as the sole marker of humanity and rendering the 
body beyond knowledge, Descartes’s philosophical ‘method of doubt’ 
effectively eliminated particularity: bodies, and indeed anything other than 
universal rational truths, become practically synonymous with doubt. The 
foundation upon which Descartes builds his rationalist philosophy (his 
epistemic method of doubt) is an exercise in abstract universalising from which 
the cogito is proclaimed to be irrefutable, and yet from which one’s own body 
becomes the source of doubt. The HIV/AIDS crisis emphasised the importance 
of understanding the relation between bodily matter and politicised discourse: 
the HIV virus and its symptoms were flooded with moralising discourse, 
meaning and ideology. Permeability offers a model to describe this relation 
between meaning and materiality; a means of analysis able to account for the 
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violence of dominant ideologies acting on particular bodies; and, finally, a 
mode of resistance to universalist discourse. From Cartesian rationalism to 
French Republicanism, universalism is not only opposed to the particular, but 
relies on the exclusion of particularities that are designated as bodily and 
material. Queer thinking must avoid this trap of universalism, and do justice to 
the particularity of marginalised bodies it has always been allied to.   
Preciado, Wittig and ORLAN all offer ways to voice particular bodies. 
In opposition to Nancy’s or Butler’s view of the material body as impermeable 
to discourse, their work focuses on penetrability, permeability and rupture. 
Each insists on a radical transitivity between material bodies and discourse, 
texts or language. For Monique Wittig, the refusal to acknowledge the material 
is commensurate with an inability to recognise particularity. She identifies that 
the universal (for her, the ‘straight mind’) abstracts the material and the 
particular as a means of denying its existence. Each of the figures I have 
considered in this book embraces the exploration of the material body through 
their writing or visual work. Their works refuse the notion that nothing at all 
can be grasped of the material body. They deploy the material body to produce 
meaning, with all three figures’ insistence on the materiality of the body and 
their emphasis on particular bodies (whether transgender, lesbian or female) 
being politically motivated. All recognise and seek to elucidate the impact of 
dominant ideology on marginalised bodies. What renders their work 
persistently queer is their insistence on embodying particularity, over and 
above attempts to dismantle the universal or to demonstrate how it is 
constructed on its own terms – an exercise that often amounts to the linguistic 
monism described by Butler. By embodying particularity, these figures haunt 
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the logic of universalism that depends on silencing and denying the particular. 
While all will risk using universalising metaphor and abstract rhetoric, they 
refuse to abandon their particularity. This particularity persists as doubt, a kind 
of pervasive hyperbolic doubt, conjuring monstrous and queer ‘cogitos’ in the 
form of decapitated philosophers, lesbians who are not women, or women who 
transform themselves into women-as-Medusa’s head; figures that materially 
inhabit this hyperbolic doubt rather than seeking to overcome it. 
 
Politics, Materiality: Queer Rage  
This book investigates a critical moment in the development of queer theory in 
France, a moment that asks questions of queer theory globally. Queer thought 
in France remains marginalised in universities, having emerged outside of the 
academy amongst activist groups. This politically grounded nascence has 
produced texts recalling the energy and urgency of queer political writing from 
the height of the AIDS crisis in the US. Queer theory in the US, at its roots, 
emerged as a result of the political anger and dynamism resulting from the 
AIDS crisis. The energy of queer activism at this moment was dedicated to 
understanding the devastating material, bodily impact of ideology around this 
illness and the demographics it affected. It seems unavoidable to ask whether 
or not this political urgency exists in Anglophone queer thought today, and if 
not, how far this can be explained by queer theory’s increasing 
institutionalisation and establishment as an academic discipline as well as the 
gap between queer academic work and activism. 
I have suggested that at its heart, queer theory began as the theorisation 
of an illness, of HIV/AIDS. The consideration of illness turns attention to the 
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materiality of the body, interrupting the possibility of universal philosophical 
meditations of a mind divorced from the body. Turning to work around illness, 
as I have through Montaigne’s or Nancy’s discussion of their respective 
conditions, or through Dustan’s, Guibert’s or Wojnarowicz’s writing around 
HIV, can take queer thinking back to the political necessity to account for the 
material body at its roots. Queer theory must be conversant with other 
disciplines that seek to account for particular embodied experience and 
materiality. As such, turning to the emerging areas of disability studies and crip 
theory, as well as to new materialist enquiries is a particularly exciting prospect 
for queer studies.  
Just as illness turns attention to the material body, so too does the 
consideration of transgender and transsexual experience. This is not only a 
concern of heightened subjective affect: both the experiences of people with 
HIV/AIDS and transsexual or transgender individuals expose the effects of 
dominant ideology on marginalised bodies. Such experiences are often 
described as producing a political anger imagined as emanating from the body, 
as inseparable from it: the ‘rage’ that Wojnarowicz describes as embodied, 
threatens the borders of his body. For Wojnarowicz, political rage is described 
as bodily permeability, with his own body becoming a weapon: his ‘hands 
become weapons, every bone and muscle and fiber and ounce of blood become 
weapons’ (81). 
Susan Stryker’s seminal account of the rage induced by gender 
dysphoria is just as embodied as that of Wojnarowicz’s, outlined above. In the 
poem she includes within her essay ‘My words to Victor Frankenstein’ she 
writes that ‘Rage gives me back my body’ (1994: 247). Again, like 
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Wojnarowicz, rage renders her body permeable: ‘Rage colors me as it presses 
in through the pores of my skin, soaking in until it becomes the blood that 
courses through my beating heart’ (247). The rage described in both the HIV 
writing of Wojnarowicz and the transgender writing of Stryker charges their 
bodies with a political necessity. This is a particular rage: that is, the rage of 
particular, bodily experience resulting from the violence done to marginalised 
bodies by universal discourse. Queer permeability seeks not only to account for 
but to harness this rage.    
Universal discourse is experienced as stultifying and silencing. Wittig 
imagines scenes of stasis, freezing and drowning in Le Corps lesbien to 
imagine the relation of particular to universal. Stryker’s particular experience 
of gender dysphoria produces a rage whereby she imagines herself drowning, 
silenced. The water surrounding her smothers and suffocates, mirroring the 
effects of universal logic on particular bodies. It is omnipresent: ‘I suck for air 
– and find only more water. My lungs are full of water. Inside and out I am 
surrounded by it’ (248). Furthermore, it denies, ‘annihilates’ particular 
experience: ‘This water annihilates me. I cannot be, and yet – an excruciating 
impossibility – I am’ (248).  
Finally, Stryker describes in response a rage that allows her to take on 
sound and movement against this water surrounding her: ‘rage is the force that 
moves me’ (247). Wojnarowicz’s anger informs and drives his writing and 
visual art, lending him a voice against the dominant discourse of politicians, 
media and religion. Rage also allows Stryker to find a voice out of silence:  
 
[Rage] throws my head back 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pulls my lips back over my teeth  
opens my throat 
and rears me up to howl: 
: and no sound  
dilutes  
the pure quality of my rage. 
(248). 
 
Descartes’s method of hyperbolic doubt described in his Meditations 
leads him to a kind of uncertainty he likens to the sensation of drowning. He 
dismisses the sensation, turning away from doubt by pronouncing the universal 
certainties of the cogito in opposition to his body. Stryker’s response to the 
groundlessness of drowning is to embrace it, finding a rage within that returns 
her to her body, offering her a voice to express her particular experience. Queer 
theory must embrace the political rage and energy of particular bodies, as well 
as the doubt the body casts on universal reason. Both Stryker and Wojnarowicz 
here offer a way of understanding the experience of universality as it acts on 
particular bodies. Queer theory would benefit from listening to rage such as 
Wojnarowicz’s and Stryker’s: the rage of minoritised bodies, rage that renders 
them politicised, energised and with a corporeal knowledge of dominant 
discourse. It must turn its attention to the bodily exploitation of the most 
vulnerable, and pay more attention to activist groups – to who is getting angry 
and why – engaging with these concerns not as an object of study but as part of 
the same struggle. Queer permeability has, through its elaboration in the 
analysis of Preciado’s, Wittig’s and ORLAN’s work throughout this book, 
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been shown to contain a definite violence: from Preciado’s auto-vivisection, to 
Wittig’s dismembered lesbian bodies and ORLAN’s surgical work. Such 
violence would not be possible without a particular rage that offers a way to 
return to material bodies, to the concerns of those who find their bodies 
infiltrated by universal discourse. Rage gives voice to particularity, to a 
necessarily embodied particularity.  
 
Rethinking Theory: Breaking the Rules, Breaking the ‘Law’ 
The French context urgently establishes theoretical work as political: it is not in 
any way removed from politics and ‘real life’ but can inflict material violence, 
especially against marginalised bodies. The ambiguity over the status of the 
material body and sexual difference in Lacan’s work explored in chapter four 
has material implications for minority sexualities and transgender people, 
nowhere more so than in France. Lacan’s work has been taken up by the most 
socially conservative voices in France, from the debates on homoparentalité 
and the PACS before it was introduced in 1999, to more recent arguments over 
the legislation for gay marriage. The French government sought numerous 
testimonies of psychoanalysts during the discussions over gay marriage in 
France in November 2012, during which work including Lacan’s was appealed 
to as an authority, a ‘Law’ not to be broken. Psychoanalysis remains the focus 
of clinical psychology within universities in France, and psychoanalytic bodies 
are often represented on government health panels. The issue is perhaps most 
relevant to transsexual and transgendered people in France, since 
psychoanalysis offers the dominant mode of discourse regarding transsexuality 
in France. While psychoanalysis may be deployed in Anglophone (American) 
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debates in queer theory on transgender and transsexuality as a theoretical issue, 
in France a centralised health service where psychoanalysts’ associations 
participate in working groups organised by the Ministry of Health and where 
psychoanalytic discourse is highly influential in political debates renders the 
material stakes of such conversations vastly different. Indeed, the specificity of 
transgender and transsexual experience in France in light of this has been 
highlighted by Todd W Reeser in his article ‘Trans France’ (2013), in which he 
notes that ‘France is viewed as lagging far behind other European countries in 
terms of trans rights and care’ (7).iv  
The interventions of psychoanalysts in the PACS debate often focused 
on homoparentalité and sexual difference. Of numerous examples, the 
Lacanian analyst Jean-Pierre Winter argues in ‘Gare aux enfants 
symboliquement modifiés’ [Beware of symbolically-modified Children] that 
for the child of gay parents: 
 
before even having access to language, he will be faced with an 
impossibility: that his own life results from a fertile union between two 
people of the same sex. How will he be able to answer the question 
‘where do children come from?’ that is so determinant for his future as 
a reasonable being [pour son avenir d’être doué de raison], if he is 
confronted with a socially legitimized situation which excludes the only 
real allowing him to separate his unconscious fantasies from his 
conscious faculties: the anatomical difference of the sexes [qui exclut le 
seul réel lui permettant de séparer ses fantasmes inconscients de ses 
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facultés conscientes: la différence anatomique des sexes]? (cited in 
Robcis, 2004: 118)v  
 
Knowledge of sexual difference is linked to heterosexual reproduction, and 
both are tied inextricably to the capacity for the child to reason, to acquire 
rationality.vi In ‘Homoparentalité et refus du réel’ [Gay parenting and denial of 
the Real] (2010), Winter is clearer regarding the denial of sexual difference he 
sees as necessitated by gay parenting. Very much in contrast to the ambiguity 
present in Lacan’s work, he writes: 
 
la différence des sexes, en tant qu’elle est indissociablement liée à la 
différence des générations, est à la fois réelle, symbolique et imaginaire. 
Ainsi en va-t-il également de la différence entre la vie et la mort. Et 
chacun le sait bien. (2010)  
 
[sexual difference, in as far as it is inseparable from the difference 
involved in procreation, is at once real, symbolic and imaginary. As 
such, it is also the difference between life and death. And everyone 
knows this very well.] 
 
In a total dilution of Lacan’s position, sexual difference and heterosexual 
reproduction are simple and commonsense fact, which it would not only be 
foolish to deny but which constitute a question of life or death.  
This theoretical language resisting gay marriage in France spanned the 
political spectrum. While important figures on the political left in France such 
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as Elisabeth Guigou similarly claimed the need for children to have a parental 
model of sexual difference, Catholic intellectuals used very similar theoretical 
terms of sexual difference, warning of ‘the violent narcissism of 
homosexuality, the imminent risk of psychosis in same-sex parenting (given 
the foreclosure of the paternal signifier), and the social and psychic 
deregulation that would ensue if same-sex unions became legal’ (2015a: 919).  
Finally, French Republican rhetoric collides with psychoanalytic 
arguments in the work of Michel Schneider in a nationalist defense of sexual 
differentiation. Schneider argues for what he sees as the French Republican 
approach to sexual difference as a ‘middle way’ between two extremes: that is, 
American individualism on the one hand and Islamic fundamentalism on the 
other. Schneider’s argument is that the American imposition of gay marriage as 
part of a ‘politics of recognition’ denies sexual difference (again reduced to 
reproductive heterosexuality). Likewise, Islamic fundamentalism is also unable 
to accept a non-hierarchical differentiation between the sexes: it falls to France 
then, to bear the responsibility of demonstrating to the world that ‘an 
asymmetry is not necessarily an inequality’: it is therefore imperative that 
France does not accept gay marriage (Robcis, 2004: 124). As bizarre as this 
argument may seem, this ‘oscillation between the American and the totalitarian 
“extremes” actually proved to be one of the most powerful rhetorical devices 
throughout the PACS discussions’ (130). This turn to nationalism marks France 
as the ‘middle way’ between two societal ‘extremes’ (US liberalism and 
totalitarianism). It embeds the defense of sexual difference as the defense of 
national identity – and even national security – against totalitarian or 
fundamentalist ideals.  
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This maelstrom of Republicanism and French psychoanalysis has 
influenced ‘global’ heavyweights of philosophy. Taking up a strikingly similar 
argument, the Lacanian theorist Slavoj Žižek argued during a lecture at the 
LSE in 2016 against two ‘extremes’ in the understanding of sexual 
difference.vii He describes an individualist, neo-liberal and American account 
of sexual difference characterised by the ‘bathroom debate’ in the US – that is, 
the recent legislation in a number of states of the US aimed at transgender 
individuals, requiring the use of bathrooms designated for the sex one is 
assigned at birth and subsequent campaigns by civil rights groups against such 
laws. Echoing some Marxist arguments of the recent past regarding ‘bourgeois’ 
homosexuality, he stated: ‘It’s easy to see how transgenderism or even 
postgenderism fits perfectly our late capitalist subjectivity’. For Žižek, the 
resistance to these laws by activist groups, and particularly the demand for 
gender-neutral facilities amounts to a denial of sexual difference and a desire 
for uniformity that he also identifies in Boko Haram. In Žižek’s reading, like 
Schneider’s, Boko Haram represents Islamic fundamentalism’s inability to 
accept a non-hierarchical sexual difference. For Žižek, ‘both [Boko Haram and 
‘transgenderism’] want to get rid of sexual antagonism [...] they want harmony’ 
– one wants a clear and hierarchical difference between men and women, one 
wants no difference at all. Again, Lacanian thought is deployed to produce an 
imperative to defend sexual difference (this time imagined at least, more 
faithfully to Lacan, as an antagonism rather than a certainty or ground for 
knowledge).  
Upon this evidence, it is easy to understand why French queer theory 
has rejected psychoanalysis wholesale. Yet the capacity of psychoanalysis to 
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consider gendered and sexed accounts of subjectivity and identity should not be 
abandoned by queer or gender theorists as a result of its most normative 
interpretations. Fortunately there has been a recent and productive interest in 
the consideration of transgender questions from Lacanians including Jacqueline 
Rose, as well as interest in psychoanalysis from transgender studies, with the 
fourth issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly dedicated to the theme of 
‘Transgender and Psychoanalysis’.viii This engagement between transgender 
theory and psychoanalysis is all the more necessary in France where 
psychoanalytic conceptions of sexual difference are certainly not abstract 
debates for many, in the way they seem to be for some within Anglophone 
theory. Despite the much more conservative stance of many of his followers, 
Lacan’s work itself does offer radical possibilities for thinking sexed 
embodiment. There is enough ambiguity and contradiction in Lacan’s work 
that singular or ‘correct’ readings of Lacan appear contradictory in themselves. 
And neither should ‘correct’ readings be sought: the ‘truth’ according to Lacan 
does not exist, and in any case queer theory need not play by his rules. 
The moments of genuinely radical thought expressed by Lacan with 
regard to sexed embodiment have recently been exploited by transgender 
theorists: most recently, for example, work by Patricia Gherovici (2010; 2017); 
Shanna T Carlson (2010) and Oren Gozlan (2014) has deployed psychoanalytic 
theories in order to consider trans embodiment and subjectivity anew. Carlson 
follows Tim Dean’s interest in the disruptive, queer potential of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Yet unlike Dean, she sees the ‘divorcing of gender from 
unconscious sexuation’ as the ‘the logical consequence’ of reading Lacan 
(2013: 60). The analyst Oren Gozlan has reconsidered psychoanalytic 
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approaches to transgender embodiment and the desire for surgery, offering 
welcome approaches that contrast to the singular narrative of transsexuals as 
seeking to embody a totalising completeness, as imagined by Catherine Millot. 
Gozlan imagines trans surgery as signifying an alternative to heterosexual 
reproduction ‘a rebirth that resists an origin […] a birthing of the self that is not 
tied to the phantasy of reproduction, whose aim is not unity via procreation or 
continuity through lineage’ (2014: 50).  
It would be hard not to compare this notion of rebirthing oneself 
separated from the origins of the Mother or the Father to ORLAN’s Orlan 
accouche d’elle-m’aime (1964), and perhaps even more so to her re-imagining 
of the mirror stage in her ‘Manifeste de l’Art Charnel’:  
 
Désormais je peux voir mon propre corps ouvert sans en souffrir!… Je 
peux me voir jusqu’au fond des entrailles, nouveau stade du miroir. ‘Je 
peux voir le cœur de mon amant et son dessin splendide n’a rien à voir 
avec les mièvreries symboliques habituellement dessinées pour le 
représenter’. 
‘Chérie, j’aime ta rate, j’aime ton foie, j’adore ton pancréas et la ligne 
de ton fémur m’excite.’ 
[I can observe my own body cut open without any suffering!…I can see 
myself all the way down to my viscera, a new mirror stage. I can see to 
the heart of my lover and its splendid design has got nothing to do with 
the soppy symbols usually drawn. 
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‘Darling, I love your spleen, I love your liver, I adore your pancreas and 
the line of your femur excites me.’]  
 
ORLAN’s work once more shares similar concerns to those of transgender and 
transsexual theorists in notions of rebirth and bodily resignification. The 
eroticised description of the body’s interior – strikingly similar to Wittig’s Le 
Corps lesbien – embraces the corps morcelé and again rejects the equation of 
bodily matter with the Real. ORLAN’s notion of the ‘nouveau stade du miroir’ 
is left provocatively open, and it is instances such as this, or her mise-en-scène 
of the castration complex in Tête de la Méduse, that offer a model of reading 
Lacan critically that may be put to work in reconsidering queer and transgender 
accounts of embodied subjectivity. It is precisely this kind of model for reading 
Lacan – reading with the spirit of invention and possibility rather than 
obedience to his texts – that queer theory may also employ fruitfully. 
If transgender theory can find academic inspiration in the work of 
Lacan himself, it need not disregard queer theory due to its grounding in 
Lacanian or poststructuralist thought. However, the ‘blind spot’ displayed in 
relation to the materiality of the body by these disciplines – as well as by queer 
theory – together with their overstatement of the difficulties in gaining any 
appreciation of the body, should be regarded critically and with care by any 
theory seeking to account for the material body, especially the vulnerability of 
marginalised bodies. Queer theory must not become a theory of sexuality that 
follows theoretical dogma, including that of poststructuralism’s insistence on 
the separation of language and materiality.    
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Making space for Utopia 
 
Finally, for all its political anger and persistent imagery of violence, queer 
thinking emerging from France is unerringly utopian. In fact, its utopian 
qualities are often inextricable from its investment in violent imagery: Wittig’s 
grenades do not simply destroy old and laden linguistic forms for the sake of it, 
but to clear new ground for new possibilities. Preciado does not perform his 
autodecapitation out of nihilism, but to imagine new and less oppressive 
futures. ORLAN’s work playfully, humorously, but deadly seriously calls for 
us to rattle the bars of the cage and wake up to new realities.  
France has a rich history of utopianism, strands of which can be seen in 
the revolutionary governments of the early 1790s, the socialist movement of 
‘Icarians’ who followed Étienne Cabet to the US to set up communes in 1848, 
as well as the Paris commune of 1871. Feminist utopianism in France began 
with Christine de Pizan’s Le Livre de la Cité des Dames [The Book of the City 
of Ladies] (1405), which imagines a utopian city constructed by the stories of 
exemplary women. It continued in the 1970s with the psychoanalytic strand of 
feminism in France espoused by those associated with Psych et Po daring to 
imagine new economies of thought: Cixous’s orange, or Irigaray’s (ironic or 
not) vulvic model. Representing a very different feminist approach, Wittig’s 
materialist, separatist feminism is perhaps the most utopian of all. Often seen 
only for its negativity, lesbian separatism is by definition utopian in imagining 
the possibility of a radically different and improved societal dynamic. This 
political heritage lends itself to the kind of utopian thinking espoused by 
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Preciado, who I have previously argued rejects the anti-social tendencies of 
queer theory, epitomised by work such as Edelman’s No Future (Evans, 2015). 
Instead, he calls in his work for innovative methodologies of bodily 
experimentation through radical manifestos, drag workshops and queer calls to 
arms.  
Where queer theory in the Anglophone academy has acquired a 
somewhat jaded outlook, French queer thinking has retained a utopian strand, 
calling for us to look out for new words for utopian possibilities that cannot be 
grasped yet, but will one day blacken out the sky as they fall to earth like 
Wittig’s samares; for the impossibilities of birthing ourselves or for speaking 
as a decapitated philosopher. Like Wittig’s self-named character in Virgile, 
non, theorists must keep striving to find the words for new possibilities so far 
from the normative they can only be glimpsed as yet:  
 
 
Je tends vers toi, mon beau paradis, du plus profond de l’enfer, bien que 
je ne te connaisse que par éclairs et que si les mots me manquent tu 
disparais comme dans une hémorragie à l’envers. (Wittig, 1985: 64) 
 
[I reach out towards you, my beautiful Paradise, from the very depths of 
Hell, although I know you only in flashes, and if words fail me you 
disappear like a haemorrhage in reverse. (55)] 
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i See Robcis (2015: 457).  
ii Quarantine camps were not only discussed or proposed, but actually balloted: 
a proposal was fortunately voted down in the state of California in 1986 
(Feldman & Miller, 1998: 22).  
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iii Wojnarowicz mentions the governor of Texas’s recommendation: ‘“If you 
want to stop AIDS, shoot the queers”’ (1991: 161). 
iv Reeser highlights the French state and its importance in trans narratives in 
France: ‘In the current French context, these types of discursive conventions 
that flatten out differences among trans subjects may be directed not toward a 
specific clinician but toward the nation state which requires a number of 
normalizing criteria for an official change of sex – including sterility (e.g. a 
transman cannot get pregnant) and heterosexuality (e.g. a transwoman cannot 
be a lesbian)’ (2013: 13). He writes that ‘French universalism is defined as 
inherently cisgender’ (10) and suggests that trans individuals feel a sense of 
‘lying outside the nation’ (13).  
v Winter is cited in Camille Robcis’s article ‘How the Symbolic Became 
French: Kinship and Republicanism in the PACS Debates’ (2004), linking the 
influence of Lacan and Lévi-Strauss to the language of the symbolic in debates 
surrounding the introduction of the PACS.   
vi In a similar vein, yet somewhat more extreme, Françoise Héritier followed 
the work of Lévi-Strauss to argue that homoparentalité, in confusing sexual 
difference, would quite literally undermine the capacity for rational thought: 
‘What I have tried to show is that the anatomical, physiological, and functional 
difference of the sexes – by functional, I mean the fact that it is the woman who 
carries the children – is at the basis of the fundamental opposition which allows 
us to think. Because thinking is first of all classifying, classifying is essentially 
discriminating, and the fundamental discrimination is based on sexual 
difference. It is an irreducible fact: we cannot claim that these differences do 
not exist; they are the unsurpassable limits of thought [butoirs indépassables de 
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la pensée], like the opposition between day and night. Our modes of thinking 
and our social organization are hence founded on the principal observation of 
the sexes’ (cited in Robcis, 2004: 116-7).  
vii ‘Against the Double Blackmail: Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with 
the Neighbours’, 20 April 2016. This later became the title of a book, the 
content of which does not however map onto that of the lecture.  
viii Rose, ‘Who do you think you are?’ (2016).  
